

THE
CHRISTIAN REVIEW.

No. CII.—OCTOBER, 1860.

ARTICLE I.—ARE OUR NECESSARY CONCEPTIONS
OF GOD RELIABLE?

IN the April number of this Review (pp. 323-334) our readers will find a convenient and an accurate syllabus of Mr. Mansel's "*Limits of Religious Thought*," presenting not only the aim of his argument, but also in what regard he has come short of his aim, or overshot it. The most momentous question which Mr. Mansel suggests, but which he does not formally discuss nor distinctly recognize, is that which heads this article. The careful reader of the syllabus above referred to, or of the book which it epitomizes, will feel that particular statements of Mr. Mansel, and even ground principles in his discussion, might be adduced on either side of this inquiry. The philosophical doctrines of Natural Realism, which give such lofty tone and vigor to the writings of Sir Wm. Hamilton, and the theological value of which is so abundantly recognized by Mr. Mansel, would demand an affirmative response; while the ambiguous (to use the mildest epithet) maxim of the relativity of all human knowledge, interpreted by Mr. Mansel to mean the solely *regulative* force of moral truth, seems to be arrayed against it, just as realism and relativity seem themselves to be arrayed against each other. But the simple question as to the validity and exact value of our neces-

sary conceptions, does not appear to have come distinctly before either of these great authors, or at least has not received from either a positive or direct answer. We write this sentence with unfeigned regret. It would be difficult to give due expression to our sense of the intimate and interdependent relations of religion with philosophy, or to overstate our estimate of the immense service rendered to each of these by Sir William Hamilton, by unanimous consent the greatest thinker of the century. Hence the amazement and pain with which we reluctantly record our belief that he who has furnished the strongest materials and the wisest method wherewith to construct the defences of Christianity, has also supplied, through inconsequent and dangerous admissions, the most powerful means for undermining and overthrowing them.

Enough, however, of this for the present. To pursue it further now would be aside from our immediate purpose. The inquiry taken as our theme is pressed upon us by the current discussions in speculative theology, especially by those which have been started by Mr. Mansel and his critics, and we at once proceed to give our own answer, with the reasons for it.

I. Let us first seek an exact understanding of the question. When, now, inquest is made as to the reliability of our necessary conceptions of God, it is intended that attention shall be directed rather to the manner of forming these conceptions than to their matter. It is assumed throughout this examination, that we employ all available materials, from whatever source, to build up and perfect our idea of Jehovah, — the analogies of our own spiritual being, the testimonies of science, the declarations of the Bible, the person and life of Christ. But our very mental and moral constitution compels us to use these materials after certain fixed and necessary methods, — imposes upon us laws of thought whose action and dominion we can neither escape nor resist. It is these laws and methods that demand chief consideration in our present inquiry.

1. In forming a conception of any object, and so in forming a conception of God, we are compelled to start with our own being. Our notion of ourself is the basis, — the ground-

conception in all our thinking ; and we know other objects only as we compare them with and distinguish them from ourselves. More than this, we can know only those objects which are analogous to ourselves, and we must know these by their analogies. Analogy of existence between the subject and object of thought, is a universal condition of human knowledge. Man must represent, in the circle of his own being, all in the universe of which he can frame any conception. He is and must be a microcosm, if he is to know the macorcosm. What does not participate in his nature is to him inconceivable.

We are not certain that there is here more than a verbal disagreement with Sir William Hamilton, who condemns the postulate that "the relation of knowledge infers the analogy of existence." (*Hamilton's Reid*, p. 300 ; *Discussions on Philosophy*, &c., p. 67 ; *Lectures on Metaphysics*, p. 351.) We are certain, however, that no conception or definition of the human mind is defensible which regards it as other than *embodied* spirit ; and to man, body is equally essential and constituent with spirit. What is possible to disembodied or bodiless spirit we cannot tell, because such mode of existence is itself inconceivable by us, and that for the simple reason that it is foreign to our experience. Now in every act of the human mind, it is not too much to say that the whole mind acts, body and spirit each furnishing its own factor, in every intellectual product. Nor is it possible to think how we could apprehend that which had nothing whatever in common with either element of our complex nature.

We know material objects by means of material bodies and bodily senses, which bring us into definite relations with other matter. He who is deprived by birth of any one bodily sense, is thereby deprived of all knowledge which comes through that sense. One blind man insisted that scarlet color was like the sound of a trumpet ; another denied that there was any more darkness in his eyes than in the back of his hand. Like deprivation of all our bodily senses would necessarily reduce our knowledge of matter to nothing.

The same law holds in spiritual knowledge. Our conception of spirit and its attributes must be based upon our con-

ception of ourselves as spirits. If we were not conscious of power, and thought, and knowledge, and will, in ourselves, we could never receive any notion of such spiritual energies in others, and we must conceive that these are in others analogous to what they are in us.

So in thinking of God, we are compelled to think of Him as in some sort like ourselves. It is a conception necessary with us that holiness, justice, will, wisdom, power, love, thought, should be in Him analogous to what they are in us. We have no other way of thinking; no other way of thinking is conceivable by us. Our necessary conception of God, as of every other object of knowledge, rests upon our conception of our own being.

2. It is further obvious that whatever materials we may use in building up our conception of God, we must use in accordance with the laws of human thought. It is true that while we must think of God as in some sort like ourselves, we need not to think of him as altogether such. Although the basis of our conception is our own being, yet we can enlarge, correct, complete this, and thus rise to the conception of a being infinitely above ourselves. Only, in so doing we are ever controlled by the necessary and unescapable conditions of all human thinking. An immediate or intuitive beholding of God is a figment of the philosophers. We must needs be like Him to *see* Him as He is. But through inferences forced upon us and vindicated by the constitution of our being, we do reach a conception of Him.

Our own personality is the basis of our conception of the Divine Personality. How do we reach a notion of the former? It is not an immediate intuition, alike clear and convincing to the reflecting and unreflecting, by a simple introspection of the mind. A perception of the several acts of the mind,—as thinking, willing, believing,—is immediate and convincing in the clear light of consciousness. But personality lies below consciousness, and our notion of it is an inference from these direct perceptions. Assuming our spiritual endowments, our intellectual and moral attributes, as unquestionable facts, Logic, whose dominion is absolute over every movement of the soul, constructs them into a series of premises, and weaves

out of them an irresistible argument, by which we are forced to find their unity and their vitality, and their significance in our personality. And yet the inference, because it is an inference, is no less valid than the premises from which it is drawn. For this pertains to the laws of thought, that there is all the necessity and authority attaching to a clear deduction from assured premises that there is to a clear perception.

So in our conception of God, we apprehend his personality through his attributes. His attributes are the manifestations of Himself by the various relations He has established with the universe, and we reach a notion of them by correcting, purifying, perfecting, our conceptions of our own attributes. But we do not confound the Divine Personality or essential Being, which is the archetype of our own, with the divine attributes, nor make it a mere collection of these. It is that of which these are simply the manifestations. It is that eternal and all-perfect spiritual Being, whose independent, self-existent, self-sufficient life, is the last analysis of our conception of God. Through the relations and along the attributes which reveal the Godhead, as along rays of living light, we travel back to the uncreated Sun,—the “I AM” from everlasting to everlasting. And our conclusion is no less certain than the grounds on which it rests; nor are these last less certain than the existence of our spiritual energies which discovered them. When we reach the furthest verge, the last limit of thought, Logic—Reason—passes into Faith; nay, Reason necessitates and commands Faith, and in the serene transfigured rest of the soul, confirmed by the encompassing cloud of reasonable witnesses, we yield to the voice from the throne—“He that cometh unto God must believe that He is.”

We arrest the discussion here to notice some striking facts which disclose themselves as we endeavor to frame the highest possible conception of Jehovah.

(1.) The difference between the christian and heathen conceptions of God lies in the difference of materials with which each is constructed, and not in the method of construction. The ground-conception is the same in each case,—our own being. And this is necessarily so, for all men, in virtue of the

fact that they are men, must think or philosophize after the same manner. The contents of our thoughts respecting any object may vary, but the laws which govern thought remain ever and universally the same. And so the old Greek, after projecting himself for God, had scanty means for discriminating between what was essential to a perfect being and what in himself was the work of sin. Nor was he able to elevate his conception above the finite. We are blessed above the Greek in our resources, and so saved from fatal error; but we must employ our resources after the same method.

(2.) No two men have precisely the same conception of God, because no two men have equally mastered and wrought into their conception all that is revealed of God. One man has more carefully canvassed the testimonies of physical science; another has more profoundly explored the intellectual and moral nature of man; another has weighed more justly the positive declarations of Scripture; still another has learned more of Jesus Christ, who was the fulness of the Godhead bodily, the express image of the personal and invisible Jehovah. Each of these sources discloses somewhat of the divine nature not found in the others; each testifies of God and reveals Him, and each must supply material for that symmetrical conception which shall nearest approximate the truth. Of course, what is true of different men, is true also of the same man at different times. His conception of God grows with his growth in knowledge and power of thought. And precisely here is provided the endless progress of the human soul. An exhaustive and rounded idea of God is the goal of that progress. All created things, with Him who is the first-born of the creation, furnish means for reaching that idea. The rays from each converge upon the throne, and every several ray must be travelled to the end before man can cease from his holy pursuit. "This is life eternal, to know Thee, the only true God."

(3.) The testimonies to the nature of God are valuable in the ratio in which the medium of their communication approximates a perfect man. Recall these testimonies in the order suggested in the last paragraph: 1, The structure and laws of the

physical world; 2, The constitution and necessary processes of the human mind, as discovered by introspection without the aid of Revelation; 3, This mental constitution as defecated by the authoritative declarations of Scripture respecting its original condition; 4, The literal and symbolical statements of Scripture respecting the divine nature; 5, The God-man Jesus Christ, very man and very God. Christ was able to be the truest and highest exponent to man of God's nature, through His being a true expression of a perfect man. When He says, "No man can come unto the Father but by Me," we understand it as not only meaning that through Him alone is reconciliation and salvation, but also that through Him alone can be secured a worthy conception of the Father. No one can know God philosophically as well as theologically, who does not learn of and by Jesus Christ. It is important for us to remember that a perfect Man has been chosen as the best medium of communicating to the race the loftiest possible conception of God. This ought to have some bearing upon the question as to the reliability of our necessary modes of thought.

II. We resume the discussion with the inquiry, Is our best conception of God, formed according to the necessary laws of human thought, reliable? May we not only say that we must think of Him so, but that in so thinking we think rightly? The question is not, Is our conception adequate, exhaustive, entirely worthy of God, — such in all respects as He has of himself? It is admitted to be partial and insufficient, but is it, as far as it reaches, reliable? Does God, as He looks upon our thought of Him, say that although it is inadequate, it is a true, a valid, thought? Or are we so constituted that we can have no right conception? Do our necessary and inevitable modes of thinking so distort our knowledge that it becomes untrustworthy? Is it true only relatively, for us, and not absolutely, for all time and for all intelligences?

Here we see how fundamental and how momentous this inquiry is. No arguments for the existence of God, no evidences for the truth of Christianity, are of any value until it is decided. If no reliable conception can be formed of the

object of these evidences and arguments, then proofs are impertinences, the Gospel is indefensible, and scepticism is invulnerable. If we cannot vindicate this reliability, what use to enter upon a reasoned defence of the divine existence? Our corner stone will be laid in the dark and fluctuating waters of uncertainty, and will perpetuate a dangerous unsteadiness to the entire structure. Distrust of our conception of what God is will beget suspicion as to our assertion that He exists. At the very best, the whole question will be excluded from the discussions of the understanding, and thrust as a postulated dogma upon unreasoning faith. Within this citadel, that man cannot really know anything of God, the most formidable foes of Christianity are now collecting their forces, and that partly through the fault of faith's defenders. The present imperative work of the Christian apologist is, that these forces be dislodged and their citadel destroyed.

It may be well here to state two answers which have been given to our inquiry, before more formally stating our own.

1. It is said by some that our conception of God is at once reliable and exhaustive. We not only apprehend, but we comprehend Him. We know Him adequately, fully, completely, even as He knows Himself. There is great variety among the holders of this view, as to the method of attaining it. Some assert that it is by immediate intuition, by direct vision of the reason. Others derive it from the assumed relation and correspondence between God and man. Man, say they, is not only an image of God, but he is a full-size image. God and man belong to the same category of supernatural being, and we can reason from one to the other in either direction, without any abatement. God is uncreated cause; man is created cause, but no less a cause for that, — self-determining, independent, and cannot be compelled even by Omnipotence. According to this theory, we can say, either that God is an infinite man, or that man is a finite God. Hence, man may not only criticise the contents of any divine revelation, and question any verdict in the judgment of his Maker, but, by his self-formed principles of honor and right, he may even put his Maker on trial and supplement his Word.

This we understand to be the position of theological rationalism, showing itself in this country in quarters where rationalism would be scornfully denied,—where, indeed, it would be claimed that rationalism is alone successfully subverted.

2. A second reply is, that the question itself is scarcely pertinent; that we know nothing at all about it. The disproportion between God and man,—the infinite and the finite,—is so intrinsic and essential, that there is no possibility of reasoning from one to the other. In our furthest flights of speculation, we can never pass beyond our *human* consciousness, we can never escape the trammels and limits and laws of human thought. Hence, we cannot compare our conception of God with God Himself, and cannot, therefore, pronounce either for or against its reliability. Our knowledge of God may be as unlike the reality as sight is unlike sound. Still, it is the best we can attain to, and is doubtless the best for us in the present state. Knowledge for us is designed to be regulative, not speculative; to control the will, not satisfy the reason. With this view, faith is not the conquered assent of the soul to the clear-voiced testimony of the understanding,—the complement and the crown of reason. It results rather from the impotence of reason, and is the bewildered silence of the heart, baffled and cowering before the irreconcilable confusions and contradictions of the head.

This we understand to be the position of Mr. Mansel,—a position naturally and inevitably consequent upon the doctrine of the unqualified relativity of all human knowledge,—that the culmination of our hopes of knowing God is in a profound nescience. His language is: “We cannot say that our conception of the Divine Nature exactly resembles that Nature in its absolute existence; for we know not what that absolute existence is. But for the same reason, we are equally unable to say that it does not resemble; for, if we know not the Absolute and Infinite at all, we cannot say how far it is or is not capable of likeness or unlikeness to the Relative and Finite. We must remain content with the belief that we have that knowledge of God which is best adapted to our wants and training. How far that knowledge represents God as he is, we know not, and

we have no need to know." (*Limits*, p. 145.) Strong as this ground may be from which to contend against rationalism and dogmatism, it certainly furnishes motives for religious indifference and epicureanism (in both the philosophical and the popular sense) which will not lie unused. Mr. Mansel justly restricts the immediate office of reason to the *evidences* of Christianity, but if these evidences cannot introduce man to the object of Christianity, they are surely unworthy of the name. By removing that beyond the field of our knowledge he deprives these of their dignity and value. It is useless to examine God's witnesses if they are dumb, or if their responses are ambiguous. Our objection to Mr. Mansel's view is that it is deficient as a positive guide for reason, and as a support for faith. It stifles thought rather than controls it, and undermines the faith it would commend.

III. Our own answer has been already more than intimated. We do not suppose it possible to attain an exhaustive knowledge of God, or of any of his works. The authentic seal of his handiwork is set in the absolute incomprehensibility of all and singular that He has done; and we might safely challenge any lithologist with a pledge to give him an all-comprehensive definition of God, when he should do the same for the meanest pebble by the wayside. But because our powers are limited, they are not therefore delusive. Because we do not know everything, we are not hence compelled to admit that we know nothing. Our necessary conceptions of God, as of other objects of knowledge, are partial, but reliable. We would here commend the words of Mr. Mansel himself, which he seems elsewhere to have forgotten: "If partial knowledge must not be treated as if it were complete, neither, on the other hand, may it be identified with total ignorance. The false humanity which assumes that it can know nothing, is often as dangerous as the false pride which assumes that it knows everything. . . . We may find ourselves reasoning to prove the worthlessness of reason." (Page 61.) "It does not follow that our representations are untrue because they are imperfect." (Page 146.) Our conceptions are inadequate, in the sense of being neither exhaustive nor fully comprehensive

representations of his nature and being; but they are true and trustworthy. The larger knowledge possessed by higher intelligences, or by God himself, would correct and complete, but would not essentially change them nor set them aside. Man may possess absolute truth,—may participate in that knowledge which is common to all orders of cognitive being, and which constitutes their distinguishing heritage,—that knowledge which is essentially affected neither by lapse of ages nor by gradation or circumstances of rational existence.

At this point two objections present themselves, and demand removal. The first rests upon the use of the word “partial” above, and the second upon the use of the word “absolute.”

(1.) The first objection cannot be better stated than as given by Mr. Mansel. “The supposition [that we may have a partial knowledge of the infinite and the absolute] refutes itself. To have a partial knowledge of an object, is to know a part of it, but not the whole. But the part of the infinite which is supposed to be known must be itself either infinite or finite. If it is infinite, it presents the same difficulties as before. If it is finite, the point in question is conceded, and our consciousness is allowed to be limited to finite objects. But in truth it is obvious, on a moment’s reflection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite can be represented in the form of a whole composed of parts. Not the Absolute; for the existence of a whole is dependent on the existence of its parts. Not the Infinite; for if any part is infinite, it cannot be distinguished from the whole; and if each part is finite, no number of such parts can constitute the Infinite.” (Page 97.) “If the Infinite is too large for the mind of man, it can only be recognized by some other mind, or by some faculty in man which is not mind. But no such faculty is or can be assumed. In admitting that we do not recognize the Infinite in its entire extension, it is admitted that we do not recognize it as infinite.” (Page 278.)

We wish Mr. Mansel had told us whether, by the Infinite and Absolute in the above and other similar passages, he means the Infinite Personal Jehovah, who has revealed Himself in creation and in the Bible, or whether it is some meta-

physical abstraction, with which logical thimble-riggers perform their jugglery, to the infinite perplexity of plain people. We have partial knowledge of an object when we perfectly know any part, or imperfectly know any part, or imperfectly know the whole. Now we do not profess to know perfectly any part of God, but we do profess to know somewhat of God as a whole. And our knowledge is of the true God, the real Sun of his people, and no mean sun, simply assumed to make our moral reckonings by. The Atlantic ocean cannot be put into a quart measure; yet we may procure a quart of sea water, and it will tell us almost everything respecting the Atlantic ocean except its extent. We suppose that infinite power is power, and infinite wisdom is wisdom, and infinite love is love, and infinite holiness is holiness. We certainly can have some conception of holiness, and love, and wisdom, and power; nor does the fact that they are infinite alter their quality as spiritual energies.

(2.) It is again objected that we cannot know absolute truth, which Mr. Mansel well defines as "truth in relation to all intelligences." (Page 147.) It has been more than once shown in this Review, that the doctrine of the relativity of all human knowledge, as expounded by Sir Wm. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, is untenable,—and that, too, upon the principles of natural realism. We need now only to give it brief notice. Knowledge, say they, implies a relation between that which knows and that which is known; for if the object did not come into cognizable relation with the subject, there could be no consciousness or apprehension of its existence and nature. Granted. Therefore, they conclude, what is known is not the related object, but simply the relation of the object,—the object as it appears to us, and not as it is in itself. The conclusion contradicts the premise. The object as it is in itself is in relation to our faculties, because we and the object belong to the same scheme of things; and the adaptation is mutual, in order that we may gain knowledge; therefore what we know is the object itself, by virtue of its relations to us.

But our present purpose requires that we look at this question under another aspect. Any object of knowledge has a

two-fold value,—first, what it manifests concerning itself, and second, what it deposes concerning its author. We may study an engine either to learn the number and connection and functions of its parts, or to learn the skill and genius of its builder. In the first instance, our study is one of simple inspection, with the inference, through our necessary laws of thought, of the value of the engine for its proposed use. In the second instance, the engine is the symbol or language by which another mind addresses ours, and by which we infer its nature and practical skill. We cannot know other minds by intuition or immediate consciousness; we can only know them by their words and works; but the degree in which we understand these (supposing their authenticity established), is always the measure as well as the means of our knowledge of their authors. Now Creation in its widest extent, physical and rational, and Revelation, are symbols through which God makes known his nature and will. These symbols are related to us, else we could not understand them or know of their existence; but they are equally related to God, and so express precisely what we understand. Man is not an isolated being, and for himself alone. He is part of a harmonious and single system, which finds its unity and its life in God. God organized man for the attainment of truth respecting himself, and He arranged all things else as ancillary to this. The splendid scheme of adjustments discernible in nature reaches all the way from the creature up to the Creator. The adjustment of things to man at one end of the chain is no greater and more complete than their adjustment to God at the other. We believe that what man may understand to be the language of Nature and Scripture is what God intended to say, and what God intended to say is the truth,—absolute and immutable truth. Any other supposition is unworthy of God and unsatisfying to man.

No one who has read Hugh Miller's "*Testimony of the Rocks*," can forget the beauty and the force with which he argues for the Bible truth that man was made in the image of God, from the *human* principles of skill and taste exhibited by the Creator in the construction and beautifying of the pre-

adamic earth. "Just as we infer from the mechanical contrivances of the Creative-Worker that He possesses a certain identity of mind in the *constructive* department with his creature-workers,—and this upon the principle on which we infer an identity of mind between the creature-workers of China, ancient Egypt, and our own country, seeing that their works are identical,—must we not also infer, on the same principle, that He possesses in the *aesthetic* department a certain identity with them also." "The appearance in nature, age after age, of the same forms and colors of beauty which man, in gratifying his taste for the lovely in shape and hue, is ever reproducing, does seem to justify our inference of an identity of mind in this province." (*Testimony of the Rocks*, p. 254.) The argument is valid, and is of much wider reach. We may learn the intellectual and moral characteristics of Jehovah through their manifestation in what He has done and is doing. The sole end of creation is to glorify God by the communication of a knowledge of Him to his rational creatures. Knowledge, then, is in a sense relative, and at the same time in a sense absolute. The relation does not destroy its absoluteness, but becomes the means of establishing its certitude.

We come back to the affirmation that our necessary conceptions of God are reliable ; that they give to us partial but positive knowledge of their Object. We may vindicate this affirmation by three arguments, which might be expanded into as many separate lines of defence. The first builds on the mode of forming the conceptions, or the trustworthiness of our mental constitution ; the second on the object of the conceptions, or the truthfulness of God ; the third on the purpose,—the final cause,—of the conceptions, or an immutable morality.

1. The trustworthiness of our mental constitution. If our necessary conceptions of God are not reliable, it is nevertheless impossible to disprove their reliability. If our mental constitution—our consciousness—our necessary laws of thought—affirm anything, they affirm the truthfulness and trustworthiness of our necessary conceptions. This is on all hands conceded. To deny these, then, is to assert that our mental constitution speaks false ; but the only power within us which can make this asser-

tion is our mental constitution itself; that is, we must admit the reliability of a witness when he testifies to his own mendacity. It requires the word of an apostle to confirm the testimony of a Cretian that the Cretians are always liars. If our necessary modes of thinking are false, the defect is not only incurable, but its existence as a defect can never be known, for we can know only according to our necessary modes of thinking. Thorough-going scepticism, therefore, so far from being philosophical, is suicidal. It is not the fair resultant and equipoise of arguments for and against the reliability of consciousness. There is, there can be, no ground for disbelief here; there can be no ground for doubt even. If we are in error in maintaining as a fundamental article of philosophical belief, the absolute and universal veracity of consciousness, the means used to remove the error must vindicate our belief before they can operate to subvert it. The unvarying and incessant and unimpeachable testimony of consciousness shuts us up to unqualified faith in its validity. Our necessary conceptions cannot but be believed as reliable.

2. The truthfulness of God. God certainly assumes to reveal himself through our necessary conceptions. No other mode of revelation is possible. The Divine Veracity is pledged that this revelation is real. Of necessity imperfect, it must yet be reliable and growingly intelligible. We do not forget that Hume (*Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sec. 12,) calls this "recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being in order to prove the veracity of our senses" a "very unexpected circuit." But an examination of his argument shows that he sustains ours. He is aiming at those idealists who hold to the value of consciousness as a witness for the reality of the internal world, but deny her equally clear testimony for the reality of the external world, and appeal to the veracity of the Creator for the validity of their procedure. Only those, he replies, can justly make such appeal who acknowledge consciousness to be *universally* truthful. We can only refer to, but cannot quote, the confirmatory discussion of Dr. McCosh, (*Intuitions of the Mind*, chapter on Ontology, especially pp. 370, 383.)

When Jesus says, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father;" when an evangelist adds, "He that hath received Christ's testimony hath set to his seal that God is true;" we take the declarations as worth all in philosophy that they are in religion. We may know more of God than we now do; but we can never know Him as essentially different from our present conception. Truth is conformity of our conceptions to their objects. The standard of truth for conceptions of God must be his own real nature. To this the mental constitution of man has been conformed. If the divine veracity is not a pledge that through Creation and Revelation, by the instrument of our mental constitution, we can gain real and reliable knowledge of God, then we stand with Pilate, asking, "What is truth?" with no hope of a reply from the Universe or its Creator, if indeed there be a Universe or a Creator. Our response to the lofty challenge of Jehovah must be the mutilated echo of his own words: "Is there any God besides me? I know not any."

3. If our necessary conceptions of God are unreliable, there is no more a foundation for immutable morality. "Be ye holy, for I am holy," is God's highest command to man, enforced by his strongest sanction. But if the sanction be invalid, then the objection is null. If God is not, in his very being holy,—as we are compelled to conceive of holiness,—then his requirement that we be holy falls away. There can be no such essential discrepancy between regulative and speculative truth, as Mr. Mansel would intimate. Yea, the regulative energy of any doctrine is in the precise ratio of its truthfulness. There is no binding force in a lie, or even in a reasonable doubt. *The moral law is able to command the conscience of man only because God is truthfully represented alike in the conscience and in the law. The law is God's declaration of his nature the conscience is God's most distinct witness in man, that man was made in the image of God; in the fine expression of a living writer, (*Shedd, in Bib. Sac. for Oct., 1859, p. 731,*) "the ethical part of man's being is the finite contacting point in man that corresponds with the infinite surface in God." Sir Wm. Hamilton may say that "a God understood

is no God at all." We admit it, but insist, as a correlative proposition, that a God not at all understood is no God, so far as his authority over us is concerned. Moral character rests entirely upon the validity of our conceptions of Him; upon a reasonable and defensible belief that his commands accord with his character. Nothing can move an upright man but truth, just as nothing seems worthy of an upright God but truth. "We must remain content," says Mr. Mansel, "with the belief that we have that knowledge of God which is best adapted to our wants and training. How far that knowledge represents God as He is, we know not, and we have no need to know." Unspeakably sad, if true, but who will assure us? Man would embrace his Maker, but is deceived, for aught he knows, with a "passing shadow." So we are all—Christian and heathen—idol worshippers; with this difference, that for the Christian, Jehovah makes the idol. If our necessary conceptions of God are not reliable, then truth is a word without meaning; and truth once gone, morality has neither motive nor foundation.

A word, in closing, as to the practical influence of the view we have been endeavoring to present. We are told by those who claim that all human knowledge is of the relative only, that their doctrine is preëminently a discipline of humility. Man must feel that the flower of all science is a profound and irresolvable nescience, that the fruit of knowledge is a "learned ignorance," that, in a word, he is

"Cabined, cribbed, confined, bound in,"

by the limitations and restrictions of his nature, before he will properly appreciate and acknowledge the low and degraded position to which he has been consigned by his Maker. We are free to confess that if we had no other reason for rejecting this doctrine, we should do so on the ground of its practical bearing on the aspirations and hopes of man. The more man knows, the more conscious he is of the infinite ocean of knowledge stretching away before him into eternity. But this is the heritage of his immortality, and he surveys it with rapturous delight,—a "joy unspeakable and full of glory,"—unless

he has been "despoiled through vain philosophy." It is this which kindles a fine phrenzy in the heart of the enthusiastic Christian scholar, causing him to "hunger and thirst after righteousness," and to live upon "every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." Man has nothing he need be ashamed of or lament over, except sin. If this were removed, it would take with it the last vestige of pride, and leave only that of which pride is the sinful perversion,—a noble and worthy dignity. There is nothing in our original constitution or endowments, or necessary modes of thinking, that we should blush for, or wish other than it is. Man is not a truncated being,—some higher intelligence imprisoned forever in Plato's cave, to gaze with pensive longings upon the flitting and intangible shadows of a realm he may not see. God was not ashamed to create him in his own image, to call him "very good," and to constitute him crown and chief of his Creation. Surely we need not regret that which our Maker and Archetype regards as worthy of Himself. We know, we feel, the fearful blight of sin,—that it gathers a thick darkness about all our hopes, and intercepts or refracts every ray of heavenly light. But sin may be eradicated through the Gospel, and we become complete in Christ. In Him who is Lord of all worlds we become heirs of the ages and inheritors of the earth. We have the freedom of the universe, and whatever is necessary to our perfection and blessedness we are privileged and commanded to appropriate. We should as soon think of impugning the wisdom of God because the delicate petals of a rose cannot be wrought into an ocean steamer, or its perfume be used as motive power for the engine, as to have a thought of sadness or repining because man was not somehow made other than he is. Philosophy and religion are at one. In the name of both we may say to the Christian, "All things are yours and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's;" "In Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge;" "Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven;" "This is life eternal, to know the only true God." Philosophy must leave the classic precincts of Athens and Rome for the sacred borders of Jerusalem; the Ilissus and the Tiber for

“Siloa’s brook ;” she must relinquish her meditations in the groves of the Academy for those suggested in the garden of Gethsemane and beneath the shadow of the Cross ; she must exchange her ambiguous oracles for the sure and abiding word of Him who spake as never man spake. Then will her complaint through the wise Plato, “God is hard to find,” give place to the beatitude of the Omniscient Jesus, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God ;” then may she receive for her votaries the kingly diadem of true divine knowledge, and we be able to speak, “not in the words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth.”

ARTICLE II.—NOTES ON THE MYSTICS.

MYSTICISM has originated in the desire and effort to escape from the sphere of the senses and appetites, and to rise to communion with God. The name has been applied not only to a general tendency of the human mind, but to the principles which have been inculcated, the plans which have been suggested, and the practices that have been adopted for the religious perfection of our natures. We propose to discuss the doctrines which Mysticism has advanced, and to consider its results. The extent of the subject will prevent an exhaustive treatment, and we have, therefore, entitled our essay *Notes on the Mystics*.

Mysticism has flourished both in Pagan and Christian lands. In Paganism it appeared in two forms — the Emanative and the Pantheistic. In Christian lands it has spread into more numerous branches — the Ecclesiastical, the Psychological, the Scientific, and the Devotional.

I.—PAGAN MYSTICISM.

Emanation, the oldest of the Pagan systems,* teaches that all things descend from God by successive deteriorations.

* Schlegel, *Wisdom of the Indians*, B. I, Ch. i.

This doctrine is found in the first part of the laws of Menu, and of the Vedas, and constitutes what is termed the Mimansá system among the Hindoos. It is often confounded with Pantheism, which, however, is precisely opposed to it. Pantheism is fundamental immorality ; for if everything is God, we need to acquire no virtue, and to submit to no discipline. But Emanation, which represents everything as at a greater or less distance from God, affords room for an effort to return to the primeval light and perfection. Hence it is not wonderful that this system has exercised a wider and more lasting influence than any other. Still in its idea, Emanation is the most deeply tragical of systems : it is the philosophy of a ruined world ; it proclaims as its great principle our loss, our degradation, and our guilt ; it is the inventor of the four seasons celebrated by the poets, the seasons of gold, of silver, of iron, and of brass, the symbols of the perpetual deterioration of the human race. It is the source of the awful terror that broods over the Dramas of Æschylus. It is the secret of that dread of death which interrupts the festive strains of Catullus and Propertius. It presents the amazing contrast of God the blessed, with the universe accursed ; for the true God was known when the doctrine of Emanation began ; and in the laws of Menu, side by side with truthful exhibitions of the divine attributes, of immortality, of the future state, appear the recorded cries of human anguish. Opposed to the beauty and glory of the Creator, stands the vision of a sinful, suffering, dying world. The traces of this doctrine are found everywhere among the heathen nations. From Persia and India it extended to Greece. It pervaded the teachings of Pythagoras. It found an abode in the dark, colossal temples of Egypt. It was acknowledged by the Celts. It perverted Judaism by the Cabala ; and in Gnosticism, united its fundamental principles with christian doctrines and terms. It has even succeeded in later times in establishing an esoteric school of Mahometan philosophy in Persia and Arabia. And everywhere it has commended systems of lustration and self-denial, which have promised the reunion of man with God, but which in effect have only added new burdens to an existence wretched enough already.

We shall have occasion hereafter to observe this doctrine in its Christian guise. Before dismissing the subject now, we may remark that it wears its most attractive appearance in the writings of those Alexandrian philosophers who claimed for their speculations the authority of Plato's great name. In the Neoplatonic philosophy, Emanation was relieved of its most forbidding features. It was no longer a process of deterioration, but became a development. The Primal Being produced his image, who was the creator of the world of ideas, the pure, the perfect and the changeless Reason. In its turn, this intelligence produced the World Soul, to whose plastic and persistent power we owe the wonders of creation and providence. As applied to our sphere of existence, Neoplatonism ignores facts of human sinfulness and misery. It regards almost exclusively the wants of intellect. It represents man as immured in matter, and yet related to a higher existence, as a ray of light which at the same instant links the earth and the heavens together; and represents it as his business here, to dissolve his material connexions, to enter into the sphere of ideas, to unite himself in ecstatic contemplation with the infinite Reason, so that hereafter no distinction shall exist between his thoughts and the very source of thought.* The hope of the philosopher is that after death he will enter into the sphere of ideas, and that there a new advance shall be practicable. As here he rose to reason, there he will contemplate the glory of the Primal Being, until he shall be permitted to enter into union with that ineffable nature, losing personality, consciousness, and everything human, so soon as that mystic relation is formed. Neoplatonism is, then, the deification of genius. It is more than a system of thought. It is a majestic polity. In professedly Christian lands the silence or even the faith of sceptics has sometimes been purchased by the conferring of honors strictly ecclesiastical upon them. In the days when Paganism seemed to have lost its hold upon the

* Letter of Plotinus to Flaccus, A. D. 260, quoted by Vaughan. "Hours with the Mystics," Vol. I, p. 87, where he maintains that the highest degree of knowledge is founded on the identity of the mind knowing with the object known.

most influential minds, Plotinus sought to reanimate their faith in the ancient system, by proposing to them a nobler boon. Himself a man of genius, he represented genius first as the shining image of divinity, and then as divinity itself.* Nowhere does the aristocratic spirit of antiquity appear more distinctly. The multitude, with whom great reforms and vital religions always begin their work, are overlooked. Neoplatonism with all its beautiful dreams of excellence, left them as it found them, in superstition and sensuality.

Pantheistic Mysticism is later in its origin than the system which we have just considered, yet for many centuries ran parallel with it. It is the most recent Indian system. It was taught by the Buddhists and the Chinese philosopher Fo, and secured a wide dominion in Eastern and Middle Asia a thousand years before the Christian era. It regards God as unchangeable, infinite and absolute in such a sense that everything is God, and God is everything. Whatever seems to be finite is mere delusion, for nothing is real but unity. The manifold objects of the earth are but a shadow. The earth is empty as the profoundest night, but God shines and all things appear in his light. When the light shall be withdrawn, the unsubstantial shapes it has exhibited will sink back into nothingness. According to this doctrine man has no independent existence. There is neither truth nor falsehood, vice nor virtue. Existence has no object. Its votaries may either surrender themselves to an epicurean indolence, or may seek to annihilate self by constraints, austerities, suicide, by horrors of self-torture, from which the mind turns away appalled and almost incredulous. The Vedanta system, which is a complete Pantheism, has produced both these results.

The philosophy of Spinoza, a Jew of Holland, who simply reaffirmed a great Oriental doctrine, has effected the revival of Pantheism in modern times. His teachings are a logical unfolding of the idea of substance, which he makes to be the same as God. The whole system is contained in definitions that are assumed, not proved ; and its results, which are thrown

*Compare Degerando *Histoire comparee des Systemes*, &c., Tome III, p. 376.

into geometrical forms, deny personlity and liberty, whether human or divine.* His views have attracted attention on account of their depth and peculiarity, at least in the West, though they have been familiar to the Asiatic mind for centuries.† And finally Spinoza's simple and noble life, which renounced all sensual pleasure, and sought its enjoyments only in the world of thought, have conciliated regard,‡ although the positions he assumed were opposed at once to civil liberty and revealed religion. Besides, his disciples in Germany were affected by the reaction against the French atheism. The restlessness of the American mind is sufficient to account for a similar phenomenon in our own country. Yet whatever excuses for its reappearance may be urged, Pantheism can exist only to the injury of the best interests of mankind. To say nothing of its false cosmological theories, it has been associated with the denial of the inspiration of the Bible; it acknowledges as God a being who in truth has never existed. It is a belief most unreasonable, for it invests matter with the attributes of thought. It is a worship more degrading than idolatry, for that worships stocks and stones, while this recognizes God in objects that Fetichism itself would blush to adore. He who clothes everything with divinity, must worship not "heroes" only, but the meanest of his race, and the most stupid of the brute creation. Pantheism rightly calls the universe divine; but the cosmos bears this character, not because God is its substance, but because he is its creative cause, its original types are in him, and to everything in space he gives being, force and activity.§

II.—CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM.

We have thus briefly sketched the two schemes of doctrine which have divided the Pagan world, and still, whatever name they bear, retain a Pagan character. We have seen them begin in a primordial tradition which gradually becomes more

* Œuvres. Paris. 1843. *Ethique*. Tome II.

† The indebtedness of Spinoza to Plotinus also has been noticed by Tenneman.

‡ *Vie par Colerus*. Paris. P. 20, sqq.

§ So Albert the Great and Aquinas, *Neand*, iv, 449, 452.

obscure, until it identifies God and the universe, and produces a religion scarcely better than atheism. We have now to weigh the influence of Mysticism upon the Christian mind. It is but natural to expect that the Pantheism of the old philosophy and esoteric theology, would reappear to some extent in the early Christian communities. Converted men would bring some of their old beliefs into the new system; the literature of the world was impregnated with this subtle spirit; and finally, the Apologists sought proofs for their religion in the acknowledged tenets of Gentilism. The highest examples of heathen genius and virtue commended a religion whose primary tenet was that a universal, pervasive spirit existed, to which matter was opposed, and to which by asceticism man might attain. This idea, too hastily adopted, manifests itself not only in the writings of the Gnostics and other heretics, but underlies some of the patristic works, as those of Clement of Alexandria, and is distinctly asserted in the poems of Synesius.* But without entering into this large field, we must content ourselves with considering the great mystical systems which have existed under Christian names. We will distinguish each by its central idea and its principal representative. Ecclesiastical Mysticism, which is based upon the church constitution, is represented by the pretended Dionysius, the Areopagite. Psychological Mysticism, which is based upon the constitution of the human soul, is represented by Jacob Boehmen. Scientific Mysticism, at whose foundation lies a scheme of nature, is represented by Emanuel Swedenborg. Devotional Mysticism, which springs from a loving heart and expresses itself in acts of worship, is represented by Theresa, the Spanish Carmelite. These four may be denominated as preëminently the Christian Mystics.

The works attributed to Dionysius, the Areopagite,† are probably the productions of some Greek monk of the fifth century. They teach the system of Ecclesiastical Mysticism.

* See Hymns, III and V.

† Dictionnaire de Patrologie, Migne, Tome II, 71, 87, &c. Vaughan's Mystics, I, 120, 399.

His doctrine may be thus summed up. The objects we behold are not only the works of God, but the emblems and receptacles of his invisible blessings. An uninterrupted succession of ranks, each superior to that which follows it, unites creation with Deity. Nearest to him is the heavenly hierarchy, consisting of three ranks of intelligences, each rank being divided into three orders. In the first rank are the bright and burning Seraphim, the wise Cherubim, and the Constant Thrones ; in the second are the Dominions, who are exalted above everything false and vile, the active and invincible Virtues and the dignified and orderly Powers ; in the third are the Principalities who direct, the Archangels who govern, and the Angels who are ambassadors of the Lord. The divine blessings are gradually diminished as they are distributed to each order by that which precedes, and before they reach the earth have imparted energy to nine choirs of the heavenly host. A similar arrangement prevails on earth. Yet with this difference : men who are imprisoned in the body need that sensible images should direct them to God ; hence Providence provides for their wants by establishing among them the Sacraments and the Priesthood. Our duty is to use these provisions as a means of assimilation to God. We must discover the nature, practice the rites, and enter into the spiritual sense of the Sacraments, that they may contribute to our perfection. And for the good of society and as a rule of life, we must carefully honor and maintain the privileges of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Thus shall our flesh be spiritualized, our souls be made godlike, and our whole natures return to their author. It is true also that in some of his writings Dionysius commends the duties of meditation, prayer and practical godliness.

His general plan, however, is a blending of Neoplatonism with a perverted form of Christianity. Instead of the Pagan, he adopted the idea of the Church Hierarchy of three orders as the foundation of his scheme. The priest as the mediator between God and man, the sacrament as the agency by which a divine light was communicated to the soul—such were the bases upon which he reared his cloud structure of mystery. The heaven that he described was simply the church of his

age, magnified and translated to the skies. His writings, introduced into Europe in the ninth century, under the name of the patron saint of the French, gave a new impulse to the western mind, and produced a healthful reaction against formality and scholasticism. But their ultimate effects were pernicious. At the bottom his system is only a christianizing of the Jewish priesthood and the Pagan rites. His idea of the Church as the representative of God, and as his earthly vice-regent, produced a spirit of pride and a series of conflicts which have little benefited either the church or the world. It necessarily involved a perpetual crusade upon civil government. Instead of raising men to heaven, it established an earthly despotism whose essential meanness was hidden by spiritual names. And, further, by attaching salvation to ecclesiastical orders and forms, it reduced men more and more under the influence of the carnal and the outward in religion. Not only forms, but the forms of forms, as statues, pictures, dresses, and architectural devices, were multiplied without limit, and were superstitiously relied upon. These, as Bernard has remarked, while they excite delight and reverence, repress the true feeling of devotion.* A taste for beauty supplants the love for holiness. On the contrary, the Christian doctrine of forms is, that the Divine has incarnated itself in Jesus of Nazareth, whose truth his ministers declare, and the facts of whose history are set forth in the Scriptures and in the ordinances he has appointed. Thus the supernatural reveals itself sensibly, and invites and enables men to aspire to God. But this doctrine is fatal to the Hierarchy of Dionysius, the Areopagite.

We approach with some distrust the next system—the Psychological—although its representative is nothing more than a little, illiterate German cobbler. Jacob Boehmen† is the most profound of the mystical writers. He is the philosopher who, blending the highest object of earthly knowledge with religion, has taken as his point of departure the human soul,

* Neand iv, 264.

† Works. London. 1763. Ennemdsers Hist. of Magic. Bohn. II, 297-325.

and with this single key unlocks the highest mysteries. The state of God in his original, independent existence, is like that of the soul before it is affected by desire. He is unnameable and unknown until he manifests himself in action, when he appears in Trinity. The eternal will feeling the yearning of desire, the unity seeking itself, is the Father; the delight with which the unity discovers and reflects upon itself, is the Son; and the outgoing by which the unity proceeds from itself, is the Spirit. It is the human trinity of desire, thought, and energy, transferred to the heavenly throne. But now this yearning of desire in Deity, this painful sense of want, is the root of all darkness, bitterness and wrath, which appear in the elements, and is the deep underground of creation; but which at first was concealed under God's manifestations of love, light, and power, as the baleful meteors are hidden from our sight by the sun. The first Nature, an emanation from God, was a universe of glory, which included three spheres, each filled with flaming angels, and presided over by a kingly head. The highest of these potentates, now known as Satan, fell through a passion for universal monarchy, and in his apostacy involved the third part of heaven. The ruined sphere he occupied was reconstructed into an abode for man, an angelic creature who first lost his purity by yielding to the temptation of Satan, and then became imprisoned in a fleshy body, and subject to the dark and tormenting elements of the world. Then the Divine Light, the Word, became incarnate, raised man above the world, and revealed the way of the Cross as the method of perfection, and the new birth, with the "great exulting joy" that arises in it as the beginning of a new life. To attain unto the supernatural and supersensual, the Teutonic philosopher insists, in his dialogue with a disciple, upon the necessity of three things. "The first," he says, "is that thou shouldst surrender thy will unto God, and let thyself down into the deeps of his mercy; the second is, that thou shouldst hate thine own self, and not do that whereunto thy will impelleth thee; the third is, that thou shouldst bring thyself into subjection unto the Cross, that thou mayest be able to bear the assaults of Nature and creature. If thou wilt do

this, God will inspeak into thee, and will lead thy passive will into himself, into the supernatural deep, and thou shalt hear what the Lord speaketh in thee." These seem to be the great outlines of his system. It is fundamentally a psychology. An infinite soul passing from desire to thought, and thence to action, is his idea of Divinity. A finite soul surrendering desire, thought, and action to a superior will, is his idea of perfection. Yet it is not easy to comprehend Boehmen's ideas. The language is exceedingly obscure. The name of his first production, "*Aurora, or the Morning Redness in the East*," may well describe its blended lights and shadows. The thoughts seem too large for expression, vainly striving in a narrow and grotesque vocabulary to express the beauty and the terror of that divine universe in which our lot is cast.

The third system, which we have denominated Scientific Mysticism, originated with Emanuel Swedenborg,* the Northern seer. His attention early was called to religious subjects in the house of his father, a Lutheran clergyman, and in his travels in Europe when he became of age, he was pained to observe the declining state of piety. His manhood was spent in the study of Nature. But he studied the world, not for itself only, but in the hope to find everywhere the traces of the Creator, and of the plan upon which he had constructed it. Not until the decline of life did Swedenborg appear in a new character, claiming to be a teacher who had been appointed to unfold to men the mysterious works and word of God. The fact that atheistic systems of nature were then in vogue, may explain the tendency of Swedenborg's studies, and the character of the system he constructed. He sought, on his part, to make Nature transparent,—a revelation of the spiritual and the divine. He announced a great system of laws and forces, in which all ages, past, present, and to come, are included ; and all existences, God, angels, men, and the universe of inferior things. The central object in his system belongs to

* True Christian Religion. Apocalypse Revealed. Apocalypse Explained. Divine Love and Wisdom. Divine Providence. Heaven and Hell, &c.

natural science.* It is the sun, the object in which creation began, the agency by which its inferior works were effected, and the emblem and outward sign of that divine Sun whose heart is love, whose light is wisdom, and whose outgoings are from everlasting. In these three attributes the Trinity subsists. And forming the creative cause, they have everywhere manifested themselves in his works, in man especially. To the primal heat, light, and effluence, correspond the affections, intelligence, and power of man. According to this scheme, the fall consists in the loss of love, wisdom and moral power. Redemption enables him to recover these excellences. The loss of these is Hell, the recovery Heaven; for Hell and Heaven are not regions of future retribution, but present states of spiritual being. Swedenborg's imagination made every science tributary to this new, transcendental system of sun-worship. He also confirmed his ideas by arbitrary and fanciful interpretations of the Scriptures, and by visions of that world unknown to others, but which conformed itself to his views as readily as Purgatory, Heaven, and Hell adapted themselves to the political partialities of Dante.

The fault of that large class of Mystics who are represented by Boehmen and Swedenborg, is precisely the fault of the ancient Gnostics. They construct a religion out of their sentiments and imaginations, forgetting that the Christian religion consists of revealed and positive facts. The creed of Gentilism, so far as it was a religion at all, reduced the multitudes to a dependence upon human speculation. It was Christianity as a popular faith, not as a philosophical religion, that opposed and supplanted Gentilism. And Gnosticism was a reaction against Christianity, seeking to raise the inspired doctrines into a theory and science to which the common mind could not attain. The same objection may be urged against the pretensions of Boehmen and Swedenborg. The vague obscurity of their reveries may awaken enthusiasm in such a mind as

* Swedenborg dignifies man by ascribing the human form to him in the future state, and even to God himself; the *spirit* of his system is derived from the powers of Nature.

Coleridge, or may afford principles of transcendental knowledge to such a thinker as Schelling, but they cannot sway the masses. And these theosophies, whatever may be their moral precepts, are essentially irreligious, because they substitute the dreams of speculatists in the place of the affecting realities and substantial and sacred truths of the gospel. Thus, for example, the atonement itself is sacrificed, by both the philosophers of whom we speak, to the spirit of their systems. In the New Testament, Redemption is a great act, related to the policy of Government, to the holiness, not less than to the clemency, of the Universal Sovereign, to the revolted state of his creatures, and to the penalties denounced against them. With these Mystics, it is only a channel for the communication of divine blessings, the tempered medium through which the emanations of divine love stream forth to their objects. Again, according to the declarations of the inspired writers, the Bible is the distinct, authoritative exposition of the Divine Will. With these Mystics, it is an outward shell, containing a concealed nutriment within, such as the spiritual man alone can appropriate—a word which means anything or everything, according to the consciousness of the reader. Thus, dreams become realities, and realities dreams. And to crown the absurdity, the illuminated seers, whose claims all men are required to acknowledge, write, for the most part, in a style so crabbedly unnatural that scarcely one man in a thousand can decipher its meaning.

The last class of Mystics, the Devotional, may be represented by the ardent spirit, around whom, as a centre, the mysticism of the sixteenth century revolved. For beauty, purity, energy, and enthusiasm, Theresa* divides with Isabella the glory of Spanish womanhood. She was a prominent actor in the sixteenth century, that stage on which the famous parts of Loyola and Luther were performed. For the first twenty years of her religious history she was an ascetic, submitting to the influence of the stern monk of Palestine,† fluctuating between extremes of religious transport and agony, until at

* Women of Christianity. Kavenagh.

† Jerome.

last the tender confessions of Augustine fell into her hands, and revealed to the impassioned penitent the way of love and peace. She remained an obedient daughter of Rome; yet the virtues she displayed were such as cannot be obscured by the gloomy shades of the cloister, or be suspected even amid the pitiful mummeries of superstition. It is the voice of the true Christian confessor that we hear singing in the depth of these midnight dungeons. She taught, and her life corresponded with her teachings, that self-denial, contemplation, and prayer are the methods by which the soul first sinks into nothingness, like a worm hiding itself in the earth, and then rises, winged and exultant, to spurn terrestrial things, and to float in the air and bask in the light of heaven. The beautiful, dark-eyed Spaniard, who appears in so many works of art with the pen, the sign of a doctor of the church, held modestly in her hand, has not inappropriately been assigned a place among the teachers of mankind. She is the representative of that illustrious class to which Bonaventura, Tauler, Ruysbroch, and other "friends of God," belonged, and she perpetuated their influence. Francis of Sales, and Madame Chantal, whose brave humanity held a dying leper to her breast, deserve only to be ranked as kindred spirits. While the thoughtful Madame Guyon, and the gentle Fenelon, who was condemned at Rome because he carried the love of God to an extreme, derived their enthusiasm from "the burning heart of Theresa."

Nor to this, the highest class of Mystics, can we render an unqualified admiration. They seem to be opposed, in general, to the principle of self-love, which is necessary to human existence, and which Christianity does not require us to destroy. With them, faith is not directed to definite objects, as in the Divine Word, but rather separates itself from every intelligible idea. Their terms are pantheistic, and too often express the desire for absorption into the Deity. So far as the soul surrenders its own personality, it puts on the Divine. Loosed from its mooring, it is borne on, steadily and surely, like an abandoned boat upon a river, until at length it reaches the broad ocean, and finally sinks into the unfathomed depths.

Too often the Mystic is represented as enjoying an interior life, to which no outward ministry can reach. He heeds not the splendid testimony of Nature to creative wisdom and goodness. He cares not for the outward letter of the Word. He eschews literature as a distraction. His only sanctuary is the closet, or rather the heart itself, where the true ark, and the divine glory abide. He learns nothing from the changes of time and fortune, or from observing the character and acts of man. He need not even dwell upon the Divine Nature as a theme for intelligent and earnest thought. God he regards simply as an infinite affection, which repudiates the quality of justice. We become like Him by indulging in sentimental repose. Or if existence forces a conflict upon us, we must break the yoke of matter, not of sin, to win a place in the Paradise of spiritual rest and everlasting triumph. The devout Mystics too often inculcate or suggest ideas like these. They make a system of morals out of devout sentiment, and thus lead their votaries away from the truth of Nature and the precepts of religion.

Yet, while we find so much to object to in every mystical scheme, we are not insensible to the grandeur of the end which they sought to accomplish—the peace and submission of soul, the divine union, the devout experience, to which they taught man to aspire. Happy must we esteem those who, in whatever age or country, attained to this elevated state—a state where all inferior hopes are merged and lost in one sublime, eternal expectation, where fear in its anguish has been soothed, and in its solemnity has been softened into reverence, where pride cannot inflate, nor earthly desire sting any more. Forewarned against their errors, as we moderns are, we may even learn much from the Mystics. When the rude life of the Middle Ages perished, the marvellous book of Thomas a Kempis was written as an inscription upon its tomb,* and when the animal nature dies, the triumphant spirit cannot better celebrate its enfranchisement than in those words of humility and peace.

* Michelet, *Hist. France*.

We may reject every mystical system, and yet it is certainly our privilege to propose to ourselves the same calm dignity of existence to which their votaries aspired. It is due to ourselves that the passions of the heart should be brought under discipline, and that we should not permit external events to sway us at their pleasure. The wiser Mystics have sought to preserve life, and yet to make life hopeful and resigned, to maintain, in spite of all outward shocks, a cheerful and inexhaustible development of Nature, like that in volcanic regions, where the earthquake only serves to deposit new seeds in the soil, and where new vineyards spring on the mountain sides when the rivers of lava have ceased to flow. This state of mind is not unattainable. Though we dwell in a world of decay and disappointment, we may, by acquiescence in God's sovereign will, transform our outward griefs into spiritual blessings. And in the meantime, we may enjoy, without disquietude, whatever gratifies the taste and charms the imagination, by referring all earthly loveliness to its original end. Thus did the sweet and spiritual genius of Spencer transform the wrecks of hope and love into the memorials of unfading and infinite beauty, when he sung,

Beautie is not, as fond men misdeeme,
An outward show of things that only seeme.
For that same goodly hew of white and red
With which the cheekes are sprinkled, shall decay,
And those sweete rosy leaves, so fairly spread
Upon the lips, shall fade and fall away
To that they were, even to corrupted clay !
That golden wyre, those sparkling eyes so bright,
Shall turn to dust, and lose their goodly light.

But that faire lamp, from whose celestial ray
That light proceeds which kindleth lovers' fire,
Shall never be extinguished nor decay,
But when the vital spirits doe expire,
Unto her native planet shall retyre ;
For it is heavenly love, and cannot die,
Being a parcell of the purest skie.

Hymn in Honor of Beautie.

Such views will enable us to gain a mastery of the external.
And though we ourselves have elements of discord within us,

whose removal causes the keenest anguish, though we can secure peace only by consigning to destruction those impatient and fierce desires which seek for sensual pleasure as the highest end of life, still the result is worth the effort ; for, to adopt the image of another poet,

When, his pulse failing, Passion speechless lies,
When Faith is kneeling by his bed of death,
And Innocence is closing up his eyes,

it is then alone that a calm, true life awakens in the soul. After the week-day conflict, comes the Sabbath of repose. Peace, that gracious and comely spirit which in the outer world preserves the blessings of Providence from the spoiler's hand, and which, in this sense, may be said even to confer them, to gild the harvest, to scent the swelling clusters of the grape, and to scatter its benedictions over the humblest cottage, now takes the vacant heart as its dwelling. And for the evil that we have surrendered, we shall possess the seven-fold gifts of grace.*

The Mystics also propose the consecration of human nature. The mind, when touched with piety, seeks to render God some marks of homage and gratitude. A person immersed in the sensuous, will offer such sacrifices, by him esteemed most precious, as the wreathed smoke of incense, the costly beauty of great structures with vaults pointing sharply heavenward, and walls decorated with art's choicest treasures, the imposing shows of floating vestments and long processions, the solemn sound of stately liturgies and ancient hymns. But one of a nobler mould is conscious of possessing something more precious than all these outward tributes. And, therefore, he gives *himself* to God. The weak, yet trustful soul, which has not altogether lost the image of its Original ; the tempted soul, armed for brave contest with its passions ; the experienced soul, which all the pleasures of the universe cannot satisfy, which, amid life's evils, would live upon grand thoughts, and infinite, substantial blessings ; such is the offering of the true Mystic to the sovereignty of Heaven. Now he is a servant, living to

* These are described by the Scholastic Divines. Neand. iv, 521, 524.

carry out the directions of the Highest Will. Now he is a priest, whose thoughts and affections are acceptable sacrifices. Now he is a soldier, wielding the sword of truth, and winning the approval of the Captain under whose blood-stained banner he marches. The history of the Mystics is full of instances like these, which touch our enthusiasm to the quick. It opens to us the cell of Aquinas, whose study always begins with prayer for heavenly light.* It brings to our view the giant frame of Bernard, as, amid his wasting toils and travels, he exclaims: "To whom am I more bound to live, than to Him whose death is the cause of my living? To whom can I devote my life with greater advantage, than to Him who promises me life eternal? or to whom with greater necessity, than to Him who threatens the everlasting fire? But I serve Him willingly, with the freedom which love brings."† In that age of terror, when Loyola in the grotto of Maureza, and Luther in the castle of Wartburg, are contending with fiends, it sets before us the valiant Theresa, as she seizes the cross and summons all the hosts of darkness, crying: "Come all, I fear ye not; and being only an humble servant of the Almighty God, I wish to see what harm ye can do me."‡ The inspirations of human genius are contemptible, when compared with those which animate such lives.

The Mystics propose union with God as the chief object of human existence. This phrase indicates a reality which no perversion can obscure or destroy. The pretenders to personal inspiration have been many; but surely the fact that fanatics have laid claim to a privilege so exalted, does not compel us to abdicate the crowning glory of the human race. If there is any reality in worship, there must be an immediate access to the object of worship. If there is anything comforting in the incarnation of the Son of God, then the indwelling of God in man may still occur, and it may still be possible that beings in our humbler sphere may, according to those fearful words of Scripture, become partakers of the divine nature. This truth everywhere receives the support of Scrip-

* Neand., iv, 432. † *Ib.*, 259. ‡ Kavanagh's *Women of Christianity*, 123.

ture, as it has so often received the benediction of poetry.* As the world awoke out of its eternal sleep when the primeval spirit brooded over it, so the soul, the highest of all creations, awakes and lives, and it receives the same Divine Spirit, though in a way accordant with its higher nature. And all revelation provides for fellowship with God. Redemption is the opening of a way of access to the highest throne. Penitence is the prodigal's return to the Father's bosom. Prayer is the communion of the worshipper with the Father's heart. The end proposed by Mysticism, union with God, is, therefore, a legitimate one.

We do not deny that the manner of this union must be obscure. We shall seek in vain for a satisfactory definition in all the works of the Mystical writers. The ancients, as Michelet remarks,† had a glimpse of the idea of divine imitation. The Pythagoreans defined virtue to be "consentaneousness with the God-like," and Plato's definition, in the *Timæus* and *Theætetus*, is "likeness to God as far as possible." The Hindoo idea, as we have seen, was that of identity with God. The Christian idea of a divine life is not that of unity, but of union. This, although one of the most mysterious subjects in Scripture, may be illustrated by natural analogies. Thus the loving heart lives in the object of its affection, or, as Bernard has expressed it, the soul is rather where it loves than where it animates; but this living in another, and this death to one's self, does not involve the loss of personality. And even so, although the language of the most orthodox Mystics does often seem to involve this doctrine, the union after which they aspired does not really involve the extinction of personality. The fact that faith and love are the bonds between God and the believing soul, proves that an absorption into Deity is not intended, for a mutual interchange of confidence and affection supposes the existence of two different beings. Thomas a Kempis says expressly, "Thou art a man, and not God; flesh, not an angel." And the intensity and passion which the Mystical writings display, is wholly inconsistent with

* Comp. Wordsworth, Reed's ed., p. 397. † Hist. France, ii, 120, n.

the idea of absorption, even when that doctrine seems to be most distinctly affirmed. This love is, indeed, as Hugo of St. Victor has shown, a desire to possess God ; but what the possession of God is, must remain a mystery. His presence in Nature is inexplicable ; how much more mysterious must be his gracious presence in the soul itself.

Finally, Mysticism is to be commended as favoring a spiritual experience. It seems, in the Christian ages, to have been a reäction against the superstitious reverence for the empty ceremonies of Romanism. What the outward temple expressed, the Mystics sought to realize in themselves. While the multitudes remained in the outer courts, contenting themselves with the massy structure and the scented smoke of sacrifice, they, as the High Priests of their ages, penetrated into the innermost sanctuary, and looked with trembling yet joyous adoration upon the glory of the divine presence within. We must not too hastily judge them by the outward circumstances to which they submitted, by their prostrations and signs of the cross, their fasts and flagellations, but by their renunciation of selfishness, by their purity, by the attendance of spiritual graces, amid which their soul went into the audience-chamber of the King of kings. For such examples, we gratefully acknowledge our indebtedness to the Mystics. They have indicated an end which all men can pursue. Knowledge makes men learned, said Bernard, the disposition makes them wise. And as all can cultivate the disposition, all can secure, according to their principles, the excellent endowment of wisdom. We have knowledge enough in reference to our duties. What we need when passion or doubt affects us, is ardor and constancy. On this account, those who incessantly insist upon outward duties, labor vainly for the reformation of their race. The true method is, to awaken emotions more thrilling than those to which the senses make their appeal. When a high spiritual enthusiasm possesses a man, every base passion expires in his soul. And so, also, those who doubt in reference to religion, can adopt no better method of deliverance than familiarity with religious thoughts and practices. These have a self-evidencing power, when brought into immediate contact

with human nature. The flippant criticisms, and large systems of materialism so popular in our age, cannot disturb a mind which has an experimental conviction of the value and blessedness of infinite realities. It has the witness in itself.*

ARTICLE III.—ON PREACHING THE DOCTRINE OF
ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.

We think there is abundant reason to apprehend that the doctrine of eternal punishment is not now preached with that frequency, with that apparent firm conviction of its truth and deep impression of its importance, with which it was proclaimed within a period very recent. We do not mean to intimate that this doctrine is not now firmly believed by the vast majority of ministers and laymen connected with evangelical churches, but we simply express the suspicion that it is not so much preached now as formerly. If this suspicion be well grounded, it is an interesting inquiry, what reasons have induced the preachers of the present day to make less prominent in their sermons than it was in the discourses of their predecessors, a doctrine which, if true, men's eternal interests render it infinitely important that they should hear preached so clearly and frequently that they shall be induced to act in view of it; that they will "flee from the wrath to come."

We propose in this article to consider some of the more plausible reasons by which a professed preacher of the gospel may endeavor to satisfy himself that he is not bound to make conspicuous in his preaching the teachings of the Bible in respect to the condition of those who die in impenitence.

It may be thought that the doctrine that God will punish the sinner with endless misery for the sins committed in this

* Clem. Alex. Strom., vi, 699. Neand., i, 540.

short life, seems so at variance with our conceptions of his justice and his character, that if we convince men that the Bible teaches this doctrine, we diminish the probability that it will be believed. But is it certain that it will be difficult to satisfy men that God can justly punish the sinner forever? The argument by which it is attempted to prove that the eternal punishment of the transgressor of Divine laws is consistent with perfect justice, is well known. It is substantially as follows: Our obligation to love any being is in proportion to two things, — to his intrinsic excellence, and to the favors which he has bestowed upon us. If he possesses great virtue, or if he has done us great favors, then we are under a great obligation to love him. If we ought to love virtue, then we ought to love the virtuous, and the more virtuous they are the greater the obligation to love them. This seems self-evident, as does this other assertion, that we ought to cherish gratitude towards him who has done us a kindness, and the greater the benefit conferred, the greater the obligation to possess and exhibit gratitude. Our guilt is always in proportion to the extent of the obligation which we fail to discharge. Measuring, then, by these principles our obligation to love God, we shall at once perceive it to be infinite. God possesses infinite moral excellence. He loves holiness and justice with an infinite love, and He is infinitely benevolent. He also offers man an infinite benefit—the gift of eternal life. Thus He places man under an infinite obligation to love him, both for his intrinsic excellence, and for the benefits He confers; and if man violate this obligation, he must incur infinite guilt, and deserve infinite* or eternal punishment. If there be a fallacy in this reasoning, it must be proved, and not assumed; and until proved, we need not fear to present the argument with confidence, that by means of it the doctrine of eternal punishment may be made to appear credible.

* This argument is not satisfactory to all minds. The double use of the word "infinite," as applied to God and punishment, is supposed by some to invalidate it. We prefer, however, to let it stand just as here given, and each reader judge of it for himself.—[Ed.]

But we have other methods of establishing a belief in this doctrine. Endless misery may be considered not simply as the punishment due to sin, but as its natural fruit. By our constitution our sin and our misery are allied. We must be unhappy if we are sinful, and it is the tendency of man to become more and more subject to the power of any habit which he cherishes, whether it be a sinful or a holy one. They, then, who spend their entire lives in increasing the power which sinful habits hold over them, it is reasonable to suppose, will continue the slaves of such habits in a future state of being. It is then just as certain that if a man when he dies be unjust, he will be unjust still ; or, that if he be filthy, he will be filthy still, as it is that if he be holy, he will be holy still. Reason teaches us that the sinner removed from the earth, will continue to sin ; yea, that he will become more and more disposed to sin, and that the period will never come when he will cease to sin, since the power of sinful habits increasing the longer they are indulged, the improbability of the sinner's ceasing to indulge them will forever be growing greater and greater. But if there be such a probability that the sinner will eternally sin, there is the same probability that he will be eternally miserable, since misery is the legitimate necessary fruit of sin.

This argument would, perhaps, be as likely as any one which could be presented, to produce conviction of the truth of the Scripture doctrine respecting the punishment of the incorrigibly wicked ; but there is still another establishing its credibility, that drawn from analogy, which ought to be noticed. Bishop Butler has presented it in the most convincing manner in his "*Analogy*." "There is," in this life, he observes, "a certain bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things." "Though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagances, *up to a certain degree*, it is often in their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and character, at least in good measure ; yet real reformation is, in many cases, of no avail at all towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally an-

nexed to folly and extravagance, *exceeding that degree.*" By exhibiting these instances, such, for example, as that which he specifies of the husbandman who, neglecting to plant in the spring-time, "the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery," can the doctrine, which asserts that by failing in the present life to sow the seeds of future happiness eternity will be "lost beyond recovery," be made to appear reasonable. With such proofs, then, as we find of this doctrine in Sacred Writ, and with such confirmations of it as Reason furnishes, we ought not certainly to despair of being able to convince men that it is true.

But it may still be supposed that by dwelling upon this doctrine, the preacher will make the Divine Being appear so unamiable, that it will be more difficult to attract the love of men toward God than it will be if he deny it, or remain silent in respect to it. Certainly there are views of the doctrine of endless punishment which present God in an unamiable light; those, for example, which exhibit Him as hating sinners, and then only when He views them as united by faith to his Son, exchanging his hatred for love. But such a representation of the Divine emotions towards sinners as manifested in the infliction of eternal punishment upon them, has no necessary connection with a belief in the Scripture teachings in reference to the condition of the lost. It is not necessary that God should hate man in order that He may punish him. The Scriptures always exhibit the gift of Christ for men, as the fruit of God's love toward them, and, therefore, furnish the strongest possible evidence and proof that He does not hate them. And as thus there is in God no malignant feeling to be satisfied or removed by the sacrifice of Christ, it is impossible, if the Scriptures teach that some will suffer eternal punishment, that they should intend to exhibit this punishment as the fruit of God's hatred towards those who will endure it.

If God cherishes a love for holiness, then his disapprobation of the conduct of sinners, his hatred of sin, must be in exact proportion to the strength of that love. But this disapprobation and this hatred must manifest themselves, for there can be no

good reason why they should be concealed. Their existence is necessary, if God be holy, and the fact that they exist must be known in order that God may appear perfectly holy. But the appropriate way of manifesting these emotions, that in which creatures may have the most striking and convincing evidence of their existence, is by the infliction of punishment on transgressors. This is the way in which men naturally expect that they will be exhibited, and this expectation springs not from the impression that God is unjust and cruel, but from the conviction that he is perfectly just and holy. Perceiving that human laws with penalties annexed to their violation are indispensable to man's welfare, their reason, their experience, and observation, readily convince them that Divine laws, with appropriate penalties, are needed by man; that his relations to his Creator and Preserver impose obligations, which he ought not to be able to disregard with impunity; that there are courses of conduct which he may pursue, whose consequences will be most disastrous in this life, and for aught he can know to the contrary, will continue to be equally injurious in a future life, and that it is fit that God should seek to deter men from entering upon these courses by prohibitions, and by threatening to punish them if they disregard these prohibitions. Why then should it be supposed that God cannot appear amiable, if he be exhibited as perfectly true, and also as threatening to punish sinners, if they repent not, with a terrible punishment?

Such an impression must be founded on the conviction that it is more probable that men will love God, if he be presented to them as an imperfect being, than if he be exhibited as free from any imperfection, as infinitely holy, and as perfectly just. If this opinion were correct, it might well be inquired, what is gained when we induce men to love God by presenting his character as different from that which he really possesses? Is the love to the Divine Being, excited by a false idea of him, acceptable to its object, or will it benefit its possessor? But it is by no means certain that more men would be induced to love God, if his character were invariably presented as different from what it is. Rebels may be induced to return to their

allegiance by offering them pardon, but they must be first convinced that if they persist in their rebellion they will be punished. Pardon will seem valuable to them only when it delivers them from exposure to great calamities. If there be little to fear although they remain rebels, the offer of pardon will be despised. In order that men may deeply feel how great and precious the love of God toward them is, they must first be deeply impressed with the conviction that he is just. Selfish, as men naturally are, and indisposed to worship a holy God, they will live in habitual neglect of the Divine claims upon them, unless they fear the consequences of such neglect. It is, indeed, the goodness of God which leads men to repentance, but this goodness must be felt, and it is best felt when there is a previous deep impression that they are sinners, and that as such they are exposed, and justly exposed, to Divine judgments. It is the starving man, and not the pampered one, who is grateful for a crust of bread. Said Christ, "they that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." He was not surprised that, by Pharisees, trusting in their own righteousness, the offer of salvation which he brought was not prized. He well knew that others, who felt that they were sinners, and could by no possibility save themselves, would hear the same message as "glad tidings of great joy." The goodness of God in bestowing any favor, seems great in just that proportion in which men feel their need of the blessing granted. If they believe that sin exposes them to only a slight punishment, then the goodness displayed in offering deliverance from this punishment seems slight. But if men are convinced that for their sins they are exposed, and rightly exposed, to an eternal misery, they are then prepared to regard the benevolence exhibited in providing and offering salvation to them, as infinite. God, as Redeemer, will then seem to them infinitely amiable. Is it not, then, evident that if we represent the criminality of sin as small, and its punishment as slight, we deprive ourselves of one of the most effectual means by which we may suitably impress men with the truth that "God is love." Would not the preacher, then, be foolish who should refuse to preach the doctrine of eternal punish-

ment, because he desired so to represent the Divine character and dealings that God may appear most lovely?

In point of fact those denominations of professed Christians among whom the doctrine of eternal punishment has been firmly believed, have always seemed to be more deeply impressed with the amiableness of God—that is, have seemed to love him more than any others—have been most willing to make sacrifices for him. How little has been the self-denial in obedience to the command, “Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature,” exhibited by those professed christians who deny the doctrine of endless punishment, compared with that displayed by others who hold this doctrine? Or, if we look not at societies, but at individuals, what denier of this doctrine ever had a deeper impression of the loveliness of God, than that which the eminent defender of the doctrine—President Edwards—expressed in these words: “The first instance that I remember of that sort of inward, sweet delight in God and divine things that I have lived much in since, was on reading those words, I Tim., i, 17: ‘*Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory forever and ever. Amen.*’ As I read the words, there came into my soul, and was as it were diffused through it, a sense of the glory of the Divine Being, a new sense quite different from anything I ever experienced before. Never any words of Scripture seemed to me as these words did. I thought with myself how excellent a Being that was, and how happy I should be, if I might enjoy that God, and be rapt up to him in heaven, and be, as it were, swallowed up in him forever!”

“Once, as I rode out into the woods for my health, in 1737, having alighted from my horse in a retired place, as my manner commonly has been, to walk for divine contemplation and prayer, I had a view that for me was extraordinary, of the glory of the Son of God, as Mediator between God and man, and his wonderful, great, full, pure, and sweet grace and love, and meek and gentle condescension. This grace that appeared so calm and sweet, appeared also great above the heavens. The person of Christ appeared ineffably excellent, with an

excellency great enough to swallow up all thought and conception — which continued, as near as I can judge, about an hour, which kept me the greater part of the time in a flood of tears, and weeping aloud. I felt an ardency of soul to be, what I know not otherwise how to express, emptied and annihilated ; to lie in the dust, and to be full of Christ alone ; to love him with a holy and pure love ; to trust in him ; to live upon him ; to serve and follow him ; and to be perfectly sanctified and made pure, with a divine and heavenly purity. I have several other times had views very much of the same nature, and which have had the same effects." He who felt these emotions towards God the Father, and towards God the Son, he who wrote these words, wrote also the sermon contained in his works on "*The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners*," and that other sermon also preserved in the same collection, entitled "*Sinners in the hands of an angry God*," which, when delivered, produced the greatest alarm among those whom it deeply impressed with the awful truth that they were exposed to eternal destruction.

Sidney Smith, in one of the early numbers of the Edinburgh Review, has, for purposes of ridicule, quoted an extract from the journal kept by the missionary Carey on his passage to India. It is in these words : "Read with much sweetness Edwards on the justice of God in the damnation of sinners." The great wit deemed it ridiculous that a benevolent man should seek any enjoyment in the contemplation of the awful doctrine of eternal punishment. But he was not sensible that to the heart which appreciates whatever possesses moral beauty, justice however displayed, is as truly lovely as is benevolence, and that the contemplation of the dreadful condition from which one has just been rescued, enhances his sense of present safety, and of the goodness and amiableness of him who has saved him.

We know very well the reply which will be given to the argument we have been presenting — that it will be said we make God first appear unspeakably unlovely and cruel, in order that we may afterwards produce the highest conception of his benevolence. He terrifies men with the fear of eternal pun-

ishment, and then fills them with unutterable gratitude and love, by promising to save them from this infinite calamity. We seek, it will be said, to make God appear lovely by ascribing to him conduct like that of one who should throw a companion into the sea, that, by plunging in and rescuing him as he was drowning, he might excite the deepest gratitude and affection towards himself. Such a reply to our argument would be just and sufficient, if it could be proved to be entirely unnecessary that sin should be visited with an eternal punishment; if neither the character of God, nor the welfare of the universe, the prevention of sin, required such a punishment. But no one is able to say this. If we could not perceive any reason rendering it necessary that sin should be visited with an endless punishment, yet if God has taught us that he will inflict this misery upon those who commit it, we ought to suppose that there is such a reason. And when we perceive that arguments drawn from the Divine justice, and from the importance of using the most effectual means to prevent the commission and the prevalence of wickedness, furnish confirmatory evidence of the truth of the doctrine, we see that the supposed reply to the argument we have presented loses all its force, since we have no reason to believe that the proposition upon which it builds is true, namely this, that eternal punishment is unnecessary.

Another way in which it may be shown that the doctrine of eternal punishment tends to make God appear infinitely amiable, is the following: According to this doctrine God has made a law, by which man is required to love him with supreme affection and his neighbor as himself, and has expressed his sense of man's obligation to obey this law, by annexing to its violation the penalty of eternal punishment. The greatness of the penalty reveals the criminality of the sin by which it is incurred. We judge of the magnitude of a transgression of a human law by the punishment threatened to him who commits it, and we are shocked if a slight offence is followed by the infliction of a terrible penalty. If the stealing of a dollar should be punished with death, all would cry out against the judge or the legislators who should visit

a comparatively small crime with a punishment so disproportioned to its magnitude. Or if, on the other hand, murder should be punished only with an imprisonment of a few months, all men would be as much shocked by the injustice which to the greatest criminal assigned a punishment no severer than that which is inflicted upon him who has committed the smallest offence against human laws. If, then, we are so made that in our view the penalty annexed to any crime should be proportioned to its magnitude, must we not suppose that he who so made us, designs that we shall determine the criminality involved in the violation of his laws, by the penalty which he has annexed to such violation? Such an inference seems just, and we should accordingly conclude if God had threatened the transgressors of his laws only with a slight and temporary punishment, that he regarded man's guilt in disobeying his Maker as comparatively slight; his own worthiness to be loved as only measurable, and the guilt of not loving him as limited.

But the question which we are now considering is not, ought we to measure the enormity of sin by its punishment, but are we so constituted that we shall thus do, although since we are thus constituted by God himself, it may be strongly argued that we *ought* to accept as sound those conclusions which we naturally form, and to which we are not impelled by any evil inclination. Do not the considerations above presented show that we shall in fact judge of our obligation to keep the moral law by the penalty which we shall incur if we disobey it? If, then, God is to seem to us infinitely worthy to be adored, to be served, and to be loved, he must threaten us with an infinite, that is, with an eternal punishment, should we fail to love and serve him. The proper foundation of worship, the conviction that the being worshipped possesses unlimited claims to adoration, so that we cannot conceive of any change in him which would increase those claims, is wanting, if we are induced by his own law to regard him as less worthy of reverence than he might be. We can conceive it possible that a being might exist whose character and acts should be such that there could be no limit to the guilt of refusing to love

him supremely, and to the punishment which such guilt would merit. If, judging by the penalty annexed to the transgression of God's law, we conclude that he is not such a being, then our souls refuse to worship him. We cannot but say, if he only had such excellences that the guilt of refusing to love him and serve him would be infinite, then we could worship him, then we could love him with all our hearts, then we could ascribe to him the highest praise, then the intellect and the heart would be perfectly satisfied with him as an object of adoration.

A belief in the doctrine of eternal punishment becomes important, then, because it gives us the highest idea which we can entertain of God's worthiness to be revered and loved. Such is his excellence, such have been his acts, that no possible change in either would increase his desert of reverence and love. He who refuses to love and serve this God, may properly be punished with the highest possible punishment. Eternal misery is his desert. When we view the doctrine of eternal punishment in this light, do we not perceive that it discloses to us the blessed fact that God is immeasurably lovely? In it, as in a mirror, we see reflected God's infinite amiableness, so that instead of finding it difficult or impossible to love the Divine Being, because we believe that He will inflict upon sinners who refuse to repent an eternal punishment, we love Him with supreme affection for this very reason. We praise and adore Him as the infinitely lovely One, not only because He will confer life eternal upon the penitent and believing, but just as truly because the impenitent and unbelieving shall "go away into everlasting punishment."

Having thus endeavored to show how we may reasonably expect to convince men that the doctrine of eternal punishment is true, and that God is infinitely amiable though it be true, and because it is true, in the remainder of this article we propose to speak of the advantage which the preacher of this doctrine has over him who does not proclaim it. This consists partly in his ability to attract attention. He does not come before men simply proposing to discourse to them upon the goodness of God, the excellence of virtue, upon the mani-

fold benefits which will result to them from obedience to God's laws. He can, as well as others, seek to interest the selfish, the worldly, and the sensual, with these themes ; but he has another topic which will be much more likely to engage their attention. He can speak to them of their danger. He can address to them the startling announcements : "He that believeth not shall be damned ;" "When the Son of Man shall come in his glory, before Him shall be gathered all nations, and He shall separate them one from another, and shall say to them on his left hand, Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels ;" "The hour cometh when all that are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of Man, and shall come forth, they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." Such an address appeals to motives which govern even the most degraded. If there be in such persons no desire to possess spiritual enjoyments, and no disposition to render unto God any of that love which is his due, there is at least a desire to escape misery. They can be alarmed if they can be made to believe that they are in danger of eternal burnings. And how can you reasonably hope to induce those who are rebels against God, and who mean to persist in their rebellion, to return to their allegiance, unless you can appeal to their fears — unless you can terrify them with an apprehension of the consequences of continued rebellion ? And the more you can alarm them, the more probable is it that you can induce them to accept the offer of pardon. What folly, unless you can make the strongest possible appeal to their fears, to attempt to persuade those who have no conception of any enjoyments but selfish ones, to become the disciples of Christ, when he has declared, "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me !"

If we were asked to state what spectacle appears to us most weak and pitiable, we hardly know one that we should be more likely to mention, than that of a professed ambassador from God to men who look with contempt on all the joys which religion proffers, and who never think of God, much

less desire to perform any of their duties towards Him, when this ambassador comes before such men and seriously expects and attempts to persuade them to repent, with no other message than this : God loves you, and if you do not love Him He will be displeased, and you will lose the pleasure and benefit to be found in loving Him. He resembles the parent who entreats a wayward child to obey him, when that child knows that his father will not chastise him, though he persist in his disobedience. The child despises such a weak father, and so do all who behold him. But how much more painful the spectacle, where, in the person of his ambassador, the infinitely glorious God is presented to men in an attitude like that of this weak parent, as entreating obstinate rebels to cease rebellion against Him, without combining with his offers of pardon any of those threatenings by which they might be induced to accept with eagerness the terms of reconciliation ! What can be more absurd than to expect that preaching will become most effective, when it shall never exhibit that doctrine which more than any other is suited to alarm sinners ? Or if it be maintained that some punishment may be threatened, although not an eternal one, then it may justly be replied, the more terrible the punishment is supposed to be, the more reason have we to expect that the fear of it will induce men to take the necessary steps to escape it.

Thus is it evident, that so far as respects awakening attention to the message from heaven, and so far as securing compliance with its requirements is concerned, the preacher of eternal punishment has great advantages over him who denies the doctrine, or over him who refuses to proclaim it.

Whatever, then, may be the preacher's objection to exhibit this doctrine, whether it be an apprehension that men will not believe it, or that by proclaiming it he will make God appear unamiable, or subject himself to some disadvantages in comparison with him who denies it or fails to declare it, the objection appears to have no solid foundation. If there be a neglect on the part of preachers at the present day to present this doctrine to their hearers, we have seen no good reason for this neglect. They voluntarily deprive themselves of that

which their predecessors considered the most effective weapon with which they could assault the heart of the sinner. They not only, in the manner which has been shown, weaken the force of those motives by which the love of men might be drawn forth towards God for his infinite amiableness, but they also deprive themselves of that consideration which, of all possible ones, is best fitted to excite the attention and induce the action of the careless, the sensual, the worldly, and the selfish.

ARTICLE IV.—GODWIN'S HISTORY OF FRANCE.

To the names of Prescott, Bancroft, Hildreth, and Motley, the historian of historians must add another, that of the author of this history of France.* Although but the first installment of a work which must occupy, for years to come, all the leisure of a life given for the most part to the arduous labors of journalism, it is yet of such generous proportions, so thorough in research, so comprehensive of its themes, and so vigorous in style, that we may reckon upon the fulfilment of its promise for that which remains behind, safely, unless the hand of Death shall for the third time smite the worker in the midst of his work.

Like his latest predecessor in historical writing, Mr. Motley, Mr. Godwin has leaped to an instant and secure success. Who portrays well the history of Gaul in its earliest and obscure eras, whereof the materials are widely scattered, recondite, conflicting, or vague, stretching over centuries, and having to do with the origin of races and the sources of national life, may hope to walk safely when he has passed out of the shadows of this historic night and traverses the eras from Charlemagne to St. Louis, from the great wars to the

* *The History of France*. By PARKE GODWIN. Vol. I. Ancient Gaul
New-York : Harper & Bro.

great ministries of Sully, Mazarin, and Richelieu, and from Louis XIV to the wasting revolution of 1789.

The work would be superfluous in a language rich with historical literature, but a thorough general history of France, gathered from original sources, and written with all the aids which recent French historians, antiquarians, and scholars, have made accessible, fills an empty place in English literature.

The present volume treats of Ancient Gaul, ending with the era of Charlemagne, and is, therefore, a history of France, before France began to exist—the annals of the French nation before a Frenchman was born. Charlemagne himself was a German of the Germans, a Belgian geographically, but a Frank of the old war-loving Teutonic stock, and not until the dismembered fragments of his empire began to strow the continent, was the enforced unity of Roman contrivance shattered forever. Then the seeds of vital nationalities were sown, and France, like Italy and Germany, the France of St. Louis and Richelieu and Napoleon, began to spring out of the earth.

Before proceeding to offer such remarks as we have to make upon this volume, let us at once disclaim any attempt to emulate that style of criticism, not without its examples in the history of American literature, which is yet so shameless and so impertinent—that criticism, we mean, which has for its prerequisite the assumption, by a stroke of the pen or the turn of a phrase, of the possession of an equal learning to that earned by the historian with the special labor of years. We have had no special acquaintaince with the period which Mr. Godwin unfolds, not more at least than every student acquires for himself, in such desultory ways as the intervals of leisure from other studies and the *Brodwissenschaften* permit. Moreover, we have neglected Sidney Smith's advice to "first review your book, then read it." We must confess that we have read it carefully from end to end, consulting such authorities as were accessible to us. But we may, perhaps, hope, as one familiar with the author's previous essays on political topics, to give some candid expression to our opinion of his first effort in the still higher department of historical composition, besides doing our readers the service of conveying to them a

more or less complete idea of its contents, with here and there such comments as the course of the narrative or the author's speculations may suggest. The high cathedral judgment which may be passed upon his work in these pages years hence, when *finis* shall have been written on its last leaf, would be out of place here and now.

Ancient Gaul (from Gael-tachd, the land of the Gaels, whence the Greek Galatia, Keltika, and the Roman Gallia) and the Gauls occupied more territory than France and the French of to-day. Add to France the cantons of Switzerland, the Rhenish provinces this side of the Rhine, add Belgium and a part of Holland, all once briefly recovered and again lost by the first Napoleon, and you fill the boundaries of Ancient Gaul. The waters of two oceans, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, of the beautiful Rhine, and two lofty mountain ranges, the Pyrenees and the Alps, are the natural surroundings of this lovely land. For all Europe its races have made or moulded history, and till within two centuries, have made its epochs the epochs also of the history of the world. On its soil Romanic and Germanic ideas waged their stupendous war; there only a barbaric monarchy flourished after the great invasion; there feudalism was at its best and worst estate, and there "royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, wrestling for centuries, achieved the most brilliant successes, and experienced the most disastrous defeats."

Eight or ten millions of people known abroad as Kelts* or Gaels, divided into three nations, and differing from each other in manners, customs, and laws, were its earlier occupants. Cæsar, of whom it is well said that it was his peculiar fortune to reveal to mankind, by his conquests, the ancestors of the three greatest modern nations, France, Germany and Britain, in spite of all later research, remains the best authority re-

* For reasons which will suggest themselves to every scholar, Mr. Godwin uniformly uses the spelling Kelt, Keltic, etc., instead of Celt, Celtic, etc., and as to the sense, conforms to the best practice also in using that as the *generic* designation of all the races to which it may be applied, while Gallic, etc., are used in the more specific, instead of the broad and popular sense, as applying chiefly to the central inhabitants of Gaul.

garding Ancient Gaul. Correcting his divisions by the discoveries of modern ethonologists, Mr. Godwin notes three distinct races, the Keltic, the Ibernian, and the Greek, of which, with their subordinate stems, their respective boundaries and affinities, a clear account is given.

Of the origin of this nation Mr. Godwin says little, accepting the theory of the ethonologists that all Europe was peopled from the East, as speculatively satisfactory, but deeming their deductions out of the sphere of history, which treats of progress and development.

This appears to us an extreme statement, overlooking something of truth. The science of ethonology, or of comparative philology, its foremost adjunct, is still an uncompleted edifice. But so far as it has yet progressed, we reckon its conclusions quite as worthy of credit as those which are constructed out of the dim, vague, and conflicting traditions of the early eras of any nation. When we consider to what corruptions the best of such poor authorities as we have of these obscure ages are, in the very nature of the case, subject; how the white light of truth must be refracted and broken a thousand times in its passage through the dense medias of early ignorance or blind credulity, and colored by the misrepresentations of hostile or conquering nations, or the reckless traditions of a superstitious fancy, it is but a distrustful credence that we can give to their legends when best attested. And making every allowance for the unfounded conjectures of antiquarians in search of evidence to support an ethnological hypothesis, of which Sir G. C. Lewis has spoken with such a contemptuous scepticism, we must still be permitted to think those records more authentic which are perpetuated in the language of every nation, victors or vanquished, literate or illiterate, populous or obscure, which make their unexpected revelations in the very phrases of partial tradition, and vindicate themselves in the words themselves of most mendacious chroniclers.

Indeed what Mr. Godwin himself has written of the early appearance of this restless, mobile, and eager race in general history and tradition, the forays of the Kelts in Spain, and their adventures in Italy, received its stamp of truthfulness

at the hands of ethonology. The traces of the Semitic words found in French are a better proof of the presence and deeds of the Phœnicians in Gaul twenty centuries ago, than those traditions of the Gauls themselves (not without a parallel in almost every race), of beneficent ameliorations wrought among them by a divine race of strangers; and, to our minds, are quite as positive an argument even, as that based on the fact, that the Romans found in Gaul skilful miners, workers in metal, and dyers, — arts for which the older Phœnecians had been distinguished. For, to make the argument valid, it needs to be proved that the Gauls were incapable of inventing such arts, and it is at least certain that they had invented quite as difficult ones (p. 39).

The Greeks, too, were early in Gaul, and the city of Marseilles dates its origin back to the advent of an armed pente-konter filled with Phœnecians two thousand four hundred years ago. Gallic invasions of Italy were equally remote in their period, and in that almost forgotten part, swept down before their advancing myriads, Etruscan arts and civilization, as in a later day Goths and Vandals overthrew the arts and the armies of Rome. There, indeed, the history of Rome began, a history from whose dark background this ruddy and stalwart race are hardly ever absent. They wandered over the world in search of adventure, helping Hannibal and Hasdrubal, and fighting at Thrasymene and Cannæ; they were the hirelings of Alexander the Great, they fought in the pass of old Thermopylæ, and under Cleopatra and Mithridates completed the circuit of the known world.

A tall, fair-skinned, yellow or auburn haired and keen-eyed people, they wore a showy barbaric dress, and though vain and loquacious, yet, like the French soldier of the Crimea and Morocco, exhibited a fiery valor in battle which “boiled the brains” and made them reckless of death. Like him, too, they were as despondent under defeat as intolerable in victory. Their weapons were long spears, heavy broadswords, and the bow and arrow, and in military genius Sallust reckoned them equal to the Romans. On the sea, too, the vessels of the Armoricans were nearly a match for the galleys of Cæsar.

Of their progress in civilization, Mr. Godwin collects from Strabo, and Pliny, and Cæsar, Athenæus, Polybius, and Ammianus Marcellinus, an interesting page, and we may refer to the second chapter of his work, treating of the character, manners, customs, government, and religion of the Gauls, as a model of condensation, and clear, accurate information happily conveyed.

The structure and spirit of Gallic society, however, were opposed to progress. There were but three classes—the priests or Druids; the warriors, who in peace administered civil affairs; and the plebs, who were almost or quite a servile class. Like the Hebrew tribe, the Greek phratry, the Roman gens, and the German sipschaft, the Gallic clan was a union of families afterwards extended in the usual way, by intermarriage, conquest and adoption. A certain number of clans formed a canton (*pagi*), and of cantons a state (*civitas*). Some states had common laws and magistrates, and made alliances, but the most were the clients and dependents of the few powerful ones. The organization of the priesthood, especially its arbitrary exercise of judicial functions, was equally an obstacle to progress. In his account of the doctrines of Druidism, the author follows the latest and best authorities, and the foot-notes to his well written chapter may serve to point the way to students who desire to pursue the subject further.

It is enough to mention here that God did not leave himself without a witness, even in so dark an age; the adoration of one Supreme Being, the belief of the immortality of the soul, and of a future state of rewards and punishments, and the hatred of images, were the principal articles of the Druidical creed, and the great moral object of Druidism, as expressed by itself, was “to reform morals, to secure peace, and to encourage goodness.”

Rome was two hundred years in expelling the Gauls from Cisalpine. “The lithe and sinewy Ligurians of the mountains falling upon them suddenly like the torrents, and dissipating like the mists, long baffled and thwarted their efforts.” But in time the Massaliotes needed the help of the Romans to repulse the Ligurians, and in turn invited them to a more

important conquest. About the year 122 before Christ, their first transalpine province was created, which had its principal city at the site of the present Narbonne, which in the course of time rivalled, then ruined, Massalia. When the Kymri and the Teutones, three hundred thousand warriors, with their wives, children, and old men, a few years later, after ravaging northern and central Europe, turned westward and descended upon Gaul, even this province, defended by consular armies, failed to stay their march, and it was stripped as naked as the rest of Gaul. Caius Marius, whose character De Quincey calls "massive and columnar in all its proportions," alone made head against them. He left Africa and his battles with Jugurtha, added to the veteran legions a rabble from the city stews, disciplined them to obedience and valor, with calm foresight and an indomitable will, laid his plans, for months pursued a masterly inactivity, and then joining battle with the barbaric hosts, in one day left a hundred and fifty thousand of them dead, to give to the soil so fertilized with blood, the name of Putrid Plains, and for his own part was proclaimed the fifth time at Rome, Consul. Later, on the Rhaudian Plains, Marius was again victorious, and grateful Rome decreed him divine honors and a sixth consulate. Relieved finally of these external dangers, Rome turned her monstrous energies upon herself, but during the civil wars of the next fifty years (101-59, B. C.), the provinces shared, as partizans, the quarrels of the Roman leaders, instead of opportunely reasserting their old independence, and so the foot of Rome rested firmly on the soil of the transalpine province. The conquest which Caius Marius had begun, was completed by him in whom Sulla saw many a Marius Caius. Julius Cæsar found Rome's possessions in Gaul a province and left them an empire.

The fourth and last chapter of the first book describes the conquest of Gaul by Cæsar. The classical scholar may wonder, perhaps, why so much space is given to a series of events already so tersely and eloquently narrated by the man himself who moulded them, and so familiar also to every schoolboy; but neither schoolboy nor scholar, we think, will be able to

read Mr. Godwin's condensed and graphic chapter without a new thrill of pleasure. There was no lack of authorities to prevent him from making it complete, and his own style gathers itself with a new vigor as he follows the writer and the soldier and his conquering legions through Gaul, from the fight with the migrating Helvetians on the Saône, through the victory over Ariovist and his Germans, and the desperate but victorious fight with the Belgic tribes ; in the conquest, at last, of the fleet of the Veneti, and in the sanguinary revenges of the sixth campaign ; through the unsuccessful siege of and retreat from Gergovia, to the terrible siege of Alesia, and the hard-won but decisive victory over all Gaul, dramatically closed by the final subjugation of the Vercingetorigh, who, six years later, was dragged from the dungeons of Rome to grace the multiple triumph of the great dictator, master of Rome, and "foremost man of all the world."

In his second book Mr. Godwin treats of the history of Roman Gaul. The narrative of events during this era (from B. C. 46 to A. D. 400), the era of the Heathen, and then of the Christian Roman Emperors, is prefaced by a chapter treating of the organization of Gaul by Augustus, and, by implication, of Rome itself in the Augustan age, and is followed by a chapter on the condition of Gaul toward the close of the Roman dominion.

For seven hundred years the power and dominion of Rome had greatened, till now the conquests of Cæsar, and the policy of the emperors, and the fulness of time, were fast bringing both to their highest pitch of splendor. Into this magnificent kingdom, surrounding the Mediterranean sea, with 3000 cities and 120,000,000 of people, speaking nearly a thousand different dialects, Gaul was incorporated by the matchless organizing skill of Rome.

"A large scheme of administration — of which the base was military force, but which combined flexibility with strength and policy with power ; which, though capable of the most crushing and cruel despotism, did not forget the attractive use of the superior arts, or the flatteries of graceful concessions — was devised to envelop, connect and regulate the universal movements of society. A splendid and omnipotent imperialism at the centre, which concentrated all political attributes in a single agent ; a magnificent net-work of roads, bringing

it into easy contact with the most distant parts ; a hierarchy of separate states and municipalities, each permitted its local and seemingly independent functions, yet strictly subordinated to the head, and executing its commands — describes in few words the main features of its external mechanism of control."

The burden of its support fell chiefly on the provinces, but the government was better than those which it displaced, and the spirit of discontent was absorbed in the enterprise newly awakened.

Moreover, "there were two means of civic agglutination which Rome used chiefly, and with consummate ability — the establishment of colonies, and the graduated distribution of the high boon of Roman citizenship. By the one she imparted herself to the world, and by the other she drew the world to herself."

With these more comprehensive statements prefaced, conceived in a truly philosophic spirit, Mr. Godwin enters into the details of the Roman organization. By the new territorial divisions (1, Aquitania, 2, Belgica, 3, Lugdunensis), old associations and patriotic traditions were broken up. The taxes were onerous and the military rule not inoppressive ; but instruments of amelioration accompanied these instruments of subjugation. Arts, literature and eloquence were transported along with the tax-collector and the military officer. Gallic genius was kindled into life and vigor, schools multiplied, and the Gauls of the old province were early distinguished as actors, orators and poets. Druidism was cautiously undermined in the upper classes by the decree of Augustus, that no adherent of it could be received as a Roman citizen, and among all classes it was more effectually extinguished by its submergence in the reigning polytheism. These changes were not wrought in a day. The tribes still had their sporadic struggles with the invaders, for centuries Druidism lingered in Armorica and Brittany ; but Primitive Gaul was Gaul no more. Her clans mingled their blood with the blood of other races, but after eighteen centuries of vicissitude and war, we shall still be able to recognize in their descendants, occupying their ancient places, the same genius which once taught eloquence to Cicero, and disputed victory with Cæsar.

On the stage where such a splendid drama as the Rise of Christianity and the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire

was enacted, the history of a subordinate province like Gaul recedes into comparative obscurity ; and, indeed, it is a curious fact, that some historians of Gaul, Père Daniel, and others, have omitted all reference to this period, and Sismondi, in his more elaborate work, allows but two brief chapters to the affairs of Gaul prior to the great invasions of A. D. 406. Mr. Godwin, however, has looked with a closer scrutiny into those vicissitudes of the empire in which the dependent province was involved. Taking a philosophic view of the long reach of time from the age of Augustus to that of Justinian, he discovers the key to its numberless and confused conflicts in the one struggle between two great principles — the imperial Centralization, representing the political and social unity of the Roman world, and tending to despotism ; and Federalism, which resisted an extreme political domination, and claimed for the parts of the great whole a certain subaltern political liberty and freedom of action. With well defined steps, the republic marched toward universal unity, while the provinces kept step with as regular an advance toward independence.

While the successors of Augustus were running the careers of vice, and grasping the reins of a more tyrannic power, the provinces were conquering local rights, and laying slowly the broad foundations of a federated power. While Tiberius was fighting the Germans, the offences of the revolting Sacrovir were forgotten or forgiven, and Gaul won a lengthened tenure for her governors. Even Caligula's madcap rule did not end this amelioration, and Claudius, who, like Caligula, was a Gaul by birth, balanced his persecution of Druidism by securing to the inhabitants of long-haired Gaul admission to the Roman senate, and the right to bear office ; the wrath of an intolerant polytheist thus overruled, and conducing to the benefit of his countrymen, not less than his temperate firmness in advocating the Roman policy of foreign adoptions. "The swart malignity, the stealthy rapine, and the shoreless pollutions" of Nero's reign, worked out the same opposite results ; for although Vindex, and Maric, and Civilis, and their project of a Gallic Empire failed, out of the wild storm of revolution wherein Vespasian won the prize of the purple, Gaul and the

provinces snatched the secret, that "elsewhere than at Rome emperors were created." Likewise in the reigns of the good emperors did this enlargement of municipal functions continue; nor was the peaceful equilibrium of federalism once seriously disturbed. Over the whole empire brooded what Pliny called "the immense majesty of Roman peace."

Passing from the era of Trajan and the Antonines to the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the last barrier which kept out the surging sea of violence and bloodshed that in Nero's time had overflowed the empire, and which now was so soon to return in the reign of Commodus and the dominance of the soldiery, Mr. Godwin does not fail to take note of that benefaction to Gaul, better than the favor of princes — the establishment of the first Christian Church, gathered by teachers from the Church of Smyrna, at Lyons, now the capital city of Gaul.

The barbarous persecutions which they suffered are faithfully recorded, and the historian lingers with an appreciative pen, over the serene death of the Bishop Pothinus, whose prayers had earlier mingled with those of the beloved companion of the beloved disciple, and the serene piety and sublime heroism of Blandina, the first saintly martyr "whom the pious gratitude of the Gallic Church has since raised to the skies." "In less than twenty years," says the historian, "the little original germ had grown to a vigorous tree. Nursed by the zeal and prudence of Irenæus, the successor of Pothinus, and the great luminary of the west, it became a champion of orthodoxy in Europe, and sustained many a powerful contest against the Gnostic and Manichæan heresies, while it dared to check even the overweening pretensions of Rome."

There is little during the reigns of Commodus and the wild military adventurers who succeeded him to detain one who traces the fortunes of Gaul and her citizens; citizens, we say, for as Thierry has proved, it was the mad Caracalla who completed the long series of Roman naturalizations, and consummated the social equalization of the empire, by granting the right of citizenship to all its free inhabitants, thus relieving with at least one beneficial act the long monotony of oppression and violence.

The project of a Gallic Empire, buried for two hundred years, was once more revived, and once more failed — this time through treachery, and not for a want of concord in the rebels.

Let us part with the historian here, to rejoin him again as he begins the recital of events in Gaul under the Christian Roman Emperors, leaving the reader to follow for himself the rapid vigorous sketch with which he recalls to our memory all the appalling disasters of those horrible times; the rushing of Oriental corruptions and superstitions; the degradations which befel the already degraded polytheism; the beginning of the barbaric invasions; the wild delirium and uproar in the time of the thirty tyrants; the twenty years of transient order and peace; the insurrection of the Bagauds; the tenth and last persecution of the Christians; and the gathering of all elements to the political overthrow of ancient heathenism. We are led aside from the current of the narrative to admire the truly remarkable skill with which, in a space so limited, Mr. Godwin has succeeded in painting life-like pictures of the events of this pregnant epoch, in spite of a paucity of materials in one portion of his subject, and an embarrassment of riches in another. Even the characters that figure in these scenes are sketched with an easy and free skill. Of many, history has left little record — the position of others upon the canvas is so obscure and subordinate, comparatively, that some dimness in their outlines might have been pardoned; but almost without an exception, what is drawn has such precision and mastery in the lines, though the lines be few or faint, that the character stands out a unity, and the scene a reality. This is partially owing to his power of vigorous, clear conception, and partly to a fine command of language. Mr. Godwin's vocabulary is a copious one, and although it includes few rare and recondite words, yet its wealth is taken largely from those ten or twenty thousand not in common use, but whose meanings every one knows, so that his style is far richer, and his thoughts cling longer to the memory, than if it included only those ten or twenty thousand whose meanings have become commonplace, and lack something of their first

sharp significance, as coins, from over-much handling, have their stamps effaced, and part with something of their first value.

In a brief note appended to p. 146, Mr. Godwin throws out a very original and striking observation. We allude to the remark, that from the time of Marcus Aurelius to the time of Diocletian, the provinces supplied Rome with her emperors, and that, too, in a remarkable order : first Spain, then Africa, then Syria and the East, then Illyria, then Gaul and Britain, the imperial circuit following the shores of the Mediterranean from west to east, and then from east to west, with a quite regular progress.

The history of Gaul under the Christian Roman Emperors is properly prefaced with a brief sketch of the character, establishment and progress of Christianity.

"That religion, described in its most essential and comprehensive features, may be said to have been the revelation of a new Fact, the exemplification of a new Life, and the annunciation of a new Society. At a time when the antique beliefs were exhausted of vital force, when the creative spirit of mankind was immersed and sunk in dead forms and pernicious moralisms, and when the whole social system was paralyzed or only convulsively alive, Christ came to declare a purer theism, to impregnate morals with a spiritual principle, and to regenerate society by means of new institutions and new humanitarian relations. His purer theism was contained in the doctrine of a transcendent assumption of humanity by the infinite Wisdom and Goodness ; his new life was the substitution of a free and disinterested love of God and of man for the servile love of self and of the world ; and his new society the "Kingdom of Heaven," or reign of God upon earth, destined to be manifested gradually in a universal organization of brotherhood and peace."

This masterly characterization of Christianity is followed by a sketch of the nature of the primitive churches, and their first teachers, and the developments of the new power, both as a doctrine and an institution. The Baptist reader will have satisfaction in observing how the unprejudiced studies of a candid historian have led him to the same conclusion regarding the nature of the first organized assemblies of Christian believers to which he himself has been led ; and in tracing with him the transmutations of that simple society of Christian brethren alternately into the barren and monkish asceticism of later times, or the vast and pompous superstitions and

imposing ritual of a church no longer catholic, he will rejoice that he adheres, amid every fluctuation and variance, to that simple organization which was sufficient for the apostles, to that pure creed and those divine ordinances imposed alone by the Great Head of the Church, and to those simple forms of worship where preacher and people, on common ground and with common needs, alike appeal to the High Priest of a perpetual advocacy.

It was Gaul that furnished to Rome an emperor when Christianity ascended to the throne of the world. For, whatever view we may take of Constantine himself, or of the union of Church and State, it is certain this, his era, was the turning point in the fortunes of the Church. He gave Rome a new organization, a new capital, and a new faith. But, like Alexander, his kingdom fell into feebler hands, unable to carry out his administrative reforms, and, indeed, both he and they were incapable of applying to the empire that remedy of superior efficacy which is yet to save the world. The murderer of his wife, and son, and nephew, the promoter of factions in an already disputatious church, a Christian because Christianity was the best policy, was not to be the harbinger of a millennial effulgence, whatever the dreams of ambitious bishops or a too sanguine laity.

In all the troubles of this momentous era, Gaul had a full share. The ardent controversy between the Arians and Athanasians waxed hottest there where Athanasius himself had once taught, and this, be it remembered, was in a day when to be a heretic was worse than to be a criminal, and when metaphysical and theological controversies were as bloody as secular quarrels. While the emperor and his court gave their time and heed to useless polemics or the prosecutions of heretics, hordes of barbarians overran the fairest province of the empire; and but for the genius and courage of Julian, who revived in Gaul the memory of the exploits of the first Cæsar, Roman Gaul might have been Germanized long before her time. The failure of the Apostate, when he came to the throne of Cæsar, signified the world's refusal to reconsider its decision against paganism, which Constantine had authorita-

tively announced — none the less authoritatively that his politic embrace of the new faith was not so pure as Julian's love for the old.

Jovian, the successor of Julian, undid his labors in a day, and by the time Theodosius died and the empire was divided never to be reunited, polytheism had been officially and finally extinguished in the civilized world, which now ranged itself with all its forces so entirely on the side of the Catholic Church that heresy had no better fate than heathenism. A long period of revolution, calamity, and decay, began with the death of Theodosius, for "the tottering thrones were occupied by mere puppet emperors, and behind them stalked the huge and heroic figures of the great German chiefs."

The concluding chapter of the second book is one of the most instructive in the present volume. It treats, as we have already said, of the condition of Gaul toward the close of the Roman domination. It has a backward and forward aspect, both showing the effect of four hundred years of Roman rule and how far the condition of things left Gaul at the mercy of, or capable of, resistance to the incursive Teutons, who are now beginning to thicken on all her borders.

By this chapter, if by nothing which has preceded it, the reader will be led to concede that Mr. Godwin has fairly rounded his claim to the high rank as historian, which in the beginning of this article we ventured to assert for him. Having acquitted himself well in his picture of the meeting and blending of nations so diverse in origin, manners, and religion, as the Gauls and Romans, he now prepares himself thoroughly for the still larger and more difficult task of describing the collisions and final intermixture of this mixed race with still another nation — the Germans from beyond the Rhine.

Nowhere has he contented himself with a narrative of the mere outer life of the nation possessing Gaul,—that life whose events are mainly wars and battles, and treaties, and trades; but he is always aiming to discover and present something also of its inner life; the thought and feeling of the people; the sentiments and ideas prevailing among them, whether pertaining to literature, laws, or religion; their origin and

growth and their final decay, or organization into living institutions or habits. In public events, he sees but the indices and exponents of social and individual forces. His pen is graphic in describing the natural features of the country, the soil and climate; but that is an inferior merit to the patient labor which gathers from all quarters whatever is extant regarding the industrial condition of a people, their progress or decline in agriculture, and commerce, and the arts, the relation of the cultivator to the soil, and of him who tills to him who rules. Who reads history now desires less the elaborate description of a courtly procession, of the color of a dame's brocades, the fineness of a knight's cloth, the ambling of horses, the foppery and finery which only changes its color and not its nature, from court to court and from age to age, than to read of the relation of class to class, of the king to the nobles, and to the plebs, and of each to each, of where the king's revenues come from and how they are gathered, of who pays taxes and to whom they are paid; and even the narrative of events whose law is that of time and place, however entertaining and picturesque, is unsatisfactory and inadequate, without the complement of that other and more philosophical species of history which has for its guide the law of cause and effect.

In this chapter, then, we are instructed regarding the political divisions and administration of Gaul, the classes of civic society, the manners and customs of the Gallo-Romans, and of the Christian society. True to the ancient ideas of government, the officers of the states, provinces, diocese and præfecture possessed no coördinate or independent powers, but were arranged in strict hierarchy, each in his degree representing the emperor and subject to his will—an administrative despotism with no local life—or if any, so obstructed and vitiated that the general assemblies of the provinces died out of inanition, the municipal assemblies (or *curiæ*) being the intermediate organs between the imperial authorities and the great body of subjects, exhibited great tenacity of life. Their local powers and duties included the regulation of the ceremonies and festivals of religion, the care of local properties and revenues, the preservation of order, the care of public health, and

supervision of weights and measures. Besides, they had to collect, or, at any rate, to pay the imperial taxes, raise recruits, furnish means of conveyance to civil and military officers travelling at the expense of the state, and execute the orders of presidents and præfects. They were paid by the proceeds of the public domain farmed out, and tolls on commodities entering the town. In dignity, freedom and scope these bodies fluctuated, but finally succumbed, to the encroachments of an overpowering centralism.

The higher classes were senatorials, or imperial dignitaries, and decuriones, or municipal dignitaries. The former were an idle and ornamental rather than active class, whose influence was derived from patrimonial wealth or honors. The latter, in law, were a kind of upper *bourgeoisie*, but in fact, the veriest slaves of the empire, for they were responsible jointly for the taxes—their estates securities for imperial dues; unable to resign office, and compelled to impose the same burden upon their children, they were willing to become bondmen, or marry slave-women, or join the barbarians to escape it. 'Death was denounced against whoever should conceal a magistrate trying to get rid of his magistracy.'

The third class consisted of the mechanics or free artizans of the towns and the small possessors of land in the country. The former had to adopt patrons among the upper classes; laws prescribed their wages and the prices of their products, and the public factories using slave labor oppressed them as much as the absentee system, and the exactions of the tax-gatherer oppressed the small possessors in the country. The servile classes suffered, one and all, the hard condition of laborers in a worn out and impoverished economy.

The general manner of life of the upper classes among the Gallo-Romans was not greatly different from that of the Romans themselves. They were enormously rich, and their days were devoted to a sumptuous and idle indulgence. Only a few, and these mostly Christians, devoted their time to books or public duties, or their wealth to generous charities. They spoke and wrote in Latin, though not of the purest: nor they alone, but the common people also; for the sermons and

homilies of the fifth century, and the farces of the theatre, addressed to the public of all classes, were in Latin. The ancient dialects were not wholly expelled in any part of Gaul, and neither the customs, manners, nor speech of the Romans made rapid way or permanent impression beyond the Loire. The science of the period was feeble, and its literature feeble or inflated.

The Christians were, to some slight extent, exceptions to this state of things: their principles were purer, their lives more active. But the monasticism which began on the burning Syrian sands, in time extended to the wet marshes and lofty hills of Gaul. St. Simeon, the Stylite, stood upon his pillar by the Euphrates but little longer than Wulfilach upon his in the forest of Ardennes. In the main, however, celibates outnumbered eremites, and asceticism was tempered by more active impulses. The bishops were the busiest men in Gaul, and, for cause, won wealth, standing, leadership, and power.

"Gaul, for the most part, accepted the doctrine and discipline of Rome. Pelagius, a monk of Brittany, raised a storm of controversy on the doctrines of divine grace; Cassian and the monks of Marseilles long asserted a vigorous semipelagianism; Vigilantius, a native of Gaul, though a Spanish presbyter, protested, like an early Luther, against the worship of martyrs and relics, and the assumed merits of celibacy; St. Vincent, of Lerina, admitted no authority in matters of faith, but the unanimous teaching of the doctors; and the impetuous St. Hilary of Arles, bearded Pope Leo in his chair when he pretended to the spiritual domination of Gaul; but, nevertheless, the more general sentiment of Gaul was uttered in the verse of St. Prosper of Aquitaine when he said: 'Rome, the See of St. Peter, made the head of the world in honor of the Apostle, holds by its religion what it no longer possesses by its arms.' "

The third book treats of Roman-German Gaul, from the beginning of the Christian Era to the end of the Merovingan Dynasty. In Germany Rome conquered less by her arms than by her arts. Here and there she made an alliance, won a battle, conquered a tribe, planted a colony or organized a province, but she never succeeded in subduing completely the ruddy and irrepressible tribes of the north as she had done those of the west; and it was not later than the reign of Marcus Aurelius before the Germans began to retort upon the empire all the cruel blows which their own country had suf-

ferred. The Saxons, the Franken, the Alemans, and the Burgunds leaguings in the middle of the third century, having brooded long over vast schemes of conquest and revenge and confederation, began those compacted and marshalled movements which are yet the wonder of the world.

"The Franks (A. D. 251) crossing the Rhine, traversing the whole length of Gaul, scaling the almost inaccessible heights of the Pyrenees, desolating the fair Capital of Spain, and transporting their ravages to the astonished shores of Africa; the Alemanic leaping the barriers of the Alps, descending upon the plains of Lombardy, and waving their victorious banners almost in sight of the Capital; and the Goths, quitting their settlements in the Ukraine to make themselves masters of the coasts of the Euxine; to desolate the fertile plains of Asia Minor, and the shores made immortal by the genius of Homer; to ransack the beautiful islands of the *Ægean*, and to burn the cities and temples of Greece, still filled, we may suppose, with the matchless sculptures and the unfaded pictures of the great Athenian masters."

It was thus that the final struggle began which ended in the transfer of the sceptre of the world from the weak and failing hands of the southern races into the strong and vigorous grip of those northerners who still continue to hold and sway it. In the tenth chapter this struggle is portrayed.

In Illyria, Alarik is biding his time; Radagast, with his two hundred thousand warriors, fords the Po, thrills the Apennines and meets a wasting defeat on the heights of Fiesole, where later Galileo watched the starry hosts, and the Suevi, the Vandals, and the Alans, sweep over and devastate Gaul. Rome, parrying the stabs at her heart, has no time to defend her extremities. For now Alarik marches his forces through Italy, and the shaggy "wolves of the Goths beleaguer the eternal hills. Three times the city is conquered, and three times the infatuated government perfidiously provokes the wrath of the victor, who now gives up her citadels, and palaces, and her inhabitants, to fire and the sword. In spite of defeats here and there, the barbarians maintain their encroachments in Gaul, till finally, under Theodorik the First, and on the basis of internal independence and external subjection, the first barbaric monarchy is founded north of the Loire, while south of the Loire the authority of the empire was little more than a name.

And now the great drama is for a little time interrupted by that tragic episode, the irruption of the Huns. Attila gathers his half-million of warriors — barbarians even to the barbarians — all the wild valor that for five hundred years had threatened civilization, and sweeping on from the Danube to the Rhine, begins the great invasion. Panic-stricken Gaul succumbs to war, pestilence, famine and the terrors of the “scourge of God and hammer of the world,” until Ætius, who had already run a splendid and infamous career against these very Wisigoths, and Franks, and Burgunds, and Armoricans, twenty years before, summons his hosts, and on the Catalaunian plains “Hunland meets Rome, and the earth is played for at sword-fence by two earth-bestrident giants, the sweep of whose swords cut kingdoms in pieces.”

But soon Attila retreats from Gaul, and, a little later, dies in his nuptial bed; the episode is ended, and the curtain rises upon the last act of the great drama. Old and new enemies of the dying empire arise, herself her own worst foe, — one after one the imperial phantoms flit, and before the sixth century begins, Odoaker, a barbaric mercenary, pronounces the decree of fate, and “this thing the empire cumbers the earth no more.” There are no longer Romans in Rome, and on the soil of once her fairest province, Chlodwig, “the eldest son of the Church,” lays the foundations of the Frankish monarchy.

Chlodwig comes upon the stage, finding Gaul distributed among the Bretons, who still cling to their old laws and manners in Armorica; the Saxons, who lingered in the environs of Bayeux, and among the islands of the Loire; the Wisigoths, who had conquered, under the successor of the Theodoriks, the country between the ocean, the Loire, the Rhone and the Alps; the Burgunds, who held Eastern Gaul from the foot of the Vosges to the river Durance; and the Franks, who, from the time of Aurelian, had been steadily and bravely advancing in their conquest of Northern Gaul — conquering it from the Romans, adopted as Roman citizens, and defending it with them from the Huns, yet themselves the only pagans in Gaul. Passing lightly over the long and vehement debates among the French antiquarians regarding the origin and

early movements of the Franks, Mr. Godwin fastens at once upon that point which is of most interest to the thoughtful reader—the fusing of the old Roman and the new German elements of civilization, wherein the Christian Church and its representatives were the active flux. Soon Chlodwig, his sister, and three thousand of his warriors, are baptized, and in a day this scion of the royal race of demi-god or sea-warrior Merowig is transformed from one of the few kingly worshippers of Odin to the only orthodox monarch of Europe. His conversion consolidates his power in Northern Gaul, and he is soon urged by his ecclesiastical patrons to conquer the conversion of the Burgunds, and later, makes use of the same effective arguments, the lance and the battle-axe, to convince the Wisigoths of their heresies. Theodorik's aid of them, in resorting to similar arguments, cheated Chlodwig out of entire success, but the final result was the extension of his power over the two Aquitains, and the title of consul, conferred by the Emperor of the East. The title helped the prelates to enforce their arguments for a more centralized government, and the greater subjection of the Frankish tribes. The native and Roman society was represented mainly by these bishops, who now had come to have in the popular mind an awful sanctity, and over the popular heart an almost irresistible power. In spiritual and civic affairs they were alike potent, having almost equal authority in the local affairs and creeds of the poor subject, as over the conscience and policy of the powerful monarch. The Salic law reveals the fact, however, that at the end of Chlodwig's reign the social and political constitution of the Franks was nearly the same with that imparted by Tacitus to the ancient Germans. The family-bond, ranks, free-companionage, the weregild, are all the same. But two significant facts, which appear here as they appeared in the conclusions of the Council of Orleans, showing the growth of the royal power and the expansion of the authority of the priesthood, signally mark the fusion and the flux of which we have spoken. Mr. Godwin has duly emphasized their importance, for he does not forget that Chlodwig was not only the founder of the mightiest barbaric monarchy, but the only one which was

durable — a monarchy which owed its ascendancy and life to this curious blending, and so continued through all the fierce fusions and ferments of the great age of transition, till antiquity itself was swallowed up of feudalism, and the elements of the modern world were knit and rounded into shape.

In the opening of his twelfth chapter, this intermixture of various elements is more completely analyzed, the character of the barbaric conquests explained, the jurisdictions of their officers and the nature of their laws set forth, and the changes wrought among the Franks themselves by the conquest especially marked. But for this discernment and perpetual recognition of the principle underneath, we should have no patience with the record of such confusion of races, classes, societies, and individuals — such ferocity and dissensions, incests, broils and violence, massacres and rage, as fill the annals of the five hundred years from Chlodwig to Charlemagne.

Chlodwig found the kingdom of the Franks a small part of Gaul. His sons left it covering nearly all of Gaul and a part of ancient Germany. To these German tribes of course the influences of Roman civilization did not extend. They had their own customs, government, and laws, but still were subject to the Franks, and only in process of time assimilated to the condition of the conquerors.

The division of Gaul among the sons of Chlothar, "different in character, rivals from position, and perpetually at feud with some or other of their powerful nobles, their history becomes a long, truculent, tumultuous, bloody, and dreary tragedy, in which there are few lights and many glooms. The events of it, moving forward in the midst of innumerable episodes of intrigue and crime, attain, however, a certain dramatic unity and interest in the great struggle of the kings and the aristocracy, which finds its culmination or catastrophe in the disastrous overthrow of the royal line of Chlodwig, and the signal triumph of the leudes."

Two figures stand out prominently in these boisterous times, and they are of women. Over against the devilishness of Fredegunda it is fortunate for his art that the historian was permitted to set the noble character and life of such a woman as

the royal Brunahilda, the daughter, mother, grandmother and great-grandmother of kings, and one of the foremost women of the world. Her faults of pride and vindictiveness were those of her age ; beyond these, she was

“a noble, great, indomitable soul, endowed with the rarest capacities, influenced in her general conduct by the larger civic motives, and worthy of a place by the side of the Theodoriks and Charlemagnes. Like them she could embrace great plans of human amelioration while the stormiest passions were heaving society around her ; like them she was interested in literature, in religion, in the improvements of industry, and in the establishment of social order ; but like them, too, she committed the fatal error of recurring to an old system of things, under circumstances too entirely new to admit of its application.”

The Roman methods of government and society were effete already in the time of Theodorik of Italy, and they were much more so in the time of Brunahilda. For although a Wisigoth by birth, she was yet a thorough Roman by education, training, and desire. The constitution which she caused her son to promulge at the annual Marz-feld of the Franks, the year before his death, would have cut up by the roots the Germanic system. She labored to restrain the great proprietors in their headlong aggrandizements, and though she thus secured the favor of the small free proprietors, and the mass of the Romanized Franks, and many of the priests, she incurred the hatred of the leudes, and also of many of the bishops of Roman origin, who, being ranked with the leudes, had come to adopt the prejudices and interests and ambitions of their class, in the great struggle between the aristocracy and the kings.

The virility of the Merovingan kings was exhausted. This woman was worth a whole dynasty of the others. They had kept themselves at the head of things by the sword, doing nothing to compose the turbulence of affairs. The same atony marked society itself. All the literature, and art, and science, were dead. Credulous legends and lives of the saints took the place of literature and philosophy, and the successors of the early disciples were brawlers, gamblers, drunkards, adulterers, and fighters.

The fourth and last book treats of the affairs of German Gaul, beginning with the wars of the Leudes, including the

mayoralties of Pippin, of Karl-Martel, the mayoralty and reign of Pippin the Short, and the reign of Charlemagne, ending with the dissolution of the empire of the Franks.

Montesquieu (*Esprit de Lois*) remarks that before this time (Clother II), the mayor was the mayor of the king; now he became the mayor of the kingdom: the king had chosen him; he was now chosen by the nation. The distinction is sustained by the authorities, and is so far in accordance with analogy of events as to be a proper landmark and division of the period whose history is now begun to be traced. The royalty had become enfeebled, and power passed over to the great proprietors, leudes and bishops, and by the beginning of the seventh century this new order of men, called Mayors of the Palace, began publicly to assume what for some time they had already more or less generally wielded — the supreme political power.

The battle of Testri, in 687, fixed this power in the hands of the mayors securely — and those, too, issuing from the great ducal house of Pippin of Herrstall; thus, at one stroke, rendering forever impossible what the weakness and pliancy of the wasting quarrels of the original inhabitants of Gaul, the Gallo-Romans, had already made quite improbable — an instauration of Roman customs, and laws, and rules, and restoring instead the Germanic customs and methods of their conquerors. The same principle, however, which established a new dynasty, made its early years full of turbulence and uproar. In the same spirit of pride and independence, many chiefs broke away from the central and larger power, and the reign of the first Pippin was too short to compel or persuade a return of their allegiance. His bastard son, Karl, the Hammer, was more energetic and more successful. But in these victories over men of his own race, he was only preparing to fight the battle of Christianity on that great day of Tours, when it grappled with Islamism in a deadly and decisive conflict. The followers of Mahommed, burning with religious zeal, had already conquered Spain, and now disputed the supremacy of Gaul, but the descendants of the men who had braved the terrible blows of the "hammer of the world," and

rescued Christian Europe from an impending heathenism, now, under Karl the Hammer, rescued her from the reign of Islamism, and broke the power of the Arabs north of the Pyrenees forever. Karl fought the battles of civilization with the exchequer of the church, and if some of the clergy called his confiscation of the ecclesiastical estates a sacrilege, the historian owns that without the aid of one of their number, St. Boniface, the battle of Christianity could never have been won.

The first chapter of this book concludes with a sketch of Karl's more intimate relations with the rising power of the papacy. The attentive reader will not fail to notice that it was in the reign of Karl-Martel, which coincides with the pontificates of Gregory I and II, and, indeed, by the aid of Karl himself, that the complete temporal independence of the papacy was established, and while tracing the effects of this intervention in the politics of the peninsula long after, as they appear in the foundations of Charlemagne's stupendous fabric of western empire, he will not fail to glance still further into the future, and observe how time has wrought his slow ravages by putting into the hands of the third Napoleon, ruling in the same land, the hammer which a thousand years later smote the same temporalities, which the ignorant but vigorous Gregory then acquired from the hands of the ignorant and feeble Pius.

With Karl-Martel the Merovingan race ran out. Society had made one step forward, and the hour was fully come when the mayor of the palace should be proclaimed king of right and by title, as he had long been in fact. Germanism had fairly conquered Imperialism, Christianity had slain Paganism, and now found its worst foes within, and it was not strange that the champions of both should assume the supreme power. Karloman became a tonsured monk, while Pippin, lifted on the shield by the Franks, was also crowned and anointed by St. Boniface; and now the reign of the Karlovingan dynasty begins. Seven years of hard fighting conquered Septimania from the Arabs, and ten years won Aquitaine and Wasconia, and Pippin, carrying on with vigor the work which his father

the first Karl, had begun, left to his sons a sceptre which swayed from the Pyrenees to the Rhine, and under the greatest Karl swayed from the Atlantic to the Adriatic.

The first great figure upon the historic stage was that of Julius Cæsar conquering Gaul for Rome—the last great figure is of Charlemagne, from Gaul guiding the destinies of Rome. In the one, the ancient world culminated, as with the other, the modern world began.

It is needless to draw here the lines which mark that colossal individuality, or to recount the familiar record of his days—how when his brother died, all France hastened to become a united monarchy in his hands; how at the height of Ehresburg he smote the Saxons in the forehead of their faith; how he reduced Pavia, and annexed Lombardy, and won back the Spanish march, and what traditions of glory his falling Franks bequeathed at Roncesvalles; how he reduced Saxony and tried to reform the Saxons with baptism; and that failing, with a bloody revenge; and that too failing, with the gentler appliances of concession and magnanimity; how he made his son Pippin King of Italy, and Ludwig of Aquitain, and filled these years of combat and carnage with civil labors, not less prodigious; how he extended his dominion over the long Slavonic frontier, and with what a triple series of victories conquered Saxons, Saracens, and Huns, so widening his dominions to their last limit; how he sat as judge at the trial of a holy pontiff, and by him a little later was crowned and hailed Emperor and Augustus; with such dramatic close, consummating his magnificent and life-long policy of rendering Europe his single empire, and the empire a united christendom.

Not unaware how many distorting legends and magnifying myths fill the cycle of Carolingian romance, how widely the Charlemagne of the *trouvères* differs from his historic prototype, we must still be permitted to think that the annals of his friend and companion, Einhard, his own letters, and those of his friend Alcuin, to say nothing of the *Gesta* of the anonymous monk of St. Gall, and other chroniclers, furnish materials which would have made another sheet as interesting as any that are written. We could have desired, if not a more

copious biography, at least one richer with local coloring and detail. Of the appearance of the cities of the period, of the manner in which Karl ordered his court, of his dress, his personal habits, and daily life, we could have desired further particulars.

We must think, also, that Mr. Godwin has erred both in the severity and the leniency of his judgment of Charlemagne's moral character. While he does not reprobate with sufficient severity his sensuality, he has judged him too harshly in likening his decapitation of the four thousand Saxons, to the deed of Napoleon at Joppa.

Making all allowance for the strong passions of such a man as the rough Karl, it still remains true that he had access to, and professed to be guided by christian principles. To be sure concubinage was the custom of the age, and illegitimacy was no disgrace, least of all in princes, and did not divert the succession; but Charlemagne tried to make the laws of morality the laws of the state, and should have made them the laws of his own life. The worst fact against him is his tolerance of the love intrigues of his daughters, whom he never would suffer to marry, but permitted to bear children. It is a curious fact, by the way, that the principle of legitimacy strictly carried out would have dethroned himself, for Pippin, his own grandfather, was a bastard son of Karl Martel. Mr. Godwin mentions all the wives and all the concubines of Karl, but we have missed an allusion to the contemplated marriage with the Grecian Empress Irene, one of the magnificent "might have beens" of history, a union after a thousand years of the empire of the East and West.

But Charlemagne does not deserve to be called bloodthirsty. De Quincey has stated some of the arguments which go to show that the likening of his conduct towards the Saxons to Napoleon's treacherous butchery is unjust. Charlemagne's course was a matter of policy, wherein he may have erred, as indeed the event proved that he did, but where the most tender-hearted might choose the most vindictive punishment as in the long run the least sanguinary. His clemencies were numberless, and it is no more than just to judge in their light

this one instance of Roman severity. Mr. Godwin differs from De Quincey more widely in not reiterating some of his praises of a king who, whatever his solid or shining qualities, failed to consolidate his empire or to regulate the succession to the throne—omissions which hastened the dismemberment of his empire, and left it the prey of rival factions.

Mr. Godwin's style is characterized especially by a masculine vigor and directness. Nor is it lacking in flexibility, for his vocabulary is copious, and his construction of sentences not at all monotonous. Often it is brilliant, sometimes artfully dull, and always well-weighted with thought or fact. Resembling both Macaulay and Carlyle in his minuteness of research, he has little of the extravagant rhetoric of the one, and nothing of the riotous humor of the other. The reader would have pardoned an occasional relaxation of his perpetual gravity. Carlyle emptied the litter of his note-books and the trials of his patience upon the pages of Frederick I. Mr. Godwin's notes are more than the chips of the workshop, and if the citations of authorities are numerous, their results are filtered into a clear text. Bancroft's weakness, the historical present, and his mosaic system, have not been among the author's models. He has also preferred his own conciseness to another's sententiousness, and by sacrificing something of an elaborate and painful brilliance, is the gainer in repose.

In this respect, however, he is not faultless; for, as many historians have done before him and many will do hereafter, sometimes he has sacrificed a modicum of truth to a brilliant antithesis. We must take leave to think that Cæsar's (Bell. Gall. l. vii, c. 78) describing the expulsion of the feeble and aged with their wives and children by the besieged Gauls at Alesia, and the refusal of Cæsar to receive them, hardly compels the construction placed upon it. In more than one instance Mr. G. has violated a pure taste by the sacrifice of delicacy for the sake of pointedness, of decorum for strength. The phrase "cortive chroniclers," (p. 385,) is vulgar. There was no need to call Fredegunda a "she-wolf" when the recital of her deeds had amply displayed her character. That is not a felicitous use of Shakspeare's phrase on p. 341. The compar-

ison of the repentance of Hilperik and his wife to the fading of the morning dew has had its day, and in the story of Pipin's death there is a phrase about the sands of life which reminds us too forcibly of the quack advertisement ; but it is only fair to say that in no other instance, except occasional inconsistencies in the use of names, so far as we recollect, has there been an equal carelessness, and the reader will look in vain for the repetition of those common-place metaphors and *jejune* comparisons which are the most conspicuous faults in Mr. Prescott's style. On page 402 we notice the use of "protracted" in the sense of delayed or postponed, indefensible, we think, and frequently we have found "whet" for whetted. The Western vulgarism "took ill" is no improvement on the old word sickened. There was no need and little pretence for the slap at American fire-eaters in a foot-note on p. 219. But having said so much, we have quite emptied our hearts of any objections we may have had to the minor morals of his book. It may go for praise that they are so few. In the next volume may they be less.

ARTICLE V.—ART EDUCATION :

THE PLACE ART SHOULD TAKE IN A CHRISTIAN EDUCATION.

AMONG the Greeks and Romans, the ancient representatives of thorough culture, Art took the place of Religion in the schools for youth ; for Art with them was Religion. There must be within men something more than the convictions of an instructed intellect ; nothing but a power that can subdue, and mould, and rule the impulses of human sensibility, is an adequate safeguard against the uncontrolled sway of passion in man's social relations. In all ages, and among all families of mankind, this power to control the human soul has been sought in the influence of religion ; and, hence, early religious training has been the foundation of education among barbarians and Greeks, among Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians ; that education being more purely and directly religious in proportion as intellectual refinement has been less understood and relied upon. The religion of the Greek and Roman was essentially an admiration of the true, the beautiful, and the good ;* the worship of the *qualities* of the creature, and, in some measure, of *separate attributes* of the Creator, instead of the adoration, love, and service of a personal God, whose power and Godhead were revealed by his works. Art Education, therefore, was religious education, or, at least, its chief feature, among "the wise of this world" who knew not "the wisdom of God."

The rationalism of Germany has reconstructed this artistic, rather than philosophic, religion. No one has drawn it out more fully and purely than De Wette, in his *Theodore* ; in

* The idea of The Right and The Holy, as may be shown in another paper they were practically ignorant of.

which his ideal candidate for the holy ministry of the new gospel is represented as converted at an opera, and spending years in cultivating the *love of art* now awakened; who, having finished his education for the holy office amid the galleries of art in Italy, takes his leave of the reader while standing on the roof of that model of Gothic architecture at Fribourg, lifting up an impassioned prayer to the Great Unseen that a genuine revival of pure and undefiled religion may pervade and transform Germany, even the revival of a chastened taste in church architecture and in sacred music. The important question for Christians is, "May there not be a truth of value hid among the rubbish of this mass of manifest error?" Let us see.

That is an instructive as well as attractive aspect in which our Creator is presented, when He is called "The Father of the spirits of all men;" and that is a touching exhibition which He himself presents of this relation, when of Israel, his ancient children, He says: "I taught them to go, taking them by the hands;" as if the mother's nursery training for the body, as well as the father's instructing of the mind, were alike his Divine care. There is a new force in that command to us, as parents and instructors, "Train up a child in the way in which he should go," when thus we find that God, who made all other creatures on earth to need no education, either for their bodily or intellectual capacities, has made man to be dependent for the training of his youthful powers; wedding the body as a fit mate to the spirit in this need.

Shall we, then, neglect the equal attraction and instruction revealed in the *method* which God has employed to impart this two-fold instruction? We read that ere He formed man, an infant in capacity, yet in his own spiritual image, He made every thing in the garden abode which was to be his child's nursery, *first of all*, "pleasant to the sight." The first, deepest, most important impression to be made on man, the living soul, was that of beauty in objects addressing the eye. We were made to study God's works that we may learn their material uses, and avail ourselves of their nourishing aliment, their refreshing odors, and their superhuman working ener-

gies. We were made to search into the laws and ends of all things created, that our intellects may be enlarged, our judgments instructed, our sensibilities chastened, our spiritual energies strengthened, and our souls, as well as bodies, be thus fed and made to live. But when now, as in Eden, the infant soul first feasts its eye upon the objects around it, and as the mind first begins to open, in that period when days are years, and a year a life-time, and day after day and year after year life seems given for nought but the pleasures of sight, and every hour is an elysium of delight, must it not be true that they have been in the right who have believed, and acted on the belief, that the power of beauty in plastic forms was meant to be man's first, and most controlling because earliest instructor and moulder for true spiritual life?

It was the glory of the Greeks as a nation, that, more than any other known people of earth, they recognized and appreciated this divinely ordained influence for good, the power of beauty in plastic forms as an instructor and refiner of the human spirit. They had devoted to the work of teaching the young such men as Pythagoras in the Mathematical Sciences, Aristotle in Logic, Plato in Metaphysics, and Socrates in Morals; and it is wondrous to look in upon an age when the greatest men of the world thought the position of true influence, honor, and exaltation, to be the chair of the teacher of youth. But among such teachers as these, before them, and ever associated with them as their appreciated co-laborers, we behold a class of instructors unknown in our land. Beginning with Eumolpus, a century before Socrates, we find not only in the academies and higher centres of learning, but also in the common schools for boys, a class of teachers instructing each pupil in the principles, and even training them to the execution, of plastic art.

It may be wise in us to draw near and look in at the schools of such men as we have named; to see the noble forms of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras moving among groups of boys that have laid aside the manuscript and the stylus, that all together they may take up the pencil, the brush, and the chisel. Let us stand at their sides for an hour, and ask

them what is this power they employ, why they seek its influence, how they apply it, and what are the results of its culture.

Education, which, among the stern Romans, as their word implies, was the forced drawing out of the infant faculties, was among the over active Greeks *παιδεία*, or training; a word which implies that the child's capacities, sprouting of themselves to an exuberant growth, need only to be bound like a vine to the trellis, or yoked like a heifer to the plough. Plato, writing with the advantage of generations of great teachers preceding him, divided the work of education into two departments; *ἡ παιδεία, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι, γυμναστικῇ, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ, μουσικῇ;* "training, that for the body gymnastic, and that for the soul musical." With the first department, gymnastic, or training for the development, strengthening and chastening of the physical powers—a word which, by a happy metaphor, the Germans have applied to their schools or colleges preparatory to the University, because in them it is the *training*, not storing of the mind which is sought—with the gymnasia and gymnastic education among the Greeks we cannot now pause to seek an acquaintance. It is to the halls of their Muses we turn our steps; to the cloistered retreats of those at first *three*, afterwards *nine* sister teachers, who meet us, not with the Roman's rough and masculine voice, but with the Greek's feminine grace. Their very aspect, winning to the youthful spirit, gives a new sweetness to the name they first applied to academic halls, "*Alma Mater*." This name of sentiment we find alternating with another of material import, as roving through their combined nurseries and treasures of art, we hear their own familiar word *Musæum* constantly employed. We look down as well as around, and are impressed with the exuberance of their labors, since our feet even are treading upon tessellated floors all set with gems of beauty most finished in detail and most wondrous in their combined perfection; and we wonder not to hear them give their name, "*mousaics*" or mosaics, to this rarest art. It is to these lovely sisters in this sweet retreat we come to ask what they teach, and how, and why; and what they promise us if we will give them employ in our children's schools and our academic halls.

A brief word of explanation as to who these sisters are, they will allow at introduction. When Plato wrote of the second department of education as "*ἡ μουσική*," the musical, it was a name drawn from these nine sisters, among whom the mistress of song is too much, perhaps, our only favorite. When, a century before Plato we read of Pythagoras, who wrote over his school door, "*οὐδείς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω*," let no one not a geometrician enter, that, stern mathematician as he was, he opened his school with *music*, we are not to suppose vocal and instrumental music, according to our usage of the term, is all that is meant. It was rather the eye than the ear that the old Muses addressed. The names of the first three, *Melete*, meditation, *Mneme*, memory, and *Aoede*, expression, show that it was the whole range of mental culture over which, in their first simplicity, the Muses presided. When, with advancing mental development their number was increased to nine, their names and offices were *Calliope*, or the beautiful-voiced, who presided over eloquence; *Clio*, or renown, over history; *Melpomene*, or heroic song, over tragedy; *Euterpe*, the delighter, over the opera; *Erato*, the lover, over lyric romance; *Terpsichore*, the charming dancer, over dancing; *Urania*, the celestial, over astronomy; *Thalia*, or the blooming, over comedy; and *Polyhymnia*, the many-hymned, over rhetoric or literary harmonies. Gathered by *Pallas Athene*, in the city called after her Athens, the name Muses became the synonym for beauty in spirit, character, sentiment, expression, and action, as well as beauty in the forms of painting and sculpture; these latter becoming in their hands but means of attaining the former. These are the sister teachers who wait for our acquaintance.

Drawing near, then, we inquire from them what it was they specially learned in Greece to teach? and how they propose to enter upon the training of our children, should we deign to commit them to their care? "Courteous friends," their queen replies for them, "we can only tell the story of our life and labor in fair Greece, once moulded by our power. We are pictured as having sent out Orpheus, with the power of *Music*, to charm the forests, and the wild beasts, their denizens, when

Hellas itself was a wild waste ; the simple idea of which is that by the power of beauty in material forms and human utterances, rude man is first awakened to a love of refinement. As soon as man in the rudeness of nature was thus captivated by our charms, we pointed out to woman, most susceptible to our arts, that children, even in savage barbarism, show early a love for our delights ; and that if but surrendered to our training, a race refined by culture would soon repay her solicitude. We pointed out to her (and Aristotle, in his *Politics*, is witness to this our teaching) how nurses caught our idea ; and while partly by the dandling of gymnastics they sought to soothe the fretful babe, they added, as more potent, their song of lullaby ; and we hinted to the nurses that the more melodious the strain and the sweeter the voice in their infantile education, the nobler the sentiments and the more gracious the affections of the child would prove in after years. When the next stage of life, childhood following infancy, arrived, we taught mothers to put gayly-dressed dolls, and other forms of beauty, in the hands of their children, now prepared to feel the power of plastic art ; and we easily made a mother comprehend that the more truly refined and artistic the image, the greater for the hour, and the more permanent and inexhaustable the child's delight. Thus far advanced, we could take another step still in our growing work. Plato and Aristotle will report it to you ; yes, even your western compiler, the Frank named Barthelemy, in his skilfully wrought fiction of the visit of Anacharsis the Scythian to our land in the days of Solon, has well analyzed our work. We hinted to the teacher in the primary school, that he watch how the boy longs to be an artist, ere any other yearning is seen to start in his breast. As the nursery song has lulled his almost unconscious ear in infancy, so, now a child, ere he thinks of tasking himself to the mechanical work of talking, he begins already to hum the nursery melody, and learns to sing as readily as birds do. As carved and moulded forms of beauty charmed his infant gaze, so in babyhood the book-drudgery of reading is pushed aside, and there is no delight like a pencil to draw with, and a pocket-knife to carve with. And in all this we appealed to

men thus: Has He who planted the eye and the ear no knowledge, that He should have erred in forming us with this love?

Thus leading men's minds progressively on, we called forth more and more attention to art as a power to nurture and refine the mind. First, simple drawing in outline, the pastime of the rudest savage and of the child, was chastened in our hand to the perfection of a graceful art. Then sculpture, the moulding into rounded form the graceful limbs and delicate features of manly strength and womanly elegance, was made a study. Then painting, which groups many forms and adds color, and rounds out from the flat canvas stereoscopic projections of animated forms, was our added achievement. Then architecture, the grouping and combining of sculptured forms in ascending towers and heaven-aspiring temples, till abodes courting the indwelling of the Deity were made to rise,—this art formed our yet aspiring study. Then, last of all, the climax approaching the Creator's work, landscape and villa and city groupings; now the actual creating of what the painter could only make a miniature sketch; now the heaping together scores of temples, towers, castles, palaces, and miles of battled walls; and now the bold cutting of snow-capped Athos into a single royal form, for whose head the stars should be a coronet, and the clouds a robe, in whose right hand a city might find room to spread its walls, while from his ample left a broad lake should pour its streams, like rivers, on every side. It was at the period when that important stage in the progress of our work had been reached, the adding to figures of life size in the foreground a deep retreating background filled up according to the laws of perspective—it was at this juncture, a century before Plato's day, that Eumolpus of Sicyon, near Corinth, began to demand our admission into the Common Schools of Greece. The noble people of that honored city were the first in Greece to acknowledge our claim. Soon Athens, who then had not yet seen her Solon, placed in her schools for the sons of all the people instructors in the plastic arts among other teachers; and all Greece followed and provided for the sons of every freeman the training which made

each future freeborn citizen himself an artist, and of course an admirer and patron of art. Plato and Aristotle saw and spoke of only the dawning glory of our influence on the national character ; but Quintilian and Pliny, foreigners of later times, have recorded the climactic history of our final triumphs. Not only were art teachers introduced into all the public schools, but ambitious aspirants for popular power, like Pericles, had their musical as well as gymnastic preceptors. Soon even the grammar teacher was required to be an artist, a pupil of the Muses, that he might teach the boys to form gracefully the letters of the language in their writing, as well as to express in graceful tones and forms of rhetoric the ordinary words of conversation.

And soon the transforming influence of this culture began to show itself in the whole air of Athenian society. A most intelligent criticism in the people reacted upon the artists to chasten their style, and their growing refinement again reacted on the people. The simple copies of nature in the unimpassioned pictures of Dinoysius, the over-wrought and distorted representations of frenzied passion by Panson, and the towering forms of heroic men sketched by the pencil of Polygnotus were thoroughly comprehended and justly characterized by the humblest peasant who looked upon them. Even in the army the nice application and the resistless power of our art was displayed. This was witnessed when an able Lacedæmonian general, taking advantage of the early culture of his men, resorted to this expedient at a moment when closeness of ranks and a slow but steady and unbroken advance of the entire phalanx was indispensable to success. Ordering the braying trumpets and the clangorous cymbals, which excited the soldiery instinctively to rush impetuously, and of course disorderly, to the charge, he commanded a band of flute players to advance and lead the van, by whose soft and soothing strains the already over-excited ranks were quieted to a calm, but firm step. The happy influence of this nurture showed itself also in the chastened devotion it awoke, and in the strong bond of fidelity it wove, by which to prompt and to bind to patriotic fidelity the ambitious leaders of the Athenian de-

mocracy. Pericles was an instance; who, as Plutarch records, was accustomed to address a prayer to the gods always, before speaking in public, "that there might not unawares a word escape him unsuitable to the occasion." Demosthenes was still more a monument of the power for good gained by this art-training, because he could always fearlessly and successfully attack and overcome the prejudices of the Athenians in matters of opinion, since he never offended their artistic tastes.

Here, as if the suggestion had been awakened by the Muse's own discourse, our practical American patrons of education perhaps break in upon the thread of these sisters in their address. "We," say the modern and transatlantic visitors to the Muses' Academy—"we wish nothing but what is *practical* in the training of our youth. We live not in such days as those of the old Greeks, when *men* could afford, as well as women, to dream away life in poetry and adoration of art. Here 'no pent up Utica contracts our powers,' a whole continent is open to our individual conquest; each man must struggle for dominion in the race and contest of our life, and our young men must have a sterner education than can be wrought out by courting the Muses."

Well suggested, ambitious aspirant of the Western world! I admit your demand, but shall I frankly tell you that for want of proper culture from us, you are certainly to fail in the very object you seek. You seek a practical education adapted to the end of success in life in a land of popular equality, where to be a prince a man must know how to meet and mould to his will the popular mind. This thing of a practical education is a more difficult matter, perhaps, to decide and adjust than you may suppose. English energy, French vivacity, German astuteness, have all been bent to the inquiry for centuries, and we Muses can see how all these combined in you Americans leave yet a lack. We see your public men, your aspiring geniuses, go hurriedly by the halls where we hold our court, past the galleries where our votaries gather their collections of art, on to the halls where they seek to build their power; and we know they lack one thing in their training without which they certainly fail. And that is the very lack

we are ready to supply. We admire the steady nerve, the comprehensive and resistless grasp, given to the mind by the mathematics ; we have seen it in your West Point training, in the men who can not only steadily advance to take the fortress, but who there can hold what they have gained ; and we have seen in contrast, your brilliant but undisciplined sons of genius gaining at a bound a lofty eminence, but sinking as quickly from it, because the soil is shallow and they have no root fastened into it. But forget not, courteous man of the West, that our Pythagoras, too, knew full well the same power ; that skill in the mathematics was the indispensable requisite to admission into his school ; and yet we were placed, nevertheless, at the head of all his teachers. We have admired again in England's galaxy of great men, the influence of thorough training in the languages of Greece and Italy, our ancient classic lands ; and such men as Burke and Pitt are to you testimonials of the fact, that it is not gigantic massiveness in mental proportion, so much as exquisite and labored polish of the mere surface and jointures, that make the safe and certain, and always successful engine of power. Behold here the influence of the moulding we give in this one department. You have admitted a part of our sisterhood to your circle of instructors. Is there in mere expression, in the polish of words addressing the ear, this known and felt power ; and shall the greater power of reaching man's soul through the eye be entirely overlooked and suffered to lie dormant ? Behold within the human soul, the sensitiveness to the power of plastic art ; how from the cradle to the grandsire's old arm-chair, the eye of man glistens with delight, and his whole nature is swayed by an irresistible power, when the rainbow throws its arch over the heavens, when the aurora tinges with rose the firmament—when a new flower is presented, or when the bronze charger and his noble rider are suddenly unveiled to the eyes of the crowd. And shall this, the first and the last power to arouse, and the mightiest as well as gentlest to sway the soul, be left untutored ? Ah ! it is the impulses of men—their untrained and unbridled sensibilities—it is always these that dash our brightest genius down from the very pinnacle of its success. And why should

these sensibilities be left to prove a Mazeppa's wild horse to drag, and rack, and tear, and dash their rider into ruin, instead of being a conqueror's Bucephalus, curbed and commanded, bearing on their rider to victory and triumph!

The study of plastic art *unpractical*, reëcho the Muses! Why, had not that same Athens which boasted of the Parthenon and the art-crowned Acropolis, and all the works of Phidias,—had not that same city also the largest commerce, the proudest armies, the best appointed navies, the sublimest poets, the most eloquent orators, the most finished historians, the wisest philosophers, the greatest statesmen and the purest moralists? Had she not at the *same time* her Socrates, and Plato, and Aristotle, her Aristides, and Themistocles, and Pericles! And more than this, the Athenian people *knew* whence originated their supremacy in all these respects. Hence when the envious rivals of Pericles sought to undermine him with the people, by charging him with vain extravagance in devoting the public revenues so extensively to the patronage of art, saying that it was an insult to the Athenian people that treasure gathered for defence in war, should be “lavished in gilding their city and temples as a proud woman decks herself with jewels,”—Pericles knew that he carried the popular heart and voice with him when he replied, “That as the State was supplied with all the necessities of war, its superfluous wealth should be laid out on such works, as when executed, would be eternal monuments of its glory, and which during their execution, would diffuse universal plenty.” The result was what Pericles expected; for, admiring the greatness of his spirit, and ambitious to share the glory of his projects, they cried out, “that he might spend as much as he pleased of the public treasure, not sparing it in the least.” And this, now adds the Muse, is what your aspiring men most need. You educate the foot, the hand, the ear, every member of the body; but do you not say to the untutored eye, “we have no need of thee?” Your educated young men are trained to a peculiar vigor and completeness in all respects but one; but before *our* works, in *our* galleries, they are mute and ignorant as a child; and how they blush at each other when one dares

to utter a random suggestion, standing before one of our master pieces? O sad perversion of American mind! It is one conscious lack that weakens all your mental powers, one weak timber in the structure that brings it often toppling to its fall. Your land, your people, your states, more than any that earth ever yet saw, need the central bond of an art-adorned capital; and your aspiring public men having a door open before them to a place among the princes of the earth,—they need more than any educated men of earth the ornament as well as the power of a thorough early art culture.

But now yet another, and the last demand is made on these sister teachers. "We," urges the American visitor to their bowers, "we profess to be a *Christian* people; and *you*,—come you not as the handmaids of a false, a worldly philosophy to ask a seat among us? The Old and New Testament revelations are the authoritative teachers at whose feet we sit. A greater than the Muses or the Sages of Greece is here, and no one that echoes not the voice of his spirit and his truth can hope to gain a place as teacher where the children of Christian parents are gathered.

Well suggested, again, these sisters echo. Pious inquirer, it is from that very demand of yours, it is to *meet* just this demand that we seek your shores. Let us teach you out of your own sacred books our claim. Let painting step out before one of her landscapes caught fresh from nature in its intensest glow, and fastened to fade no more on the enduring canvas; as she says, "Is it not *written* that God in Eden made every tree first of all pleasant to the sight," and wish you your children led back to Eden again, and discard you my winning powers? Then sculpture points to a new work, radiant with purity and the glow of human beauty, by which everything earthly is chastened into tenderest love; as she says, "Is it not written that God made man and woman thus in purity to woo unto virtue?" and may not he have made us his handmaids to call forth again Eden's innocence and love from the human breast? Then *Mneme* speaks, and turning page after page of the ancient Hebrew scroll, she says: Our own Plato wrote that word we so prize, "*καλοκαγαθία*," teaching

that the highest material excellence, *beauty*, is inseparably wedded to the highest moral perfection, *love*. And here, amid this array of Jehovah's ancient ritual, I see Judah's king going forth to battle and before him robed priests glittering in gold and robed splendor, bearing aloft their jewelled ark with its golden cherubs bowing above, while bands of entrancing music, psalteries, harps, sackbuts, trumpets and flutes play, and the whole mighty host singing praises to the "beauty of holiness." The beauty of holiness! beauty in forms striking the eye wedded in this divine appointment to be the handmaid of *holiness*, perfect purity of spirit. Is *this* not the spirit, the very essential type of the power of God's own appointed Old Testament ritual? beauty in form begetting beauty in spirit, that love which is the fulfilment of the law.

Say not now this is the worn out and rejected portion of this, your sacred guide. Behold your great chosen Apostle, nurtured by his Divine Master amid Grecian art, and see how he, at home amid the gorgeous grandeur that crowned the Acropolis of Athens and in Corinth, the eye of Greece, behold how he, trained to know the avenues to the human soul, makes all the storehouse of art gathered around him to minister as an handmaid of Christian truth. Does he wish to lead the Athenians whom Demosthenes and Pericles once swayed, up to the height of his great theme "Jesus and the Resurrection," he appeals to all that glory of form as wanting the presence of a spirit worthy of it, the Unkown God, whom they might feel after and find, Jesus who was raised from the dead; and Dionysius, the Athenian Senator, and Damaris, an Aspasia of her day, were thus won to become the disciples of that same Jesus. Would he arrest with his pen and fasten the attention of the Corinthian Christian, and woo him to the patient toil of moulding his character to the perfection of the Gospel standard; he points to the familiar work of their own school days, the sculptor copyist with the master's model before him, day after day carefully turning each line of grace, and elaborating the polish of each swelling muscle and expanding feature, and says to them, "thus set Christ, your Master's model, before you, and toil patiently,

moulding your spirit into the same image, from glory to glory." Would he impress upon that same people, now Christian, the idea of that perfection of order that should reign in their religious assemblies, he has but to point them to the exquisite harmony thrilling through the Grecian orchestra, where every instrument, whether it be pipe or harp, or flute or trumpet, gives its certain sound, and all, *therefore*, because differing, make up the climax of melody and harmony. And now taking on the earnestness of those speaking with authority, these sisters exclaim, "We have come for the very purpose of giving a new power and finish to the advance and development of Christian truth and grace. Christians, be it known to you that the same God who gave the Hebrew prophets to prepare a chosen people to receive his Son their Redeemer, He sent us to prepare a vaster people to "hail the desire of all nations" when He should come. Christians, mark well and ponder deeply the fact, when through those Scriptures that nation was not won to Christ, we the art teachers of the cultured Greek and stern Roman—we did fulfil our mission; we did prepare a people for the service of your Lord. And *now* he is *our* Lord too, and we his servants. Received as such; let us find some humble place among the teachers of your children. Our fidelity in the past is our pledge for the future."

Their appeal must be left to its own impression; and the practical hint as to the *aid* art may give to education where true religion prevails, must be weighed by each one interested, if it shall be of any value.

ARTICLE VI.—MISSIONARY ATTEMPTS OF THE
JESUITS IN JAPAN.

[The following brief sketch, written by one no longer on earth, will be read with a peculiar interest at the present time. It was prepared when there were no indications of the happy change which we may now hope will come in connection with Commodore Perry's admirably conducted official visit to the Empire of Japan. Except to the eye of Christian faith, a great missionary field had been hopelessly closed. But there is *One that openeth, and no man shutteth*. As disciples of Christ, it surely becomes us to lay to heart his voice in the record of his command, in the history of efforts already made, and in the wonderful events that are now passing before our eyes.—]

Few subjects in the history of modern missions are invested with a deeper interest than the introduction and overthrow of the Catholic religion in Japan. The islands which constitute the empire, containing, as they do, a population of more than twenty-five millions, were discovered by the Portuguese in 1542. By information obtained from a Japanese youth who had fled to Goa, then the chief seat of Papal power in India, the Portuguese were led to suppose a lucrative trade might be established with this country, while at the same time its inhabitants might be gathered into the bosom of the church. To accomplish this object, a ship set sail for Japan, laden with the various commodities of Europe and India. A band of Jesuits, at whose head was the celebrated Francis Xavier, joined the expedition. The expectations formed by the Portuguese of enriching themselves with the trade of Japan, were more than realized ; but the prospects of the missionaries were less encouraging. So small was their success at first, that Xavier resolved to enter China, where a more encouraging field invited his labors. Scarcely had he departed, when a most surprising change took place.

The language of the country having been acquired, difficulties seemed at once to vanish. Some of the Jesuits could number among their converts courtiers, princes, and even the

young son of the Emperor himself. Two hundred thousand had, in a short time, been gained to the faith. An embassy of the Japanese converts was sent to Rome, to assure the Pope of their filial submission to the Church.

But this tide of success was soon to be checked. The scandalous conduct of some Europeans first led the Emperor to suspect that Christianity was only a scheme used by Christian monarchs to bring other nations under their dominion. This suspicion was strengthened by the wonderful zeal of the Jesuits to make proselytes, and by the artful representations of their heathen opposers.

An edict, therefore, was issued by the Emperor, forbidding his subjects, on pain of death, to renounce the national religion. This was followed by a most bloody persecution. In one year twenty thousand are said to have suffered martyrdom. Of two hundred and fifty churches that had been erected, seventy were demolished. Yet in the two following years, while all the churches were actually shut up, twelve thousand new converts were gained. Persecution seemed only to spread more rapidly the religion it was intended to suppress. In 1596, the Emperor, instigated by his favorite, commenced a persecution which raged, with little abatement, until in 1639 it ended in the utter overthrow of the new religion, and in the perpetual banishment from the empire of foreigners of every name.

The success of the Jesuits had convinced the Emperor that the religion and government of the country were in danger of an entire revolution. Several occurrences tended very much to increase his alarm.

A Spanish vessel having by a storm been thrown upon the coast of Japan, the captain exhibited to the natives a chart of the numerous countries subject to his sovereign, the king of Spain; and when asked how his master acquired such extensive territories, he replied that missionaries were first sent to conciliate the minds of the people, and that fleets and armies coming after, effected an easy conquest. This conversation was reported to the Emperor, who swore that the Spaniards should never in this way get possession of his country.

After this, an English officer cautioned the Japanese against the Jesuits, representing them as designing men who had been banished from many of the countries of Europe, and who did not teach the pure doctrines of Christianity.

These reports could not fail to excite the fears of a government naturally suspicious.

Nor was there wanting in the conduct of the Jesuits themselves enough to confirm suspicion ; for many of them having become elated, affected the pomp and state of princes, and refused to pay to the officers of the government those civilities which they had a right to expect.

The most vigorous measures were now adopted to prevent the spread of the new religion. An edict was issued forbidding the doctrine of the fathers, as that religion was termed, to be thereafter taught. The princes were required to bring their subjects, either by persuasion or by force, to renounce the Christian faith and return to the old religion. Strict orders were given to the directors of the Portuguese trade not to bring any more ecclesiastics on board their ships ; and, lastly, the monks and priests already in the country were ordered forthwith to depart.

Although the princes used great exertions to enforce these orders, many of them were evaded. Fresh recruits of ecclesiastics were secretly brought into the country ; and the cause still went on, notwithstanding the commands of the Emperor. But the missionaries had now arrayed against them the powerful opposition of the Bonzes, or native priests, and of the rulers, who only waited for some favorable pretence to crush a religion they had come to regard as hostile to their interests.

About this time two events occurred especially deserving notice, as having had an important influence in hastening the destruction that had for some time threatened the mission.

One of these was the imprudence of some Franciscan friars who had been sent by the Spanish governor of the Manillas as ambassadors to Japan. These Franciscans, during their stay, preached publicly in the streets of the capital, and at length erected an edifice for worship, though in opposition to the Emperor's express commands and to the earnest expostulations of the Jesuits.

The other event was the interception by the Dutch of a letter from a Captain Moro, chief of the Portugese in Japan, containing an account of an extensive conspiracy against the government. The Dutch had previously obtained a settlement in Japan, and were then at war with Spain and Portugal. They did not, therefore, hesitate to send the letter which had fallen into their hands to their protector, the Prince of Firando; and by him it was transmitted to the Director of Foreign Affairs. This laid open an extensive plot which the Japanese converts, in conjunction with the Portugese, had laid against the Emperor's life and throne. It also disclosed the promise of ships and soldiers from Portugal, the names of the Japanese princes concerned in the conspiracy, and, to crown all, the expectation of the Papal blessing.

Captain Moro and the Portugese were immediately arrested, and, though he firmly denied the charge, yet hand and seal convicted. He was condemned to be thrust upon a sharp stake and burnt alive.

This discovery of the Dutch was afterwards confirmed by another letter written by the same individual to the Portugese government at Macao, in China, which was intercepted by a Japanese ship. That the followers of the Jesuits, goaded by persecution, may have entered into such a conspiracy, is not improbable. Still, by some it is denied; and the letter by which they were implicated is stated to have been a fabrication of the Dutch. However this may be, they now, in 1637, came to be regarded by the Emperor as rebels; and, as such they were made to feel his vengeance.

A proclamation immediately followed, banishing the Portugese forever from the country. A reward equal to more than two thousand dollars was offered for a priest. Persons professing Christianity, or attempting to propagate it, were to be imprisoned. No person was henceforth to be allowed to come into the country, nor any of the Emperor's subjects to go out of it. Even to return home to Japan from any foreign land was made a capital crime. Whoever should presume to bring a letter into the country, or to return, after having been banished, was, with his whole family, to be put to death.

We need not dwell on the scenes which followed this edict. It is sufficient to say that it was strictly executed.

Thus was the empire effectually closed against all subsequent missionary efforts. If the accounts of the Jesuits can be credited, six hundred thousand converts were left to the alternative of renouncing their religion or submitting to a most cruel death. Many chose the latter, and, by their reluctance to violate their vows to Christ, and by their exemplary firmness in the midst of sufferings, they have given us reason to trust that they had become true disciples, notwithstanding their errors.

A few attempts were afterwards made by the Portugese to regain the advantages that had been wrested from them, through measures so severe and terrible. But every attempt was utterly in vain. Of seventy-three men sent as ambassadors to effect this object, all except twelve were beheaded. These were sent back with the proud and threatening message from the Emperor, that should the King of Portugal himself, nay, the very God of the Christians, presume to enter his dominions, he would treat them in the same manner.

A result so disastrous must be a matter of regret to every true Christian. He is filled with profound sorrow when he thinks of the millions, to all human appearances, thus hopelessly excluded from the influence of the Gospel.

But, however painful it may be to contemplate such a result, the lessons it teaches are important. One of these is, that no body of men can ever gain permanent triumphs for the cause of Christianity with weapons which she does not herself supply or sanction. To attempt the defence of Christianity by such means, is to aim a fatal blow at her very vitals. It is to betray the cause we profess to advocate. Such attempts can never gain for truth any lasting advantage. Of this the history of missions in India, China, Abyssinia, and Japan, furnishes melancholy proofs. Intrigues and frauds, however good may be the object aimed at, are utterly opposed to the ingenuousness of the gospel. Christianity scorns such aids. The weapons of her warfare are not carnal. Her power is the power of holy truth, which gains nothing in the end, but

loses immensely by such an unnatural alliance with error and sin. Such expedients may seem for a time to succeed. They may even gain many converts to the Christian name. But they can effect no radical transformation of character. They can not save a soul from death. Nothing can accomplish this but the truth, as it falls, with love unfeigned, from the lips of the Saviour and his apostles, and is impressed on the heart by the Holy Spirit.

ARTICLE VII.—RATIONAL COSMOLOGY.

Rational Cosmology: or, The Eternal Principles and the Necessary Laws of the Universe. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D. Union College. Second edition, with revision notes.

THE public mind was prepared to welcome a second edition of this profound and able work. No book of the age has been, by reviewers, more unsparingly commended on the one hand, or more sternly denounced on the other. It is, then, evidently a work of power. Right or wrong, it has one of the rarest and best qualities of a book,—it sets men to thinking. Some mistakes in statement and errors in facts in the first edition have been pointed out by critics, and have been corrected by the author in the “revision-notes” of the second edition. We have little occasion to revert to these or similar errors, as most of them do not materially affect the main argument. But as this edition is the deliberate re-assertion of the author’s mature views, with his own explanations and corrections, after carefully considering the various criticisms upon the work, it seems to us deserving of a new and careful examination. We do not propose to follow in the track of previous reviewers, nor can we coincide either with those who utterly condemn, or with those who fully endorse the book. It contains, as we believe, much profound and original thought, in

connection with much that sober and cautious philosophy will be slow to admit. The main question at issue is not, whether the distinguished author is entirely at home in all the details of inductive science, but whether his *a priori* argument is fully sustained. The burden of proof rests upon him.

The book aims to demonstrate, as its title imports, the eternal principles and necessary laws by which the universe was made and is governed. It takes its stand-point behind all the teachings of sense and science, and the inductions of the logical understanding, and by the "insight of reason" seeks to determine the rationale of all things. Not that it regards the observation of facts in nature as of no importance: it leads us up from particular to general judgments; but this inductive process alone, it affirms, can never ascertain principles. These, it is claimed, must be seen in their own light by that peculiar function, reason, to which they reveal themselves.

"The insight of the reason may often detect in the fact the principle which determined the nature of the fact, and in the light of such principle we can see *why* the fact is, and not merely *that* it is. The perceptions of the sense give *facts*; the insight of the reason gives *principles*" (p. 13).

It is well known to all who are versed in philosophical speculations, that from ancient time it has been supposed that the world was created and is governed according to certain necessary and eternal principles. This all admit. But in the present work, it is assumed that there could be but *one* right way to make a Cosmos, and that rational philosophy is competent to decide what that way is, and to prove that the Creator has taken it.

"FACTS are things made—*res gestae, facta*. They have the nature given to them by their Maker; and in knowing the fact, there is no capability for knowing why their nature is thus and not otherwise." "PRINCIPLES are truths prior to all facts, or makings, and are themselves unmade. They stand in immutable and eternal necessity, and while they condition all power, can themselves be conditioned by no power. Even Omnipotence can be wise and righteous only as determined by immutable principles" (p. 13).

The Greek *Αρχαι*, (*Lat. Principia*,) signifies *beginnings*; and Aristotle defines it to be that from which anything exists, or is known. The term is used also to denote categories of thought, general truths, and laws of action. It is used in the Kantian philosophy, as qualified with the adjective *pure*, for cognitions in which there is mingled nothing from experience; cognitions which are thus native to the mind and wholly *a priori*. Our author uses the term "principles" to denote the objective counterpart to this. He seems to mean by it not so much the cognition as that which is cognized. It designates, as used by him, what is strictly objective, eternal, necessary, independent of and before all actual creations; yet potentially in the reason of man, to be elicited into consciousness by a process of intuitions. So we understand him.

His Introduction is long — 54. pages — elaborate, learned, able, giving a succinct history of philosophical speculations in this department; it contains the pith of the volume. Some important authorities and phases of speculation are, however, unnoticed. We have said that philosophers have, from the first, admitted most of the essential principles here claimed. Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Leibnitz, Des Cartes, Cudworth, Kant, Malebranch, Locke, Bacon, La Place, Stuart, Brown, Cousin, — men of widely different schools, — have taught that the world was constructed on principles necessary and eternal, and, to some extent, obvious to human reason. It was a purpose of Leibnitz to write a book proving that the world was constructed, and that all its movements are regulated, by strict mathematical laws. It is, indeed, deeply interesting to find to how great an extent the induction of facts and the calculations of mathematics harmonize in interpreting the operations of nature. The laws of gravitation, including the formation and movements of spherical bodies, the laws of chemical compounds, of light and heat, of crystallization, of all mechanical forces, are mostly so subjected to mathematical law that, whether in our investigation we proceed with the careful induction of facts, or with mathematical calculations, we arrive at the same results. It was not, therefore, without reason that a distinguished philosopher declared

the Supreme Architect to be a perfect geometrician. Investigations of very profound subjects, commenced at different points and pursued by different ways, have reached the same conclusion. Such, for example, have been many of the sublime triumphs in astronomy won by the united demonstrations of the calculus and of the telescope.

Passing upward from the realm of inanimate nature to that of life, whether vegetable or animal, we still find indications of mathematical law. We have an interesting illustration of this furnished by Prof. Agassiz, in the leaves of plants. The normal series of fractions which express the various combinations most frequently observed among the leaves of plants, is as follows: $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{3}{8}$, $\frac{5}{13}$, $\frac{8}{21}$, $\frac{13}{34}$, $\frac{21}{55}$, etc. Upon comparing this arrangement of the leaves in plants with the revolutions of the planets of our system, Prof. Pierce discovered the most perfect identity between the fundamental laws which regulate both. These fractions, expressing the phyllotaxis, or position of successive leaves upon an axis ascending along the spiral, correspond with those indicating the revolutions of the planets, reckoning from the remotest towards the sun.* The charge of novel speculations, within the range of legitimate science, is not, therefore, to be made against Dr. Hickok. He is here in good company, and does honor to the company he is in. It is only when he over steps what we conceive to be the boundary of true science, that he fails to sustain his positions. We are somewhat surprised to be told that the "truly Aristotelian method prevails in all the successors of Kant, in carrying forward the critical philosophy" (p. 43). What the precise man Plato taught, or what the precise man Aristotle taught, is of little consequence. There have been from the earliest times two distinctive schools of philosophy. The first begins with assumed principles, as revealed by the intuitions of reason, and proceeds with them onward to results. This process is termed *a priori*. The second begins with facts, as known by sense-perception, and otherwise, and with these moves back-

* See Agassiz' Nat. Hist. of the United States. Essay on Classification, (p. 128). Also, the numerous learned authors referred to by him, (p. 18).

ward to principles. This process is termed *a posteriori*. The former method philosophers call Platonic ; the latter, Aristotelian. Men may combine the two in philosophizing, but the two methods have never been and never can be the same. Dr. Hickok maintains (p. 43) that in the Kantian school "the pure thinking is no insight of reason that gets in the facts their determining principles, but solely an analytical process that finds facts already in the human mind before they have worked themselves out on the field of consciousness. The whole labor, though transcending the point of conscious experience, is still that of the logical understanding." But this depends solely on the psychological philosophy, or rather terms, which we adopt. Whether the source of our ideas be called the insight of reason and the logical understanding, as taught by the senses, or whether it be called intuition and sense-perception, is not at all material in this connection. Reasoning from principles to facts, however cognized, is still the same ; and reasoning from facts to principles, however cognized, is still the same ; and both schools admit that we must have some cognition of both facts and principles, in some sense, *ab initio*, before we can reason either way. It is only as the author leaves the "truly Aristotelian method," which he says "prevails in all the successors of Kant," for something which he considers more truly Platonic, in the untaught "insight of reason alone," that his wisdom forsakes him.

Much of the volume is devoted to a survey of the results of inductive science. With few exceptions, the facts and doctrines here taught are admitted on all sides. The only material question in this regard is, how far these results could have been obtained without the inductive process. It is one thing to see a truth after it has been laboriously demonstrated ; it is quite another to have seen it by untaught intuition. There is, in this respect, a vast difference between men. Some are much more intuitive in their perceptions and judgments than others. While some men seem to learn almost nothing but by the slow process of induction, doing little else all their lives than to observe, classify, and label facts, others spring almost by a single leap to principles. As one mind is thus constitu-

tionally inclined to move *a posteriori*, while another inclines to move *a priori*, what is perfectly clear and conclusive to the one may be dim and doubtful to the other. In some persons we find a wonderful combination of the two; as in Sir Isaac Newton. With what rapidity his mind leaped, at the falling of an apple, from the fact to the principle! And yet he was one of the most cautious and patient of inductive philosophers. Such men are the princes of science. Yet generalizations and logical deductions are not, in our author's view, "good philosophy";—he must go behind them all and have the "principles" on which they depend. To call its results (the results of the inductive process) "in the broadest generalization, *good philosophy*, would be wholly to mistake the name and the thing; since this practical experience can use facts only, and its most general judgments can attain facts only, while the distinctive work of philosophy is to go back of the facts, and attain and apply the principles which determine why the facts are so." (p. 15.)

It is natural for those who publish a book to show that it was needed; but while we are truly glad to see this able volume, we had not supposed the state of philosophy quite so desperate as the author represents it. "Where is the philosophy," he inquires, "which can logically from its method present a God to our acceptance, as a *causa causans*, without being thought a *causa causata*? Who seems to feel any shock at the absurdity and impiety of talking about the *nature* of God, and the *nature* of the divine will, as if the awful prerogatives of the supernatural could be brought and bound within the condition of the natural." "What, then, we need for a truly *rational* theology, is the conception of an absolutely supernatural Being—a God for the rational soul, and not conditioned to the physical necessities of the logical understanding" (p. 52). We had supposed that just such a God as this had been not only revealed to our faith and homage in the Bible, but that He had also been recognized as an "absolutely supernatural Being," in the severest inductions of the Baconian school; and, moreover, that in this very school are found some of the most reverent worshippers of that Being,

as well as not a few of the profoundest philosophers. If we are mistaken in all this, and if up to the present time the world has been without a philosophy that has taught a truly supernatural and spiritual God, it was certainly high time for this book to be written. We had supposed that when the Scotch, English, and American philosophers and divines speak of "the *nature* of God and the *nature* of the divine will," they expect their language to be understood with reference to the obvious subject in hand. As we are sometimes under the necessity of employing the same term in different senses, the canons of interpretation require us to interpret a term by the connection in which it is used, and the author's explanation. Philosophers sometimes speak of the nature of virtue, of the nature of our affections and desires, and of the nature of God, not because they attach any physical idea to them, but because they find it convenient to borrow a term from physical science. Thus Paley and Edwards speak of "the nature of virtue," and "the nature of God," but what uninspired man, whether philosopher or Christian, has had loftier conceptions than they of God, as "an absolutely supernatural Being?" We have no sympathy with the arrogance of the so-called positivism of Comte, on the one hand, nor with the scepticism of Hume, on the other, nor with any philosophy in which "all the elements of possible human knowledge are affirmed to be given in the senses;" turning from all these, we say most devoutly, with our author, "How much more rapidly may the knowledge and the worship of the true God spread, when philosophy herself shall become converted to and baptized in a gospel theism?" (p. 53).

Dr. Hickok adopts the Kantian psychology, in maintaining that there are "three distinct functions of intellectual agency, the Sense, the Understanding, and the Reason" (p. 58). We have always considered this division somewhat fanciful, and at the best unsatisfactory. We, for many reasons, prefer the classifications usually adopted in the British schools to those of the German. Still every man has a right to his own analyses, and if he abides by them we shall not complain of him. We all agree that the human mind is a unit; or, more

properly, one and the same spiritual and sentient being, in all its operations ; that it attains some knowledge by the senses ; that it obtains other knowledge by comparing and classifying the ideas received through the senses ; and that it obtains yet other knowledge by its direct intuitions. Any one of these, without the others, would be insufficient. Without sense-perception, we could have no ideas of the objects of sense ; without the ability to compare and classify these ideas, they would be very limited and chaotic ; and without intuition, we could not see facts in their principles, but all the axioms and first truths, by which we connect our knowledge and build them up in science, would be to us wholly wanting. Our chief objection to the Kantian psychology is, that it often gives too great latitude to "the insight of reason," either mistaking for it mere fancy and esthetical sentiment, or ascribing to it what is due to other functions ; which functions, from its defective analysis, it fails to recognize. Its analysis is not sufficiently exhaustive and complete. But we have no space here to pursue this topic, and it is no part of our business to make a psychology for our author, but simply to exhibit his own as related to the science of Cosmology.

In considering the idea of an absolute Creator and Governor, Dr. Hickok treats of "The Absolute as the Infinite," and of "The Absolute as the Unconditioned" (p. 59). By the Absolute as the Infinite, we understand him to mean, in plain English, *absolutely infinite*, whether it be infinitely small, as a mathematical point, or infinitely large, as universal space. In maintaining that our idea of this pertains to the reason and not to the logical understanding, he means to teach, as we suppose, that our minds are so constituted that we may conceive of what is absolutely infinite, but cannot logically construct the idea of it. In plain English, we can conceive of it, but we cannot comprehend it. Thus we conceive of God, but cannot comprehend him. Understanding the author thus, we are at one with him on this point.

But in his remarks upon the "Absolute as the Unconditioned," he has fallen into what we believe to be a serious error. In this he is not alone, for other distinguished writers

have done the same. "The sense," he says, "can take no cognizance of a *substance*, but only of the qualities. The qualities appear, the substance does not appear" (p. 63). "The absolute substance is necessarily to the understanding an absurdity; a contradiction to the necessity of thought; and can, therefore, never become a cognition to the discursive intellect" (p. 67).

By "absolute substance" we must understand a substance independent of everything extraneous to it, an independent reality or objective thing of itself, irrespective of all thought of it. Whether cognized or thought of, or not, it is yet a substantial reality. Such, if we understand language, and apply the author's adjective, is an absolute substance. Now such a substance does not logically depend upon its qualities, but its qualities depend upon the substance. This is true of all substances. Their qualities or properties pertain to them and make them manifest. As it is intuitively certain that the qualities pertaining to any substance cannot exist without the substance itself, the existence of its qualities always intuitively demonstrates the existence of the substance to which they belong. Hence the error of our author and of the whole Hegelian school on this point. We ask particular attention to this, as the main argument depends upon it. We *do* cognize substances by their qualities. I cognize that book, that inkstand, that pencil, now before me, each by its distinctive qualities or properties, as made known to me through sense-perception. Or, if we speak of a material substance in its natural state, without any artificial form, it is then made known to us by a corresponding perception. We thus cognize *all* objects, whatever they may be, by their qualities or properties.

If we dismiss all fancy and meaningless words, and come to the naked truth, we find it to be just this. An object must be either material or immaterial. If material, our knowledge of it is obtained by sense-perception; it is not an object of mere intuition, or the insight of reason. If it is immaterial, it of course does not reveal to us, through the senses, even its qualities. If, when our author says, "The sense can take no

cognizance of a substance, but only of the qualities," he means that if we had no other mental faculties than the senses, no understanding, nor reason, we could not cognize an object, that would be doubtless true; and it would be equally true in this case, that we could not cognize its *qualities*. But if he means to say, as we suppose he does, in common with those who adopt the Hegelian philosophy on this subject, that by our perception of the qualities of a substance we do not cognize the substance to which they belong; or, in other words, *do not assuredly know its existence*, we entirely dissent from him. We can have no knowledge whatever of a substance of *any kind*, whether material or spiritual, but by its manifested *qualities* or *attributes*, — and hence, if we do not cognize it by these, we do not and cannot know that it exists. We are then Berkleyans, in spite of both reason and logic; or rather, we must be universal doubters, with Hume, — for what we have said is as true of spirit as of matter. We cognize a *spirit*, a *person*, by his manifested qualities or attributes, as truly as we do a material substance. In this way only we cognize the soul or spirit of a fellow being, and in the same way we cognize God. We cannot otherwise have any possible knowledge of the existence of either a material or a spiritual substance.

A mistake is often made here by confounding elementary *parts* with *properties*. If we take from a house all its stones, bricks, timbers, boards, nails, &c., nothing is finally left. The house was only a particular combination or juxtaposition of all these. But these were not *properties* of the house; they were only its *parts*, each part having its own properties. If we analyze water into its two gases, hydrogen and oxygen, these again are not properties of the water, but its elementary parts; each gas having its own distinctive properties and being cognized by them. But this cannot be said of extension, solidity, &c., which are not elementary *parts* of matter, but *properties* of it; nor of reason, judgment, &c., which are not parts of mind, but properties of it. The phenomena extension and solidity, *necessarily imply* the existence of that which is extended and solid, just as the phenomena reasoning and

judging, imply the existence of that which reasons and judges. We *intuitively know* that they *do* and *must coëxist* in the relation of cause and effect, or of substance and property.

All ontological research ends exactly here ; it can go no further. Whatever be "the insight of reason," it cannot see either spirit or matter, excepting as they are made manifest to us by their effects and properties. Deny this relation of cause and effect, and of substance and property, and our consequent knowledge of the former by the latter, and we are at once and forever afloat upon a sea of uncertainty. For ought that we then know, all existence is merely phenomenal ; we know of no substance, no being, no power, back of phenomena, to which they sustain the relation of effects or properties ; and even the so-called positive philosophy of Comte, becomes only positive uncertainty. For it is clearly manifest, that if we are so false to ourselves as to deny the intuitive relation of effect and cause, and of properties and substance, and our certain cognition of the one by the other, we have no means of proving that all the phenomena of the universe are not purely subjective. This was the logical conclusion of Fichte, deduced from the philosophy of Kant. We are thus brought inevitably around to Spinozism, the doctrine of the identity of the ego and the non-ego, with the additional uncertainty as to whether either has any other than a merely phenomenal existence, or even any existence at all. The disastrous fruits of such absurd speculations, as a substitute for sound philosophy, are such as might be expected. But how shall we escape from them ? Not by shutting our senses — the windows of the mind — against the phenomena of the universe, declaring that they can teach us nothing of their origin, and so falling back upon the untaught "insight of reason," to reveal to us even what lies beyond the phenomenal, if anything ; this is to forsake the sobriety and assurance of wakeful and exacting science, for the enchanting visions of a dream. In this case, not only does objective nature teach us nothing of itself, but even God himself is not revealed to us in his works and his Word ; we see Him only, as Schelling says, "in the esthetical intuitions of reason." This, we confidently submit, is not the true way

either to cure infidelity or to enlighten philosophy. We must return to sober-mindedness, allow our senses to teach us, and trust to their decisions. Then, only, will the insight of reason be true to its mission. Our senses may deceive us, and so also we may mistake fancy or sentiment for reason, but it is the duty of philosophy to determine when they are to be trusted. All this Dr. Hickok virtually admits, and we are confident that wherein he seems to differ from us on this point, it is rather in terms than in meaning. There is often, with those who adopt the Kantian psychology, much unmeaning reference to the "insight of reason," as though it were a distinct part of the soul, having a distinct world of vision entirely to itself."

Of the author's remarks upon "The Absolute in the Understanding itself," we have little to say. It is an exposition of his psychological views of the understanding, and of its functions, as distinguished from the reason. Considering the understanding as a faculty by which we can only analyze and abstract from the conditioned in nature, we can, by it, never rise to the absolute and supernatural. "By analyzing and abstracting from the conditioned, we are making no progress towards an unconditioned, and an endless analysis and abstraction of the understanding can never find an absolute." "If, then, we have not the endowment of some" [other] "distinct and superior function of knowing than the discursive understanding, we are, from the nature of the case, shut out from all entrance upon the field where lie the problems of the Absolute. We are doomed to wander up and down through the connections of nature, and can neither know nor conceive anything of the supernatural" (p. 75).

This leads him to consider the "Absolute as given in the Reason." We turn to the use of the reason solely; the faculty for direct and immediate insight. That we have such a faculty, distinctive in kind, and giving to us all our prerogatives of rationality, personality, and free and responsible originality, is sufficiently clear in the consciousness of its own working. In pure diagrams we see unusual truths, without any process of logical deductions" (p. 76). We are cer-

tainly conscious of this rational faculty, variously termed by writers the power of reason, of intuition, of insight, of forethought, etc., without which we could never have attained to the principles of science, or the knowledge of God. In this we quite agree with our author. But we cannot adopt his method of reaching a point at which he aims, to wit, an explication of our conception of God. He first undertakes to show how, by "the insight of reason" we get the conception of Absolute Reason; he then identifies the Absolute Reason with God. Here we have again the old Platonic idea of God as the Absolute Reason—the Rational Soul—of the universe. We do not think the author means to teach this doctrine, nor do we discard it because Plato and other ancient philosophers held it; for those noble men held and taught many great truths.

Having spoken of "self-activity and self-love," as entering into our conception of "*spirit* as opposed to matter" (p. 84), the author adds, "Such supreme self-determination is the very conception of Absolute Reason. All that belongs to nature is excluded from it." "It is utterly supernatural, and nothing of the laws and conditions of nature can possess any significance in reference to it. Reason is not a fact; a something that has been made; but from its own necessity of being can be conceived no otherwise than as a verity which fills immensity and eternity" (p. 85). Such "Absolute Reason is absolutely a Person, having in himself the knowledge of all possible, and the self-determining will to execute his own behest." "Here is no abstraction, but the positive affirmation of the I AM; he who has being and blessedness, and an exhaustless fulness in himself; even the being of whom it would be an everlasting absurdity to suppose that he was not, and was not blessed, and was not satisfied. Sense cannot *perceive* Him; discursive thought cannot *conceive* Him; only a spiritual discernment, the direct insight of reason, can behold Him" (p. 86). Without adverting to the "everlasting" (?) absurdity here supposed, we may suggest whether something like an absurdity, not less palpable, if not as enduring, does not appear in this method of personification. Poetry often per-

sonifies truth, reason, and other things, and takes various similar liberties, because it is poetry; but philosophy has no such license. It must teach severe and exact truth, or it is false to its mission and ceases to be philosophy. Now, "verity" is not a "person;" and to call it a person, and to say that it fills "immensity and eternity," may be fine poetry, but is not philosophy. There is the same objection to the personification of "reason." Reason is an *attribute*, not a person. It is indeed a *distinguishing* attribute of a person, or mode of his activity, but it is not the person himself. To say that "reason is not a *fact*, a something that has been made," is not true, if the reference be to human reason. The reason of each person is his own individual reason, and God caused it to exist, as truly as he did his other faculties. Otherwise, how did the man come by it? Is it something preëxistent, eternal, and omnipresent, of which men come spontaneously into possession? Is it a "verity that fills immensity and eternity?" This is all fancy. It is the old pantheistic notion back again, of reason in general, or universal reason; and what this can possibly be we should be glad to know. According to our apprehension, both of philosophy and revelation, reason is a quality or property of a person, and all other reasons but that of God have had a beginning and a cause. The reason of man is, in some humble degree, *like* that of God; but it is not the same identical reason with his. God made man "in his own image;" but he "*made*" him. He is "a somewhat that has been *made*," with all his powers, reason included. Philosophically speaking, there is no such thing as a general or universal reason. Reason is always an attribute of an individual being, and that being must be either God himself, or some rational creature that he has made. The reasons of different persons are more or less alike, as also their memories and other faculties, but they are not one and the same reason, any more than their memories are one and the same memory. We are well aware of the speculations of the German schools respecting "the universal reason," as accepted and taught by Coleridge, but we have yet to learn that they amount to anything more than a delusive fancy.

Dr. Hickok says also of God, "He is absolute liberty" (p. 87). This is a bold figure, and it is very well for popular effect ; but considered as exact philosophical teaching, it is not true. So also he says of God, "He is absolute Good." And the Apostle John says, "God is love." But we all understand the Apostle as saying, in strong language, that God is a perfectly benevolent being. Plato, in his *Timæus*, calls the Deity the Good ; and he probably regarded the two as identical, which we do not suppose our author does. Plato does not seem to have reached the true idea of the personality of God, although our opinion here differs from Dr. Hickok's. We believe that Plato's arguments in this direction, are mainly a defence in ethical interest against the anthropomorphisms of the mythic poets. We, therefore, excuse such expressions in him more readily than we do in a Christian philosopher. In a strictly philosophical discussion, the simple truth is demanded in its simplest expression. Plato was scarcely less a poet than a philosopher.

In the second chapter, the author aims to get "the conception of nature's origin." He takes the true philosophical ground in regard to the seniority of the Spirit, as the originator, and self-active and efficient cause of material nature, and of all of its operations. But when he would explain the *rationale* of the creation of matter, or how matter was made, we confess to some demur. He says, in his opening definition, "Matter is Force, distinguished as Antagonistic and Diremptive" (p. 90). But he then proceeds directly to show that matter *is no force at all*. "At rest, it cannot move, and moving it cannot rest, without a force supplied to it. It can neither change nor resist change, neither combine nor resolve, neither sustain nor press, excepting as power is given to it to do all the work." He cannot then *mean* to say, as he does say, that matter is force ; but simply that it *has* force, and that its force is "supplied" to it. "Let us, however, keep this force which we have supposed to be supplied to matter, and which we have found in such case must work all the mutations that occur in matter, carefully subjected to a rational insight, and determine whether indeed this force that does all

that is done, is not matter itself" (p. 93). Here, then, we are taught that matter is not that inert substance which has generally been called by that name, but the *force* which has been "*supplied*" to it. We must, then, henceforth have another name for that inert substance which we have hitherto called matter.

But what is this *force* in question? To say that "matter is force," and then it can do nothing "except as power is *given* to it," and then that "force is matter itself," is not making much progress. Let us get out of the circle. This force is, in the author's view, if we can understand him, neither matter nor spirit, as we have been accustomed to use terms, but a "new thing;" the *tertium quid*, perhaps, which has at last come to light. "Simple activity," says the Doctor, "is spiritual activity, and there is nothing in it that can awaken the thought of force; and it is only as it meets some opposing action, and encounters an antagonistic, that we can have the notion of force." "In neither of the two activities can there be the notion of force, but at the same point of antagonism force is generated, and one new thing comes from the synthesis of the two activities. To distinguish this from other forces, henceforth found, we call it *antagonistic force*. In this position is taken, and there is more than the idea of *being*, which the simple activities each have; there is being *standing out*, an EXISTENCE; being *in re*, reality, A THING" (p. 94).

We are truly sorry to spoil so fine a speculation, but the truth compels us to say, that "activity" is not a *concrete* but an *abstract* term. It expresses a *quality* or *condition* of the *being* or *thing* of which it is predicated. Activities do not have the being or thing to which they pertain, but the being or thing has the activities. To speak of two activities meeting is absurd, except as we mean by it *two beings or things in action* meeting. But the author supposes the activities to meet *before the beings or things exist*. "At the point of antagonism, from the synthesis of the two activities, comes existence, *being in re*, reality, *a thing*." This is like the speculation of Schelling—"Matter is only to be apprehended," he says, "as the ever becoming product of attraction and repulsion; it is not

therefore a mere inert grossness, as we are apt to represent it, but these forces are its original." (*Schwegler*, p. 315.)

Our author seems to have an idea of *molecules*, which are not exactly the *monads* of Leibnitz, nor the *reals* of Herbart, but are strictly spiritual, and, like his principles, eternal, or else resulting from the contact of "pure forces." Let him explain; "The pure forces, in their contact in the simple limit, may be known as units under the term of molecules, or molecular forces." Now we must recollect that the term "forces," as well as "activities," is an abstract term, indicating something pertaining to beings or things. Hence molecular forces must be the forces which molecules exert, and these molecules must be either beings or things; and as the author has not yet reached the point of the creation of matter, or what he calls the "material atom," these molecules must of logical necessity be *spiritual*. We cannot think this excellent Christian author of the nineteenth century really means to teach the exploded Leibnitzian doctrine of living monads; yet his language, logically interpreted, amounts to it. But the more probable truth is, that he deceives himself, as he sometimes confuses his reader, by using *abstract* as *concrete* terms, thus confounding ideas which in philosophy should be kept entirely distinct. This is one of the errors into which Hegel, Schelling, Coleridge, and others of this class, often fall; an error for which careless and superficial readers judge them to be profound, when in fact their language has no real meaning. The following are specimens of this use of language: "The Supreme Spirit is therefore Absolute Self-law," (p. 85.) "Such supreme self-determination is the very conception of Absolute Reason." "Such Absolute Reason is manifestly a Person," (p. 86.) "He is Absolute Liberty," (p. 87.) "In such an Idea of the Absolute, we have the conception of a God who is at once our Creator and Governor," (p. 89.) "If we were to conceive of angels as pure spirits, activities without corporeity," (p. 99.) "Simple spiritual activity takes no positions," (p. 100.) The careful scholar will see that the subjects and predicates above have no logical connection, and hence that the sentences have no real meaning. Similar examples are frequent.

The author often speaks of "pure forces," "abstract forces," as eternal entities, apart from any being or thing. These can have no such existence, except in the fancy. We can correctly speak of pure mathematics, abstract numbers, and geometrical figures; but *forces* are *actual qualities or properties belonging to real beings or things*. Yet the author supposes that from these fancied "pure forces" come "molecules or molecular forces," and from these come the material or chemical atoms. Let him explain; "The combination of these forces, in their joint interaction, making a new compound or a third thing unlike to either alone, may be known as also a limit, constituting a material *atom*, and which may further on be known as a *chemical atom* or molecule," (p. 96.) He thus seems to have the idea of *two kinds* of molecules — the causal molecules, or molecular forces, and material atoms.

It is a relief to pass from the consideration of activities, counter activities, antagonistic and diremptive forces, and molecules, in the work of creation, to the distinct recognition of God; but we cannot think that the reasoning here sheds any truth-seeing light upon this profound subject. "Solely from the reason, and not from any want, as if He too had a nature, God puts his simple activity in counter agency." (p. 101.) Now what can the author mean by God's putting his simple activity in counter agency? Let him tell us. "He makes act meet and hold act, and in this originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing; a something standing out for objective manifestation, and holding itself in position as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity. This force fixes itself in position; holds itself at rest; and so far from being inert, its very existence is a *vis inertiae*, or a force actively holding itself still." This must be something like the "masterly inactivity" of which we have often heard. Nor can we see that his revision notes relieve the difficulty. We had not expected to see the day when the "insight of reason," even in its boldest flashes, would reveal the stupendous mystery of the creation of matter. The work was done, according to this philosophy, by God's putting his simple activity at work against itself, thus producing an antagonism

which constitutes force—something standing out for objective manifestation, and distinct from his own subjective simplicity. This force fixes itself in position, and *actively holds itself still!* But then comes the diremptive or separating activity, working conversely to the antagonism; and what with the holding still activities and the pulling activities, space is gained and occupied! We should presume that all this pushing and pulling would naturally occupy some space—at least “a cubic inch or a cubic mile” or so, as the author claims; but we do not see why it is not space still, except as it is filled with very busy “activities.” He says, however, “Any considerable extent so filled, a cubic inch or a cubic mile, is a creation of matter palpable to the senses, impenetrable and substantial” (p. 101).

Let us endeavor to understand precisely what the author means to say. We suppose it to be this, that God exerts his force—a force of course strictly spiritual—in two opposite directions, producing an antagonism; and then in a way which is diremptive or separating, and that thus space is taken and filled. But he has not shown that the space is taken and filled with *matter*. He has shown that it is taken by God with his spiritual forces, who, we supposed, had always held it. We did not suppose that God had to battle it so hard to get possession of space. But if, when the author says, “Any considerable extent of space so filled,” &c., he means to say that any considerable extent of space filled, by this process of creation, with *material substance*, “is a creation of matter palpable to the senses,” of this fact we have no doubt. The smallest amount of matter must fill its quantum of space, and even no more than “a cubic inch” of it is capable of making a decidedly potent appeal to our senses. This would be one of the many speculations respecting the way in which God exerts his power to produce matter, and the reader would be at liberty to put his own estimate upon it. Any other interpretation of the author’s meaning leaves us, as to the creation of matter, just where he began. There has been, in his view, a very hard-fought battle of antagonistic activities and diremptive forces, holding each other still, and then again not holding each other still, but just as we are looking for the re-

sult, in a lump of matter—a “cubic inch” of it, or more—we are only told what *would be* the case if it did exist. If it did exist to the extent of “a cubic inch or a cubic mile,” it would no doubt be “palpable to the senses.”

We are all very curious to learn how matter was created. We understand pretty well that after it *is* created it becomes palpable to the senses, when there are senses to cognize it, and we have some idea of its crystalizing and other processes, in subjection to fixed laws; but we were to be told *how it was created*. And when we had, with awakened expectation, grappled to and thought with all our might, eager as sailors to hail the “land;” expecting every moment to see, not only a “cubic inch” of it, but a whole Delos rise to view, we were unwilling to be put off thus. And yet we are sure that no wrong was intended. The learned and ingenious author sincerely believed that he could solve the great problem of creation. We wish he could have done so; and he may understand our estimate of his talents when we say, that we believe he could do it as well as any living man. If he has failed, it is not for the want of profound talents, but, as we sincerely believe, because the thing aimed at is beyond the reach of the human mind. He has, as we think, like others of his philosophical school, mistaken the cunning play of fancy for the “insight of reason.” No error is more common, especially with minds of bold temperament, inclined to speculation. They are prone to forsake the modesty of true science. They do not keep in view the line of demarcation between what can and what can not be known. It is their glory that they are no plodders. Instead of sitting down to the patient study of facts; carefully conning the actual lessons of the past and of the present; using language with logical precision; and being reasonably contented to tread the beaten path, excepting as a better one is made manifest by the calm light of evidence; they too often leap boldly into the wide realm of airy fancies, looking for glorious fruits from the “insight of reason,” long after sober reason has evidently given place to the glaring flash of fancy. Such were the illuminatists of the last century—the Semlers, Edelmanns, Bahrdts, Lessings, and Pauluses—

over whose wild and reckless vagaries the claims of substantial truth have for more than a quarter of a century been gradually but surely gaining the ascendancy. We have no fear for the final result ; demonstration will triumph over fancy, and over all the Word of God will be sure to shine as the sun when he walketh in brightness.

No true philosopher doubts that the Creator of the universe is himself absolutely and eternally supernatural ; that He made and governs all upon essential and eternal principles ; and that there are sufficient reasons for all He does ; so that if we scan his works eternally, in the light of pure reason, we shall eternally see more and more of its beauty and excellence. But it by no means follows that our reason is competent to pierce the vail of nature, and tell *how* God created matter, or why He wrought it into such a cosmos as He did. We are not quite certain but in some future age He will make *another* cosmos — a “new heavens and earth” — which will be so unlike this, and so glorious, that it will require higher “intuitions of reason” and higher philosophy than we now have to see its eternal principles and necessary laws. It seems to us a bold adventure for any man to take his stand-point behind the Creator and tell how He must work. Enough for us, that we are permitted to stand up in the midst of the real world, and tell how God *does* work. An interesting truth, in this connection, is taught us in the great work of Prof. Agassiz to which we have already referred. He not only demonstrates scientifically the existence and agency of a spiritual and personal God, but that his works, while clearly indicating one and the same ultimate plan, are yet various from epoch to epoch. At each of the successive layers or changes of the earth's crust, He has terminated the entire races of creatures, and has created new races in their place ; so that each succeeding species was not, as geologists had supposed, a continuation or resumption of an old one, but a new embryonic creation of a new and different species. “The general results of geology proper and of palæontology,” says the learned Professor, “concur in the main to prove, that while the globe has been at repeated intervals, and indeed frequently, though

after immensely long periods, altered and altered again, until it has assumed its present condition, so have also animals and plants, living upon its surface, been again and again extinguished and replaced by others, until those now living were called into existence, with man at their head."* Who, then, can tell, from any assumed principles, or from present mathematical relations to facts in creation, what cosmos there may have been in the eternal ages past, or what a cosmos there may be in the eternal ages coming? The great wheel of eternity moves slowly around, and man, less in proportion upon it than a fly upon the surface of the globe, really sees and knows little else than what actually exists just about him. The more such men as Newton, Bacon, and Agassiz study nature, the more they are convinced of this. Let us then be modest, and sit patiently still at the feet of inductive science. Learning thus, we have everlasting ages of progressive knowledge before us.

Having inaugurated the genesis of matter, and thus obtained a solid foothold, Dr. Hickok proceeds to consider the various laws and conditions of matter, as made known to us by inductive science; and his great point is to show that they are all in harmony with his *a priori* principles. He puts the two methods of philosophizing at work, to show how, on his plan, they must meet. But it seems to us, in some cases, like the boring of the Hoosac tunnel; the men are working at both ends, but they are yet a long way apart. His exposition of the facts and laws of inductive science is, with few exceptions, learned and accurate, although their application to his *a priori* doctrines, however able and ingenious, is not always so convincing to others as they seem to be to himself. The fault is not in the man, but in the task. He has undertaken what we believe no man can accomplish. Many others have wrought at the same task, with no better success. Few have evinced equal talent—none a better spirit. We cannot do less than admire the zeal of men who labor thus, with honest intent, to enlarge the boundaries of human knowledge.

* Agassiz' Nat. His. U. S.—Limitation of Species in Time, p. 106.

In the present edition, the author especially solicits attention to any "mistakes in statement and errors in fact." We had not designed to notice these; but there are some which seem to have escaped the observation of reviewers, and are yet so related to the main argument that we are constrained to mention them. Thus on p. 148 the author makes simple activities meet at a central point, and "hold each other in balanced energy, and turn each other back upon themselves, thus making a tendency to accumulate force in two positions on the line of direction each side and out of the centre," etc. But it is a first law in science, that equal forces meeting from opposite directions in antagonism, neutralize or *destroy* each other; so that the resultant is zero, or nothing. Yet from this nothing, the author supposes a "tendency to accumulate force in two positions on the line of direction each side and out of the centre, and which tendency creates further the tendency to accumulate in an equatorial ring, and turn back each way this ring till its accumulations make an ensphering layer on each side to the poles." Again, on p. 171, in a statement scarcely less remarkable, he makes "the great principle of electricity" result from magnetism by the interruption of the "continued static rest in any portion of the superficial matter, and the consequent tension in the interrupted parts to recover themselves and restore the balance." On p. 203 we read, "While the rate of revolution gives a tangential force less than the gravitating or adhesive force at the equatorial surface," etc. Now the force generated by the revolution of a body is not a tangential but a *centrifugal* force. For the undulating theory of light, now generally admitted, we have on p. 210 a "diremptive activity going out each way in the midst of antagonistic forces"—"giving alternately a prolate and an oblate form to every successive layer," &c. On p. 264 we are told, "The force by the primal antagonism must not only ensphere all the successive points of force engendered, but must so ensphere them that each point out from the centre must react back upon the centre in exact static equilibrium. The central repulsion is every way equal through the sphere, and directly as the intensity of the forces, which is the quan

tity of matter, and inversely as the cubes of the radii, which is the distance." And this is assumed as the great law of the ensphering of matter by the action and reaction of antagonistic forces, which, in the circumstances given, science has fully demonstrated to have no other effect than to annihilate each other and thus result in nothing! On p. 296, in speaking of the laws of light, the author says, "If any obstruction occur, the rays are proportionably extinguished in it, and the shadow beyond is a perpetuation of extinct light in right lines from the source of illumination." An inquirer might be curious to know how an *extinct* light could be *perpetuated*. We are told on p. 330, "The satellites revolve but *do not rotate*." The explanation in the revision notes does not reverse the fact. Is it not still a fact that the moon makes a complete rotation on her axis every time she goes round the earth; that is, nearly thirteen times a year? On p. 338 it is admitted, "That the moons of Uranus are retrograde has been a surprising anomaly from its first discovery;" but it is claimed "that this exceptional fact is found to leap within the necessary determinations of the eternal principle." How they do so we cannot possibly see, except by that magical "insight of reason" that can see things which are not as though they were. We have noticed several other instances in which the learned author has failed, as we conceive, to state the principles and facts of inductive science correctly, or to reconcile them with his eternal *a priori* laws; but our space fails us; nor does our purpose require us to enlarge on this branch of the subject. We leave it for those who make the natural sciences their speciality.

We might, in conclusion, say much in commendation of the varied and striking merits of this work. We see no just ground for the charges of irreverence, fatalism, pantheism, and the like, which some reviewers have made against the author. We regard the volume, defective as it is in method and results, as in many respects a valuable contribution to our standard scientific literature, and would commend it to the careful perusal of all who feel any interest in these profound studies.

ARTICLE VIII.—BOOK NOTICES.

THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

BRECKENRIDGE'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD OBJECTIVELY AND SUBJECTIVELY CONSIDERED.*—HODGE'S OUTLINES OF THEOLOGY.†—There is a propriety in noticing these two treatises conjointly; issued almost simultaneously and by the same publishers, they contain the deliberate opinions of two acknowledged leaders of the Old School Presbyterian Church. The last of the two, though published under the name of the "son of his father," must nevertheless be regarded as legitimately the theological system of the father of the son. The series of questions under which the contents of the "*Outlines*" are arranged, is the one used by Dr. Hodge in his lecture-room when the son was a theological student, fourteen or fifteen years ago; two of the chapters are simply abridgements of the father's latest lectures, and the whole volume is largely composed of materials collected and written down when the author was a student, "after frequent oral communication with his father, both in public and and private." Liberal extracts are also made from Review articles, in which Dr. Hodge has in later years expanded and vindicated his views more fully. And as the now venerable Professor cannot be supposed to have experienced any material change of views within the last fourteen years, the "*Outlines*" must be regarded as a somewhat careful statement of the Princeton Theology.

And it was time that Princeton should state definitely and fully the "outlines" of its whole system. Dr. Breckenridge, a *novus homo* in Theology in comparison with Dr. Hodge, had challenged the public attention by two ponderous volumes, which claimed to be preëminently orthodox in doctrine, and scientific in method. The champion of Presbyterian orthodoxy in the arena of debate, was fast coming to be regarded by some of his friends, as the true oracle of Presbyterian Theology. To have criticised this oracle in the Princeton Review would have been

* *The Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered. Being the first part of Theology considered as a Science of Positive Truth, both inductive and deductive.* By ROBERT J. BRECKENRIDGE, D. D., L.L. D., Professor of Theology in the Seminary of Dansville, Kentucky. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1859.

The Knowledge of God Subjectively Considered, etc., etc. By ROBERT J. BRECKENRIDGE, etc., etc. By same publisher. 1860.

† *Outlines of Theology.* By the Rev. A. ALEXANDER HODGE, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Fredericksburg, Va. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

indecorous if not dangerous. A corrective volume from Princeton itself would have smacked of rivalry and been undignified. The trusty son has solved the difficulty.

It would be instructive to compare with minuteness the methods and the views of these two veterans and leaders of the Old School Assembly, but we must content ourselves with bare allusion to one or two points on which they harmonize or agree. Both adopt as fundamental to their systems, the Cocceian and Witsian conception of "covenants," though Dr. Breckendridge, it must be confessed, puts the federal method to a severe strain in his explication of the doctrine of original sin. In their general methods of classification and analysis of doctrines, no two authors could be more unlike. Dr. H. adopts that known as the "synthetic" which, with few exceptions, has been followed by all great theologians. Dr. B., on the contrary, pronounces the synthetic method "artificial and arbitrary," while he declares his own to be "natural and scientific." But what his own may be is not so easily determined. He seems to have attempted the astonishing feat of combining both the synthetic and the analytic methods, while he abjures each. He is perfectly right in claiming that his "conception," "method," and "order," have never "been distinctly recognized hitherto." According to his "conception," "the whole knowledge of God" is "capable of a purely objective treatment," and receives it in his first volume; the same knowledge is "capable of a purely subjective treatment," and receives it in his second volume; while that same knowledge is capable of of, and "if God spares his life," shall receive a treatment in its "relation to all untruth." Let no unthinking reader suppose the "objective" or the "subjective treatment" to be in any sense polemical. The short work and the clean work with "all untruth," are to come with the third volume. The method of Dr. Breckendridge, including his classification and analysis of special doctrines, for instance, in his treatment of the attributes of God, is, without exception, the most successful attempt at confounding things different, and at mystifying things simple, that has yet fallen within the range of our reading.

The two authors agree substantially in the views of the Work and Person of Christ, but are not quite in harmony on the doctrine of Original Sin. According to Dr. Hodge, God "creates every human soul in a state judicially excluded from fellowship with himself, and hence the tendency to sin." Original sin, which is "an innate moral habit of soul," is in consequence of our being "abandoned by God," and is in itself "a part of the penalty of Adam's transgression." "This innate disposition or habit of soul which leads to sinful action, is itself sin," and yet "the being born alienated from God, from which the corruption of our nature results, is itself not a sin, but a dreadful punishment. But punishment argues guilt, universal punishment universal guilt, and the punishment of all men can be referred to no other cause than to the universal guilt of all in Adam." That is, if we understand him, our "innate disposition" "is itself sin," which is not damnable on its own account, but is a "dread punishment" of Adam's sin. "The guilt, *i. e.* legal responsibility of Adam's public sin, is righteously imputed to all his descendants, and its penal consequences is (are) inflicted upon

them, in the line, and in part through the agency of natural generation." See chaps. xvi and xvii of the "*Outlines*."

Dr. Breckenridge, on the other hand, in his usual dogmatic magisterial way, asserts, "it is infinitely certain that God would never make a legal fiction a pretext to punish as enemies, dependent and helpless creatures who were actually innocent. The imputation of our sins to Christ, affords no pretext for such a statement," (an argument of Dr. Hodge for his view—see "*Outlines*" p. 242, ques. 22,) because that was done by the express consent of Christ, and was in every respect the most stupendous proof of divine grace." "The sin of Adam is imputed to us, but never irrespective of our nature, and its inherent sin." "It is not enough to say sin is justly imputed to us; we must add that we are naturally defiled in all the faculties and parts of our soul and body," etc., etc.

Dr. Breckenridge, if we understand him correctly, belongs to that party among Old School Presbyterians, whose views have been specially expanded and defended by Dr. Baird in his "*Elohim Revealed*." He holds views which, to our thinking, are logically inconsistent with the formal Theory of Covenants, and which must yet come, if we read aright the signs, into most destructive conflict with that whole conception of Christianity.

The two works might also be compared, or rather contrasted, in respect to their rhetorical and logical qualities. Mr. Hodge is always calm, concise, and lucid in his statements, never leaving the reader in doubt as to what is intended to be said. Dr. Breckenridge lacks distinctness and sharpness of statement; is often tedious, full, and repetitious on indifferent points; and not unfrequently shews a want of clear and accurate analysis. His volumes abound in those sweeping and dogmatic statements and pretentious claims, for which the author has been famed as a debater, but which are not quite in keeping with the sober and exact language looked for in a treatise on Systematic Theology.

Both Mr. Hodge and Dr. Breckenridge exhibit special antipathy to the Baptists; both blunder egregiously respecting them, and refer to Alexander Carson as their undisputed Baptist authority; a just retribution, it must be confessed, for the glorification of that writer, to which intelligent Baptists have so long submitted without remonstrance. Mr. Hodge, in defending infant baptism, feels compelled to say that "the origin of the modern Baptists can be definitely traced to the Anabaptists of Germany, about A. D. 1537;" a statement which we shall decline characterizing as it deserves.

Nevertheless, we commend these two treatises to our readers, as eminently orthodox, and Mr. Hodge's as especially worthy their careful study. They come nearer, in their principal doctrines, to the views of the old Baptist fathers, than any theological treatise that has appeared in this country in many a day.

WORKS OF DR. EMMONS.*—The Congregational Board of Publica-

* *The Works of Nathaniel Emmons, D. D., third Pastor of the Church in Franklin, Mass. With a Memoir of his Life. Edited by JACOB IDE, D. D. Vol. II. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1860.*

tion is proving itself one of the most useful institutions in our land. While, like other similar Boards, it has not forgotten its distinctively denominational design, it has prepared and issued complete and authentic editions of the works of several theologians, whose writings are an honor to American literature, and are indispensable to any one who would understand the history or the present state of theological discussions in this country. The works of Samuel Hopkins, of Bellamy, of the younger Edwards, and of Shepard, John Robinson, and others, have all been thoroughly edited, and are published in convenient form by the same Board. The works of Emmons, published some eighteen years since by Crocker & Brewster of Boston, have been for years out of print. A new edition, very considerably enlarged by the addition of sermons not before published, is now being issued. The second and third volumes (of which there are to be six in all) contain those sermons which are specially doctrinal, and admit of being arranged under the general title of "Systematic Theology." The last three volumes are to follow in due time, the *first*, containing the memoir, being reserved to accompany the *last*. Each is to contain about eight hundred pages, to be sold for two dollars, and "sent, post-paid, on receipt of the price." We hope the same Board will yet give the public a thoroughly revised and authentic edition of the elder Edwards. It is a disgrace to our common country that we have no better edition of the works of our greatest thinker, and the more so, that the inheritors of his name and his papers are anxious to prepare one.

DR. THOMPSON'S LOVE AND PENALTY.* — Account as we may for the fact, there is a wide-spread social disease, in the form of a false and misjudging philanthropy. Amongst many other symptoms of this disorder, we notice the hostility betrayed, in a great variety of forms, to the doctrine of divine retributive justice, especially in the matter of penalties reaching into the life to come.

The work of Dr. Thompson is, therefore, a *timely* production. It belongs to a class of works demanded by the present exigencies of the great conflict between the Christian and the anti-Christian forces. And when we take into account the recent publication of other volumes bearing on some of the subjects discussed in this—for example, Prof. Hovey's "*State of the Impenitent Dead*"—and also remember that these works have been called forth by the urgency of a general demand, and that they are meeting with a large and thoughtful attention on the part of the reading public, we accept the present contribution for something more than what it is in itself; we accept it as a token that the Christian pulpit is recommitting itself to the earnest and pungent preaching of sin and retribution as a part of that gospel which it is commissioned to publish.

Dr. Thompson comes to the treatment of his momentous theme with suitable feelings of fidelity to the truth, and of tender sensibility as respects the subjects of the awful penalties of God's law. His volume

* *Love and Penalty; or, Eternal Punishment Consistent with the Fatherhood of God.* By JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D. D. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

exhibits nothing of that spirit of vindictiveness and denunciation that sometimes adulterates the discussion of the doctrine of divine retributions. In this respect his lectures are a good model for the public handling of the sterner truths of the Bible.

We shall, perhaps, do the best service to our readers, by furnishing them a brief synopsis of the contents of this volume.

In his first lecture, Dr. Thompson argues the divine retribution from the constitution of the human mind. And it seems to us that this argument, as here presented, must commend itself to every healthfully constituted intellect. The key-note to this lecture is found in the following sentence, page 36: "The universal sentiment of mankind, that retributive justice is due to wrong-doing—a feeling which God has implanted in the human soul—is a witness and a prophecy of his own righteous indignation against sin." The evidence that such is the decision and demand of the universal moral sense, appears in the laws of human society, in the religions of mankind, and in the literary works of all nations. Under each of these specifications, the author accumulates testimony that amounts to demonstration. And, indeed, aside from all such proofs, it is a wonder how any sane man can deny that there is that in our moral constitution which *demands* retribution for sin, and that never will rest satisfied without the rendering of a "just recompense of reward for every transgression and disobedience." So urgent is this demand, that more than one criminal has been impelled, in order to satisfy his moral instincts, to deliver himself up, voluntarily, to the course of justice.

The argument of the second lecture is drawn from "the retributive forces continually at work in the natural world, and the punitive dealings of Providence with men." In this part of the work, the argument is pressed home, logically and fairly, as we believe, that, "if the infliction of evil upon transgressors in a future state of retribution is inconsistent with the benevolence of God, then the infliction of evil in this world proves that he is not benevolent." On one of the horns of the following dilemma, is every reasoner tossed who denies future retribution, viz.: The course of this present world is either subject to blind chance, or is controlled by a capricious intelligence.

In the third lecture, future retribution is argued from the fatherhood of God in Christ. In this lecture the author has grouped together a considerable number of proof-passages from the New Testament, touching future and endless punishment. Whilst we hold to the relevancy of these passages, we confess to a wish that a somewhat different treatment of them had been employed. The *application* made of those texts should, we think, have been justified, beyond reasonable cavil, on exegetical and critical grounds. We are satisfied that a very few proof-texts *thus* brought to bear on the argument, would carry more force of conviction than any number grouped in the manner of this lecture. In speaking of another lecture, we shall have occasion to commend what we here desiderate.

In arguing, lecture fourth, for future retribution from the demerit of sin, the author, whilst just and sensible as far as he goes, does not, as it seems to us, take sufficiently fundamental views. The law of God, as

necessary to the well-being of the universe, is the principal point from which Dr. T. estimates the demerit of sin. But a more central point of view, one certainly that should not be missed in such a discussion, is, the law as an expression of the divine nature, and as demanding something as the penalty of its transgression that shall satisfy that nature.

The author, in lecture five, takes up the question of future probation, and shows that of the only three conceivable modes of such probation by which a limit could be fixed to future punishment, neither one is scriptural or rational.

In the sixth lecture, Dr. Thompson proves what has hitherto, in the discussion, been taken for granted, viz., the soul's immortality. This theme is investigated "in the light of evidence from nature," and also from the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. The argument, from the light of nature, is put forth with unusual force and freshness. We hardly know where it is better presented within the same space. The scriptural argument is more briefly given, and might have been considerably strengthened. Indeed, we must say that, in our judgment, a different order from the one we find here ought always to obtain in presenting these two classes of proof. Let the Bible *Revelations* on this subject be first set forth, and then let the *illustrating, corroborating* evidences from the volume of nature be superadded. This is the only *convincing* method of dealing with the doctrine of the soul's immortality.

The seventh lecture enters more largely than the third into eternal punishment as a doctrine of the Bible. The reasonings of this part of the volume cannot be met, except by means of a scriptural exegesis the most forced and arbitrary. Of course, the author's treatment of this topic is not exhaustive. A sound and thorough interpretation of all or a majority of the passages in the Old and New Testaments bearing on the point, would compel any candid man to acknowledge, with J. Foster, that the scriptural argument for eternal punishment is exceedingly cogent. In fact, it is irresistible. It cannot be *scripturally* refuted. The only thing possible for one who denies the doctrine, is to exclaim, with a sort of blind and desperate surrender to mere feeling, "It cannot be so." In this lecture, an important distinction is urged between mere natural penalty as the result of general providential law, and a direct, positive, judicial punishment; a distinction commonly overlooked by the advocates of the opposite view.

The eighth lecture deals with the subject of the annihilation of the wicked. It furnishes a very fine specimen of exegesis applied to the single passage, Matthew xxv: 46. We could wish that the volume did more abound in this kind of argument. It is the right method of handling "the Sword of the Spirit" in a work of this character. The critical examination of the passage from Matthew makes it certain, beyond reasonable question, that the future doom of the impenitent is not annihilation, but the conscious experience of punishment, and that the punishment will be without end. This terrible truth is thus pressed home to the conscience by all the authority of a clear, indubitable "Thus saith the Lord."

We commend to the attention of our readers the work of which we

have thus furnished a partial synopsis. We hope it will meet with the quiet and thoughtful perusal of thousands. And we may express our hope that the Christian pulpit will revive and make more frequent the feeling and faithful proclamation of the class of truths discussed by Dr. Thompson. Precisely the influence of the right discussion of this class of truths, is needed to check the moral heedlessness and to cure the diseased philanthropy of the age. Let there be no longer an undue and morbid shrinking from the public handling of the doctrine of divine retribution. The moral health of society demands that it be brought to bear upon the conscience and the life.

The volume before us is characterized by certain *doctrinal* intimations that fall considerably short, we think, of the teachings of the word of God. These intimations have reference to the *chief end* of the punishment of sinners under the law of God, and of the atonement whereby punishment is arrested in behalf of the justified and believing sinner. The view to which we take exception is apparent, not so much in what is said, as in what is left unsaid. For example, page 180: "I have already shown that the nature of sin, as the highest conceivable offence against the authority of God, and the highest possible wrong against the welfare of his intelligent creation, demands of Him, as a *benevolent ruler*, the strongest possible expression of his displeasure." Again, page 183: "The *sole* design of penalty, as penalty, is to sustain the law." Again, page 284: "We have seen that the demerit of sin, as against the law of love and the welfare of the universe, demands the highest displeasure of the God of purity and love." The emphasis in these quotations is, in part, our own. Now, we do not deny this magisterial and governmental element in the manifestations that God has made of his displeasure against sin, both in the infliction of its penalty upon sinners, and in the work of the atonement, but we do question whether the governmental requirement was the final cause of those manifestations. Doubtless both the punishment of sin, and the making of the Christian atonement for sin, were designed to make, and do make, an impression in favor of the law and government of God; but they do something more than this: *they satisfy the demands of the divine nature.* We regret to find a want of *fulness* in the author's view of the scheme of retribution and atonement.

UNITARIANISM DEFINED.*—Dr. Farley takes occasion, in his preface, to define his own position as respects the progressives of his denomination. He evidently belongs to the old school of Channing, Ware, and Norton. He "believes in Christianity as an authoritative, Revealed Religion;" "plants himself on the Bible, and especially the New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." He "believes in progress, but, in religious matters, progress within Christianity, and not outside of it."

* *Unitarianism Defined. The Scripture Doctrine of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. A Course of Lectures. By FREDERICK A. FARLEY, D. D., Pastor of the Church of the Saviour, Brooklyn, N. Y. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1860.*

The Lectures composing the volume were originally delivered extemporaneously, from brief notes carefully prepared. Their publication is at the request of those who heard them. The author anticipates and deprecates disappointment in the hearers from the loss of the freshness and vivacity that accompany and give charm to extempore speaking; but the loss has undoubtedly been more than compensated by a gain in completeness and accuracy of statement. He has evidently aimed to make his volume an authentic and authoritative statement of Unitarianism, as now held by the teachers of that faith. Diligent use has been made of the writings of both Trinitarians and Unitarians, living authors and preachers included.

As respects the Trinity and Human Nature, Dr. Farley simply reiterates the views of Channing and Ware; in respect to the Person and Work of Christ, he has advanced very perceptibly towards the Trinitarian faith. Thus, the doctrine of the Trinity is a "mysterious, irrational, unscriptural dogma;" "it is self-contradictory, opposed to all right reason, positively absurd." "The Unitarian view of Human Nature—our nature"—is "that man by nature, man as born into this world, is innocent, pure"—"in and by the nature which God has given him, is a being of glorious, God-like affections and faculties." But as respects the person of Christ and Atonement, Dr. Farley affirms that "Unitarians believe in the Divinity of the Saviour as firmly and earnestly as any branch of the church," but contend earnestly "against the dogma of Christ's Supreme Deity." Christ is "the Lord and Head of his church; second only to the Supreme Jehovah in the hearts and consciences of men; the visible vicegerent and representative of the Most High." "Jesus is the Son of God; not merely a son of God, but the Son of God, in a high, special, peculiar, unrivalled sense; a title by which he is represented as holding a singular and most intimate relationship to the Father." As regards the Atonement, "Christ saves us, so far as his sufferings and death are concerned, through their moral influence and power upon man; the great appeal which they make being not to God, but to the sinner's conscience and heart; thus aiding in the great work of bringing him into reconciliation with, or reconciling him to, his Father in heaven." It will strike our readers as something new to find President Wayland referred to, in a note, as one of the "Orthodox divines" by whom "this view has of late been admitted and preached." Minor points are glanced at in the progress of the Lectures, and a *resumé* of beliefs and not-beliefs concludes the course. All Unitarians are represented as "rejecting the popular belief in the eternal damnation of the impenitent, though believing in a righteous judgment and retribution hereafter," some holding to the annihilation, others to the restoration of the lost, and others still to their condemnation to a "consciously lower plane" than that of the righteous. It is a significant fact that, in defining Unitarianism, Dr. Farley has occupied much more space in stating and combating the views of the Orthodox, than he has in stating and defining those of the Unitarians.

MORNING HOURS IN PATMOS.*—The Rev. Mr. Thompson was ap-

* *Morning Hours in Patmos. The Opening Vision of the Apocalypse, and Christ's Epistles to the Seven Churches in Asia.* By A. C. THOMPSON, author of the "Better Land," "Gathered Lilies," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

pointed, we believe, by the "American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions" to accompany their Secretary, the Rev. Dr. Anderson, on a visit to their missionary stations in the East. Without preface or explanation, however, the author introduces us at once, in his first chapter, to the stern, rock-bound little island of Patmos, as it first rose to his view on a bright moonlight morning, long before dawn, while sailing along the southern shore of Asia Minor. "During those quiet, early hours, and whilst the morning sun poured his rays on the Ægean Sea, the author read—and naturally with special interest—the opening vision of John. The thoughts which here follow were then, for substance, suggested to him." The thoughts are distributed into twelve chapters, the last seven of which are devoted to the "epistles to the seven churches;" the whole making a volume at once readable and religious, though it be neither original nor learned.

WISE'S VINDICATION OF THE NEW-ENGLAND CHURCHES.*—To most of our readers, the name of John Wise will come as that of a new author, and the title of his book be suggestive of latest New-England controversies. It is, however, ten years more than a century and a quarter since the small treatise which gives its title to the present volume was written, and just a century and a half since the tract occupying the remainder of the volume, and entitled the "*Churches' Quarrel Espoused*," was first published. Both productions were called forth by attempts to corrupt Congregationalism. "Proposals" had been made by the Boston Association of Ministers to transform the associational meetings, then becoming common in New-England, into a species of Standing Council for the final settlement of difficult questions, but specially for the license and authorization of ministers. To these proposals, Mr. Wise, pastor of a church in a parish of Ipswich (now Essex), some thirty miles from Boston, replied in a strain of satire so effectual as to kill them outright. Cotton Mather, their reputed author, ventured no defence, maintaining a "dignified silence and a pious contempt." The satire of the "*Churches' Quarrel Espoused*" was irresistible; and when, fifteen years after its publication, "two of the most popular preachers of the day," Samuel Moody and John White, addressed to its author a letter requesting a new edition, he not only yielded to their wishes, but set himself to work in preparation of the "*Vindication*." The influence of these two tracts has been unmistakable in the history of Congregationalism in Massachusetts. With a free circulation of them among the churches of Connecticut, the system of Consociationism there prevalent could never had a being.

The Congregational Board of Publication have laid a debt of gratitude on all believers in the Congregational form of church government by republishing this old, rare book, so long and so highly prized by the select few who have been able to supply themselves with copies. It is a book for Baptists to read carefully, for it vindicates the very

* *A Vindication of the Government of New-England Churches, and the Churches' Quarrel Espoused, or a Reply to Certain Proposals.* By JOHN WISE, A. M., Pastor of a Church in Ipswich. Fourth edition. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 23 Chauncey street. 1860.

principles they have always contended for. We are quite at a loss to understand what is meant by the Rev. J. S. Clark, D. D., author of a "Historical Introductory Notice" inserted in the volume, when he says: "If Thomas Jefferson confessed himself indebted to the business meetings of a church in his neighborhood — *substantially congregational in government* — for his best ideas of a democracy," &c., &c. Those "business meetings," as every body knows, were held by a *Baptist* church, and Dr. Clark should have known that Baptists are not only *substantially*, but absolutely, congregational. They claim to be, and actually are, more congregational or democratic than Congregationalists themselves. Never before, until this autumn of 1860, have the Congregationalists of Massachusetts been willing to admit a lay representation into their State ministerial assemblages. They are now only beginning to justify their claim to the name they bear.

ANNAN ON ARMINIAN METHODISM.*—Three editions of Mr. Annan's book having been exhausted, and a fourth being called for, he has taken occasion to revise, and "in a great measure re-write it." He has also thrown the whole into a series of letters addressed to Bishop Simpson, of the Methodist Episcopate, and devoted, throughout the letters, especial attention to "*Objections to Calvinism*," a book by the Rev. R. S. Foster, and for which the Bishop had written a very commendatory "Introduction." The topics discussed lie along the whole range of debatable ground between Calvinists and Arminians, and Mr. Annan, it must be confessed, has presented the several points in dispute clearly and comprehensively, and, on the whole, with a very commendable degree of fairness.

Our Methodist friends are accustomed to speak and write of Calvinism and Calvinists with a dogmatism and misapprehension—it would be less courteous than true to say ignorance—that, but for their earnestness and manifest sincerity, would provoke intelligent people to unseemly merriment. It would be of great benefit to the Methodist clergy to read attentively such a book as Mr. Annan's. We commend it also most heartily to the careful attention of all persons, whether in the Methodist Church or out of it, who are tinctured with the spirit or with the faith of modern Arminianism.

BAXTER'S REFORMED PASTOR†—From the "*de doctrina Christiana*" of Augustine, down to the wordy volume of Mr. Bridges, or the shallow one of Dr. Murray, there has been no lack of works on the functions and duties of the Christian Ministry; but among them all, no one has exerted an influence at once so deep, so pure, so permanent, and so

* *The Difficulties of Arminian Methodism; a series of letters addressed to Bishop Simpson, of Pittsburgh.* By WILLIAM ANNAN, author of "*Letters on Psalmody*," &c. Fourth edition, re-written and enlarged. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1860.

† *Gildas Salvianus. The Reformed Pastor: shewing the nature of the pastoral work, especially in private instruction and catechising; with an open confession of our too open sins.* By the Rev. RICHARD BAXTER. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

stimulating, as the "*Reformed Pastor*" of Baxter. The unshrinking reprover of Cromwell, the faithful pastor of Kidderminster weavers, the subtle theologian, the sturdy non-conformist, threw his whole soul, with all its characteristics and experiences, into the preparation of this manual. And if one whose protracted labors transformed a vicious, brawling people into an enlightened, Christian community, is entitled to speak with authority, then Baxter should be heard with attention. Many a faithful pastor could testify of indebtedness to his suggestions. Thanks to the publishers for giving us the treatise "complete." We have no patience with that modern audacity which mutilates the work of an old author, and then palms it upon the public under the authority of his name.

MY SAVIOUR, BY THE REV. JOHN EAST,* is a series of meditations on the names and titles of Christ, conceived in a spirit of genuine and ardent devotion, and written in a style that is simple and natural, and religiously racy. Mr. East, an English rector, has evidently studied the Scriptures for himself, and can quote them with a freshness and aptness attainable by no mere study of COLLECTIONS OF SCRIPTURE TEXTS, however complete or carefully compiled. Each meditation is brief, and closes with a few lines in metre, in which the author often shews himself worthy a place with Montgomery, Cowper, Doddridge, and other writers of sacred lyrics. "*My Saviour*" is an admirable little volume to have always at hand. Any Christian can read it with profit.

PENDLETON'S SERMONS.†—Prof. Pendleton is a clear and vigorous thinker, and writes in a style at once simple, easy, perspicuous, and manly. His sermons are didactic rather than hortatory, doctrinal rather than experimental, and always lie along a track of thought within range of the most ordinary intelligence. Of the author's sermons, as presented in their full proportions to a living audience, we cannot speak from this volume, since it contains, in the language of anatomists, only the *natural skeletons* of full-formed discourses. To put *fifty* sermons within four hundred and fifty-nine duodecimo pages, in clear, fair type, there would, of course, be room enough only for the bones of the thoughts, with just enough of ligament to hold them together.

The author, in his preface, says of the sermons: "In their preparation, I have indulged the hope that they will be specially useful to one class of readers—YOUNG PREACHERS." It is not as models that he hopes for their usefulness, nor yet, we think, as comprising a system of doctrines, but as furnishing plans of sermons to be used in the pulpit. Now, if we were intent on contributing to our utmost towards the di-

* *My Saviour ; or, Devotional Meditations in Prose and Verse on the Themes and Titles of the Lord Jesus Christ.* By the Rev. JOHN EAST, A. M., Rector of Croscombe, Somerset, England. New-York : Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

† *Short Sermons on Important Subjects.* By J. M. PENDLETON, Professor of Theology in Union University, Murfreesboro', Tenn. Nashville : South-western Publishing House. 1860.

rect deterioration of our younger ministry, we know of no readier method than that of advising their use, in the pulpit, of other men's methods and plans of thought, by whomsoever made, or however excellent in themselves. The way to learn to walk, is not by the use of crutches; the way to learn to think, is not to draw over the limbs of the mind the cast-off clothes of another. We had hoped that this habit of preaching other men's sermons was to remain the exclusive possession of the Methodists.

Questions of taste are always delicate, and to be lightly touched; but we cannot forbear insinuating a doubt respecting the purity of the taste that places one's own portrait as the frontispiece, unless, indeed, the original be superlatively handsome, and the book dedicated exclusively to "the ladies."

Dr. TYNG ON SUNDAY SCHOOLS.*—The distinguished and zealous "rector of St. George's Church, New-York," has been more useful in no branch of his varied and multiplied labors, than in the Sunday schools of the several parishes in which he has spent his ministerial life. It was a happy thought that led to the publication, in the *Independent*, of the letters embodying his "forty years' experience in Sunday schools," and a very natural, as well as happy sequence that these should be collected into a volume. It will be hailed with a welcome by thousands of teachers and friends of Sunday schools in all denominations. We need not say that it abounds in useful hints and suggestions.

Dr. Tyng is one of the most liberal of the low-church party of the Episcopal segment, but, with all his liberality and charity, he still has a very unscriptural conception of the church. He and Dr. Huntington are more nearly identical in their views of the relation of the Sunday school to the church, than the antecedents of Dr. Tyng might lead the unreflecting to suppose; the neophyte has only been less politic and guarded in expressing them. Dr. Tyng is very confident that "the Sunday school must always consider itself a part of the church, and cultivate a relation of harmony and submission in this connection." "Let children be brought up as parts of the household of the faith—not indifferent to their church relations." "No sight is more beautiful, than to see the youth of a flock trained in happy regularity and devotion in the worship and principles, and affectionate maintenance, of *the church to which they belong*." The Baptists are often accused of an unseemly obtrusiveness of their views; but they are modest in comparison with Pedo-Baptist writers. Pedo-Baptism, however, is the very "pillar and ground" of all other conceptions of church-building than that of the Baptists.

THE BOOK AND ITS STORY,† is a very entertaining account of the Bible, from the beginning of Revelation until the present time. The author, after rapidly sketching the earliest known methods of writing,

* *Forty Years' Experience in Sunday Schools.* By STEPHEN H. TYNG, D. D. Rector of St. George's Church, New-York. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

† *The Book and its Story: A narrative for the young.* By L. N. R., author of "*The Missing Link*." New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

the gradual formation of the Scripture canon, and the fate of the Bible before the Reformation, devotes his attention to the first English translations, and the larger portion of his volume to the British and Foreign Bible Society, dwelling on its rise and progress, its Bible House and Bible Printing, and its present operations throughout the world. It purports to be "a narrative for the young," but many an adult will find it to be profitable reading. The first half of the volume contains information not easily accessible to the majority of readers. It is a capital book for Sabbath School teachers.

BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION.

MORRISON ON THE GOSPELS.*—This is a very scholarly and a very religious contribution to the literature of the Gospels. In many respects it is evangelical and orthodox. The author accepts, heartily, the inspiration of the Gospel histories, the miracles of the New Testament, and the doctrine of the different eternal retributions of the righteous and wicked. True, he doubts the *general* judgment, and, on the great central fact of the proper divinity of Christ, he shews a defect of faith. Yet, on this last truth, he *approaches* satisfactory declarations. He is manifestly possessed of a deep and reverential love for Jesus Christ, that is scarcely consistent with anything short of true worship. We welcome such a volume from such a source.

The *plan* of the work is somewhat new. Disquisitions accompany the notes. These disquisitions are full of fresh discussions, and add greatly to the attractiveness and value of the commentary.

With all the claims of this volume to our hearty commendation, it possesses some features to which we take decided exception, aside from its doctrinal deficiencies. One of those characteristics is a certain tinge of the cheap and too current cant about Theological liberalism. We have, for example, no sympathy with such sentiments as we find on page 16, and in various other passages. We do not allow ourselves to doubt our claim to stand as high as Mr. Morrison in the possession of the *genuinely* catholic spirit. We proscribe no man and no creed. We do not attempt, or wish to lord it over any man's religious belief. At the same time, we hold that we have in Revelation a common standard by which to try our beliefs. And we have a positive creed in harmony, as we think, with the standard to which we appeal, and by which we are willing to have our articles of faith judged. And we hold, further, that only such as agree *fundamentally* in their articles of faith can profitably walk together, or prosperously work together, in ecclesiastical fellowship, especially if there is any earnestness and aggressive force in the organization. Now, against the cant of the complaint of illiberalism concerning such views and positions, we utter our voice in behalf of the great body of Christ's professing disciples.

* *Disquisitions and Notes on the Gospels — Matthew.* By JOHN H. MORRISON. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1860.

DR. D. N. LORD ON THE APOCALYPSE.*—Mr. Lord writes with the utmost measure of confidence in his own opinions. He gives no quarter, and, it is but fair to add, he asks none. He handles others roughly, and rather challenges and provokes rough handling in turn.

His *method* in this book, as in some others, is, first to define the laws of symbolic representation, and then to apply them to the successive scenes of the book of the Revelation.

The law of symbolic representation upon which Mr. Lord lays the greatest stress, is thus defined, page 24: "The ground of symbolization is indisputably, therefore, not a similarity of nature, but analogy,—general resemblances by which objects of one species may be employed to represent those of another."

We are not disposed to dispute this canon of interpretation as a general guide to the significancy of symbols. Nor are we prepared to accept it, without leaving a somewhat broader margin for exceptions than we find in the following: "The only deviations in any degree are, when the agents to be represented are of a nature that cannot properly be symbolized by anything else than themselves." But it is impracticable to enter into the discussion of this point in this notice. It may come under review at some other time, and in some other form.

It is in the *application* of the foregoing law with others, that Mr. Lord comes to some results in this volume where we find it impossible to follow him consentingly. We will instance one, viz., that in which he finds the fulfilment of the scenes at the opening of the twelfth chapter of Revelation, in the accession of Constantine the Great and the events following thereon. The whole of this portion of Mr. Lord's exposition seems to us forced and untenable. We hope, in a more elaborate form, to justify this expression of dissent, and also to subject the volume of Mr. Lord, as a whole, to friendly criticism. This only we add now in general, that we have no confidence in any interpretation of unfulfilled prophecy that reaches to nice dates and precise details. We believe that prophecy was given to awaken a general expectation of coming events, and that it would defeat some of its own purposes should it disclose, beforehand, the time, and method, and instruments of its exact fulfilment.

BURROWS ON THE SONG OF SOLOMON.†—The author of this volume accepts, with good reason, we think, the canonical character and inspired claims of the book of the Song of Solomon. On the supposition of any other character, certainly, the composition has no right to a place amongst the Jewish sacred books, and it is impossible to account for its being included in a collection of documents held by the Jews, and sanctioned by Christ, as of divine inspiration and authority. We have no sympathy with any attempt, like that in a recent edition of the Bible by the American Bible Society, to take Christ and all spiritual truth out of this composition, and to degrade it to a mere epithalamium.

* *An Exposition of the Apocalypse.* By DAVID N. LORD. *New and revised edition.* New-York: Franklin Knight. 1859.

† *A Commentary on the Song of Solomon.* By GEO. BURROWS, D. D. *Second edition.* Philadelphia: Wm. S. & Alfred Martien. 1860.

The Song, under the drapery of a beautiful allegory, sets forth the relation of Christ to his church. And this peculiarly tender exhibition of the mutual love between the Redeemer and his bride, is not exclusive to this Song. Witness the forty-fifth Psalm, and the language of John the Baptist, John ii: 29. We accept, then, as heartily as our author, the spiritual and inspired character of the Canticles. And we fully accord with his remark, that the Song of Solomon is the favorite of the advanced Christian, whose religious love has become mature and mellow by long and varied discipline.

We commend this commentary as one chaste in language and imagery, and laden with the riches of a genuine religious experience, the experience not of our author alone, but the cumulative experience of the church through its whole past history.

McCLELLAND'S CANON AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.*—

We learn from the preface, that this "work was drawn up with exclusive reference to the wants of the students in the Theological Seminary with which the author is connected," though on the title page it is said to be "intended also for private Christians in general." And we find nothing in it unsuited to any reader of ordinary intelligence. On the contrary, we suspect its popularity and usefulness will not be less among the unlettered than among professional students.

The discussions proper of the book are preceded by an introduction devoted to the duty of young ministers, as respects the study of the Scriptures. Seventy-seven pages are then given to the canon of Scripture, and the remainder of the volume, nearly two-thirds of the whole, is occupied with the rules of interpretation. We could wish the author had treated more fully of the canon, and so shaped his argument as effectually to silence certain cavils of modern sceptics. The chief defect of the whole treatise, it seems to us, is its want of comprehensive adaptation to the exigencies of the day. New treatises are demanded for the repulse of latest assailants, and not for the mere repetition of what has been as well or better said by others.

Prof. McClelland writes in an easy and piquant, though sometimes undignified, style. We occasionally find an unguarded and unqualified statement, not quite in keeping with the Professorial chair; as, for instance, when he tells us of our English Bible, "that there are not a few instances in every page where the sense is not injured merely, but entirely lost. Even where the signification of words is given properly, the transitive and connecting particles which shew the relation of the different members of a thought, have secondary meanings, so entirely different from those of the corresponding particles in English, that a literal version is often nothing better than a mere travesty of the original." This would be unpardonable extravagance, even in the stump speech of an advocate of a new translation. But these defects are more

* *A Brief Treatise on the Canon and Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures; for the special benefit of Junior Theological Students, but intended also for private Christians in general.* By ALEX. McCLELLAND, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New-Brunswick. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

than compensated by the excellent sentiments scattered through the volume; as, for instance, in speaking of the erroneous opinion that mental application is injurious to health, he says: "Nothing is more absurd. Look through the world, and you will find no class of men more vigorous and long-lived than active thinkers. The truth is, clergymen do not study enough. That they sit much, and are more sequestered from the hum and tumult of society than members of other professions, is fully granted. But *sitting* is not *studying*, nor are we willing to bestow this respectable name on the mechanical operation of transposing a few stale thoughts on certain common places of Didactic Theology." This is a wholesome statement, which we hope will be duly pondered.

"HENGSTENBERG'S COMMENTARY ON ECCLESIASTES"*

"BRIDGES ON ECCLESIASTES."†

The first of these volumes comprises more than its title would indicate. In addition to the Commentary proper with its Introduction, are two hundred and fifteen pages comprising "Prolegomena to the Song of Solomon;" two lectures on "The Book of Job" and "The Prophet Isaiah;" and two dissertations entitled "The Sacrifices of Holy Scripture" and "The Jews and the Christian Church." Of not less worth than the Commentary are these several discussions. The last two are deserving of special attention. Indexes of the Hebrew words, and of the Scripture passages explained, and of the principal subjects discussed in the volume, add greatly to its value.

Hengstenberg has been too long known and appreciated as a commentator, to require at this day any rehearsal of his merits. With all his dogmatism and defects of temper, his contributions to our knowledge of the Old Testament have been invaluable. No one familiar with his "*Christology of the Old Testament*," or his "*Genuineness of the Pentateuch*," or his "*Commentary on the Psalms*," will need any encouragement to examine his Commentary on Ecclesiastes.

He does not believe Solomon to have been the author of Ecclesiastes, but, on the contrary, concludes that it "was not only not actually composed by Solomon, but does not even pretend to have been." He supposes the writer to have been a contemporary of Malachi, like that prophet to have written during the Persian dominion, and to have styled himself the Koheleth or preacher in "an ideal sense." The whole plan and method of the book, he thinks, grew out of the necessities and grievances of the time, and its author "keeps constantly in view the very Jews who were then groaning under Persian tyranny, to whose sick souls it was his first duty to administer the wholesome medicine with which God had entrusted him." Right or wrong, there

* *Commentary on Ecclesiastes, with other Treatises.* By E. W. HENGSTENBERG, D. D., Professor of Theology, Berlin. Translated from the German by D. W. SIMON. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860.

† *An Exposition of the Book of Ecclesiastes.* By the Rev. CHARLES BRIDGES, M. A., Rector of Hinton Martel, Dorset, author of an *Exposition of Psalm CXLIX*, "Christian Ministry," etc., etc. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

is novelty in the views of Hengstenberg, and on his theory, a freshness of meaning in the "words of the Preacher" not discoverable if we suppose the book to be a philosophico-theological disquisition of Solomon.

We have had no opportunity to compare the translation with the original, but can say, what can be said of the translation of no other larger works of Hengstenberg, it is done into intelligible and straight forward English. For a translation, it is an unusually readable book.

Mr. Bridges gives us a fair specimen of the superficial, confident, pious, practical exposition, in specimens of which English literature is so inexhaustibly rich. He, of course, adopts the opinions generally held respecting the design and authorship of the Ecclesiastes, and of the age in which it was written. There are no Hebrew words to puzzle the unlearned reader, but plenty of exclamation and interrogation points instead. Mr. Bridges is the author of the well-known ponderous volume entitled "*The Christian Ministry*."

PROF. OWEN'S GOSPEL OF JOHN.*—We are glad to welcome this third volume of the series proposed by Dr. Owen. It bears throughout the same marks of good scholarship, large use of critical helps, and sound, discriminating judgment, that we have remarked in the previous volumes.

Dr. Owen is doing a good work for the edification of the Christian membership. We are glad to know that his exegetical labors are to be extended to the remaining historical book of the New Testament.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

KURTZ TEXT-BOOK OF CHURCH HISTORY.†—We have already expressed our high appreciation of Kurtz as a church historian, and need add nothing now to that testimony. The Edinburgh translation, however, as we notified our readers, is not an exact transcript of the original, the translator having taken the unwarrantable liberty of modifying some passages, and wholly omitting others, which he thought were attributable to the Lutheran bias of the historian. Dr. Bomberger, the editor of this new and American edition, has restored the mutilated and excluded passages, conforming the whole volume to the fourth and very recent edition of the original. Improvement, everywhere visible to the careful inspector, is specially perceptible in the enumeration and arrangement of the minor subdivisions, a consideration of no little importance in a historian the chief characteristics of whose writings are the dissimilar qualities of comprehensiveness and condensation. It is greatly to the credit of American publishers that, instead of merely reprinting imperfect translations from abroad, they subject themselves to the expense of thorough revision and correction by competent American editors.

* *A Commentary, Critical, Expository, and Practical, on the Gospel of John.* By JOHN J. OWEN, D. D. New-York: Leavitt & Allen. 1860.

† *A Text-Book of Church History.* By Dr. JOHN HENRY KURTZ, Professor of Theology in the University of Dorpat; author of "*A Manual of Sacred History*," etc., etc. Vol. I.—*To the Reformation.* Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860.

PROF. GIBSON'S HISTORY OF THE REVIVAL IN IRELAND.*—We are sorry to be compelled to dissent from the high encomiums pronounced on this work. It is not a philosophical history, nor even a well digested narrative, of the events and facts of that revival. It reminds one of the "digest of letters from the churches," which sometimes accompany the published "minutes" of our Baptist Associations,—a mere collection of *disjuncta membra*,—a series of narratives from correspondents strung together according to the accidents of chronological or geographical relationship. The only chapter in the book that can be said to rise to the level of History, is the one on "the Pathological Affections" of the revival, and even that is largely occupied with undigested excerpts from the letters of correspondents.

The work is equally open to criticism on another ground. The distinguished author when "solicited, on the part of an eminent publishing firm in Boston, to draw up" the narrative, must have known that the gentlemen composing that firm, though catholic enough in spirit to invite him to prepare for them a "History," were yet in principle and in practice most decided and conscientious Baptists, and he must also have known that his account of the revival would circulate largely among Baptists, as well as among all other evangelical Christians in America. Christian courtesy, therefore, not to say charity, should have dictated his recognition of all denominations, Baptists not excepted, participant in that great work. But instead of this, Wesleyans and Independents are barely alluded to as those who "threw themselves into the movement with characteristic energy." Baptists are utterly ignored, while Presbyterians and Episcopalians occupy the whole field back-ground, foreground, and all intermediate spaces. The author's apology is utterly insufficient. He says: "My official connection with one leading section of the Protestant community, gave me peculiar facilities of access to its ministers and people; for this reason, by much the larger portion is occupied with the rise and progress of the revival in the Presbyterian Church. Under any circumstances, however, this had been unavoidable. The impartial historian, of whatever name, will acknowledge that when all the evangelical communities of Ulster were entered by the gracious grace that fell upon 'the pastures of the wilderness,' the Scoto-Irish soil received in amplest measure the shower of blessing." But could he gain no "access to the ministers and people" of other denominations? How then does he know so much of the Episcopalians? Again, is Ulster the only county noticed in his book, or the only one to be taken into account in the History of the Revival in Ireland? And still further, is the phrase "Scoto-Irish soil" strictly synonymous with Presbyterianism? The truth is, this book is unintentional but conclusive confirmation of the justice of those remonstrances, so frequent and emphatic, from the Irish Baptists against the uncharitableness and bigotry of their Presbyterian brethren. Prof.

* *The Year of Grace: A History of the Revival in Ireland, A. D. 1859.* By the Rev. WILLIAM GIBSON, Professor in Christian Ethics in Queen's College, Belfast, and Moderator of the Pres. Ch. in Ireland. With an Introduction by Rev. BARON STOW, D. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

Gibson is, unquestionably, one of the most high-minded and honorable of Christian gentlemen ; but his social position, and his offices as Professor in Queen's College, Belfast, and as Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, have made him acquainted with Protestant ministers and churches of the Establishments, but to the almost total exclusion of acquaintance with dissenters, ministers and people. This is a radical defect in the historian of the Irish Revival which the author should have spared no pains to remedy.

MILMAN'S LATIN CHRISTIANITY.*—A closer approach to perfection in the mechanical art of book-making than the first volume of this new edition of Dean Milman's great history presents, has not yet been made by an American publisher. We need not say that it came, and could only come, from the Riverside Press, Cambridge. The whole work will be in eight crown-octavo volumes, each one containing about six hundred pages, and appearing regularly, one a month, till the set be completed. This is a reprint of the last London edition, to which it cannot in justice be said to be inferior, and is sold at about one-half its cost.

Commendation of Dean Milman's *History of Latin Christianity* is at this day a work of supererogation. It is an imperishable monument of genius, culture, learning, and life-long industry. Only less learned, perhaps, than the great Church Historians of Germany, the Dean of St. Paul's, is, in liveliness and grace of narration, in vividness of picturing, and in enthusiasm and glow of sentiment, always their superior. As we have the promise of a careful and thorough review of the whole work for a future number, we content ourselves with the bare announcement of the appearance of the first volume.

MEMOIR OF KINGMAN NOTT.†—A truthful portraiture of a noble soul is a real power among men ; and if the portraiture be of one who passed away from earth with the dew of his youth yet on him, it will be a moulding power for thousands of the young. We wish this memoir of Kingman Nott could be read by all our young men who are looking forward to the work of the Christian ministry. It would teach them forgetfulness and self-denial and patience and industry, along that path which every student for the ministry must travel ; and it might keep them from that insane spirit, sometimes exhibited, which seems to expect and to exact the attention and the sympathy of the universal church, for their having consented to become ministers of the gospel of Christ. He settled the question in his own conscience at an early period of life, that he *must* preach the gospel, and, without waiting to be carried or to be sent, he went manfully to the work of preparation. True, he encountered want and suffered hardship, but he acquired a discipline of soul and a strength of faith

* *History of Latin Christianity ; including that of the Popes to the Pontificate of Nicholas V.* By HENRY HART MILMAN, D. D., Dean of St. Paul's. In eight volumes. Vol. I. New-York : Sheldon & Co. 1860.

† *Memoir of Abner Kingman Nott, late Pastor of the First Baptist Church in the city of New-York, with copious extracts from his correspondence.* By his Brother. New-York : Sheldon & Co. 1860.

not otherwise to be obtained, and which were of incalculable service in the formation of his character.

Kingman Nott was by no means what some persons have supposed—a merely popular preacher. His was a singularly harmonious and rounded character. He acquired mental discipline by patient submission to all the routine drill of the preparatory school and the College; and he accumulated rich resources by an industrious use of his time and opportunities in the Theological Seminary, losing no opportunity of exercising by public speaking the “gift that was in him;” so that when he went to the pulpit of the First Baptist Church, New-York City, it was not as a novice, nor as a flash preacher, but as a young man whose well trained intellect, whose scholarship and industry, whose zeal and ability, whose resources and piety, whose purity and nobleness of soul, gave happy augury of certain and signal success. And but for that unrestrained zeal which brooked no bounds to its endeavors, he might, humanly speaking, be to day the honored pastor of the people that has so bitterly bewailed his early demise. It was not the crowding duties of his pastorate that broke “the golden bowl,” but an uncurbed zeal to honor the Master in unbidden service.

An analysis of young Nott’s character as a man, or of his power as a preacher, would of course be impossible in a merely literary notice of his memoir. We can only say of him that, with a cheerfulness that never waned but sometimes mounted to hilarity, with a loyalty to Christ and an earnestness and honesty of purpose that sat at the very centre of his being, with an industry that lost no opportunity for self-improvement or usefulness to others, with a natural grace of person and of oratory that won the attention and sympathy of all hearers, and with a love for the perishing that hurried him into excessive preaching and into an early grave, he combined in himself the rarest qualities of a true man and an effective preacher.

We anticipate a healthful influence among our rising ministry from this unadorned narrative by the hand of an affectionate brother. The biographer never diverts the attention of the reader from his picture by the beauty of its setting. He sometimes leaves us to wish that the office of the gilder had been more magnified, but, with some defects of style which further years will rectify, he has executed his task with taste and good judgment. We hope a new and improved edition with additions will yet be called for.

EVERETT’S LIFE OF WASHINGTON.*—We are no prophets, but we are sadly mistaken if this *Life of Washington* be not the one which, for a century to come, shall be found alike in the cottage of the laborer and in the library of the scholar. The great works of Marshall, Sparks, and Irving were all demanded, each in its turn, and have taken their permanent place in our literature. But there was an unoccupied niche that could be filled only by a condensed, popular biography, which should be at the same time artistically faultless as a composition, aglow

* *The Life of George Washington.* By EDWARD EVERETT. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

with an enthusiasm that could come only from profound admiration, and filled out with a completeness possible only for a combined familiarity and sympathy with all the events of Washington's most eventful career. A fitter name for that task than Mr. Everett's, has not yet been enrolled among American authors. The mechanical execution of the book is admirable; but we must demur at the taste which puts the picture of a bust of Everett, rather than of Washington, as its frontispiece.

SOUL-LIBERTY.*—Dr. Fish, of Newark, New-Jersey, has brought together, in a very succinct form, the principal facts exhibiting the connection of Baptists with the enunciation and defence of freedom of conscience, a doctrine now so clearly and universally recognized by the millions of our land, that multitudes are in danger of forgetting the worthies to whom they are indebted for it, and the sufferings by which it had once to be defended. Dr. Fish would remind his generation of the "price of soul-liberty," and of the noble sufferers "who paid for it." A very useful little book for the unread of all classes and ages; but we suggest that the reader is in imminent danger of mystification in the last half of chapter five, from confusion of dates and a want of due regard in the narrative to the order of events.

LIFE AND LETTERS OF MRS. JUDSON.†—When Fanny Forrester gave her hand to Dr. Judson, she gave her name to posterity. Christianity has so purified and widened the significance of, the marriage relation, that the biography of a christian man is regarded as incomplete, which carries no hint of family ties and home influences. But Mrs. Judson's life merited what it here receives, a full and separate record. It is true, that as the wife of Dr. Judson, her career, however interesting to immediate friends, was too short, and, in missionary adventure, too uneventful to justify an extended memoir; and her yet briefer course as Fanny Forrester, would have received adequate memorial within the compass of a magazine article. The brilliancy of her reputation was in part factious. The flame which an old literary favorite and oracle had helped to kindle, would have soon devoured all that her maiden hand threw to it. Had she died instead of married, just in the height of her popularity, she would, doubtless, at this moment be remembered by the public only as we remember a pleasant face seen once and long ago, or an agreeable acquaintance enjoyed for a brief space and never renewed.

But it is both interesting and instructive to look at a life of two parts, so strongly, and it might seem, so discordantly colored, yet so beautifully harmonized by an element combining with each; to watch this Christian element blending only as a neutral tint with the one, as it strengthens into positive hue and deepens the color of the other.

* *The Price of Soul-Liberty, and who paid for it.* By H. C. FISH, D. D. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

† *Life and Letters of Mrs. Emily C. Judson.* By A. C. KENDRICK, Professor of Greek Literature in the University of Rochester. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

In his preface, the author, with equal grace and modesty, says: "A man writing the memoir of a woman—a digger among Greek roots writing the life of a sensitive child of genius and song—a not very intimate acquaintance delineating a character to which the most thorough knowledge could hardly do justice, constitutes a triad of difficulties, which he can scarcely hope to have overcome." To say that Dr. Kendrick *has* most successfully overcome these difficulties, is only to unite in the common voice of commendation. Few men could hope to write well the life of a woman; but this "digger" is not always at roots in the garden of Plato, but is a gatherer of the flowers of all lands, and a lover of all things beautiful. He, doubtless, would have shrunk from the survey of the life of a merely masculine-minded woman, but a mental organization like Mrs. Judson's, sensitive, delicate, refined, rapid and playful in movement, could not but be contemplated with pleasure and sympathy by one who, to his personal friends, is only less distinguished by these very qualities, than by the manly and scholarly vigor so well known to the world. Mrs. Judson's letters, addressed for the most part to intimate friends, numerous, unstudied, the faithful transcript of her thoughts and mental impressions at the time they were written, while they are not fair exponents of her intellectual capacity, and left much work for him who had them to select for publication, furnished, perhaps, ampler opportunity for acquaintance with her character, than any amount of personal intercourse could have done. So that Dr. Kendrick in portraying her character, delineates it understandingly, and writes no general or unmeaning words of praise. It is barely possible that a generous chivalry failed, not to record, but to detect, certain weaknesses which a biographer of her own sex would have been quick to discover.

Better justice will be done by the religious world to Fanny Forester now that they are made acquainted with Mrs. Judson. If in her earlier career there is little sign of spiritual life, neither is there any cant pretending to it. Nothing in her character, from first to last, is more conspicuous than its clear religious honesty. But from the time of her marriage, and more especially from the time of her severe illness in the early part of 1849, there is a deepening and widening of nature, a marked and rapid growth in every direction. After following her even to her dying bed, we return with pleasure to see hidden, underneath what seemed the superficiality, the egotism, the ambition, as well as under the virtues of the younger life, the higher style of womanhood which afterwards appeared. With her growth as a Christian, every womanly attribute grew in depth, strength, and purity. But to bring her peculiarly womanly or her intellectual qualities into stronger relief, we regret that Dr. Kendrick's brilliant pen should have betrayed him into a comparison whose fine rhetorical point is so much more just to her than to three other distinguished literary women.

There will be difference of opinion as to the propriety of introducing Dr. Judson's letters, including the note proposing marriage. We commonly expect a man to be honest and in earnest in such a proposition; but surely Miss Chubbuck herself, if not terrified, must have been slightly diverted at the idea of "dashing to pieces" a heart which had

stood sound under so many and such recent shocks. But Dr. Judson's letters gratify curiosity, and do no harm; and if they throw no special light on the character of his wife, they at least must convince the world that he himself, like other men, was sometimes weak, and, in his family, very human.

It is very inadequate praise to say that Dr. Kendrick has furnished us with the most delightful book of the season. Its interest is due not more to the character of its lovely and gifted subject, than to the grace and classic elegance of its author's style and manner of treatment. Mrs. Judson's artless narrative of her earlier struggles to obtain an education, cannot but be stimulating to our indolent, worsted-loving young-ladydom, while the direct influence of the entire work is to deepen and diffuse the spirit of missions, and to excite to individual consecration in the Christian life.

SCIENCE.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S LECTURES ON LOGIC.*—We have been awaiting in hope, deferred through several months, the appearance of these Lectures; but we could not wish them a day sooner, at the least sacrifice of the critical care exhibited on every page by both editors and publishers. With this volume, and the contributions to Logic in his "Discussions on Philosophy," we are now in a position to estimate the immense service rendered by Sir William Hamilton to the "Science of the Laws of Thought." This we shall undertake at the earliest practicable moment. Meanwhile our readers who participate in the rising interest for logical studies, which is so largely the result of Hamilton's labors, will not fail to examine the Lectures themselves, incited thereto by a faultless typography, supporting and setting off the most painstaking and helpful editorial care. They will find here, as in the Lectures on Metaphysics, a bewildering (but not bewildered) richness of erudition, mastery of materials, thoroughness of analysis, and precision of statement. The phrase "a *command* of language" has a peculiarity of significance when applied to Hamilton. Words are never slow in answering his call, nor unequal to the task of delivering his exact thought. Great as Sir William Hamilton is elsewhere, he is preëminent as a logician, and this volume will be found worthy of his fame. His definition of the science, his criticism of the common view, his "new analytic of logical forms," will undoubtedly draw the attention and prompt the discussion which they demand. The Appendix will especially claim the studious toil of the scholar. It is a storehouse of amazing and choice wealth; one of those rare exhibitions of tireless energy and research which give a new conception of human capabilities. The mission of these Lectures is to explain the scope, office and

* *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic.* By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, etc. Edited by Rev. HENRY L. MANSEL, B. D., Oxford, and JOHN VEITCH, M. A., Edinburgh. In two volumes. Vol. I.—Logic. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

value of logic, and vindicate for it its proper place in a course of liberal study. There is just now pressing need of them.

MANSEL'S PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.*—It was eminently fitting that the publishers of Hamilton's Lectures should also be the publishers of the *Prolegomena Logica*. Mr. Mansel, the friend and disciple of Hamilton, has elaborated certain questions which are naturally and necessarily evolved by Hamilton's "new analytic," and which, though not requiring to be answered before we can enter upon the study of Logic, must yet underlie and determine its value. They are questions that relate to the connection of Logic with Psychology. Logic is the Science of the Laws of Formal Thinking; the *Prolegomena Logica* inquires into the nature of Thought itself, the laws to which it is subject, and the extent to which these are efficient. Mr. Mansel would neither unite nor identify Logic and Metaphysics, but he regards the Science of Logic, as well as of Ethics, as fraught with mischief if built up regardless of the underlying principles of Psychology. To determine the connection, particularly of Logic, with some of these principles, is his object in the *Prolegomena Logica*.

As will doubtless be inferred, this is not a book for mere beginners in logical studies. It is a book, however, which we could wish all our American critics who were so indignant with Mr. Mansel for writing the *Limits of Religious Thought*, would read and inwardly digest. They will find some of its most distasteful principles here elucidated and defended in a way not to be made light of. Indeed, we advise all who have read the Bampton Lectures to read the *Prolegomena Logica*. To inquisitive readers it will prove an invaluable key. We wish, also, that room could be made in our Colleges for the study of some of its chapters. They would form a barrier against modern scepticism, before which too many text books are utterly powerless.

KRAUTH'S EDITION OF FLEMING'S VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY.†—The value of Fleming's Vocabulary has been heartily acknowledged by all students of philosophy who have made use of it. Defining philosophical terms by quotations from the distinguished writers who have used them, he furnishes us not merely a dictionary of terms, but a guide-book in the study of the history of philosophical opinions. Dr.

* *Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry into the Psychological Character of Logical Principles*. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. D., LL. D., Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Oxford; editor of Sir William Hamilton's Lectures; author of "*Limits of Religious Thought*," etc., etc. First American, from the second English edition, corrected and enlarged. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

† *The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral and Metaphysical; with quotations and references; for the use of students*. By WILLIAM FLEMING, D. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. From the second, revised and enlarged London edition. With an Introduction, Chronology of the History of Philosophy brought down to 1860, Bibliographical Index, Synthetical Intelligence, and other additions, by CHARLES P. KRAUTH, D. D., Translator of "*Tholuck on John*." Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860.

Krauth and the publishers have rendered an important service to American instructors and students, by this new edition of the Vocabulary, which differs in several particulars from the English. The only change, however, made in the text of Prof. Fleming, is in the transfer of citations from the body of the text to the bottom of the page; but there are additions in the form of Tables, Appendix, and Index, of more than one hundred pages. Prefixed to the text is a Synthetical Table of the Philosophical Sciences, on the basis of that in the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*. Appended, are a vocabulary of a few German metaphysical terms, and a Chronological Table, both taken (with very slight additions to the last) from Morrell's Edition of *Tenneman's Manual*; a classification of the more recent German Philosophers according to their schools, taken also from the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*; and lastly, a Bibliographical Index of authors and proper names occurring in the work, with the addition of some works of those authors not cited by Fleming. This last named Index is an addition to the Vocabulary of real value; the other tables are too remotely connected with Dr. Fleming's design to admit of any special service from them. Dr. Krauth's labor upon the edition does not appear to us to have been quite equal to what his Introduction, unintentionally, of course, leads the reader to suppose; and we regret to add that sundry errors have crept into his additions, both typographical and orthographical, which ought always in historical tables to be guarded against. But we advise all students of philosophy to procure this volume; its aid will be invaluable.

HOOKE'S ILLUSTRATED NATURAL HISTORY* is intended to be, and really is, an instructive book for schools and families. Not too minute nor extended in its details, it errs perhaps on the right side of brevity. It suggests questions, however, to which it furnishes neither answer nor direction where to obtain one. Its author, who is a member of the Medical Faculty of Yale College, is already known as a writer on subjects closely connected with Natural History. He does not overestimate the public need of his volume; at all events, he furnishes in his preface a series of sufficient reasons for any honest endeavor to increase the popular acquaintance with the facts of zoölogy.

LEWES' STUDIES IN ANIMAL LIFE.†—Mr. Lewes seems disposed, like Mr. Kingsley, to try his hand at popular authorship in the walks of Science, as well as, of History and General Literature. And it must be confessed that the author of the "*Life of Goethe*" and the "*Biographical History of Philosophy*," has in these *Studies*, as he did in

* *Natural History. For the use of Schools and Families.* By WORTHINGTON HOOKER, M. D., Professor of the Theory and Practice of Medicine in Yale College, author of "*Human Physiology*," "*Child's Book of Nature*," etc., etc. Illustrated by nearly three hundred engravings. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

† *Studies in Animal Life.* By GEORGE HENRY LEWES, author of "*Life of Goethe*," "*The Physiology of Common Life*," etc., etc. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

his "*Physiology of Common Life*," made an exceedingly skilful and instructive use of the discoveries of the great laborers in the domain of Natural Science. Though desultory and fragmentary, they must prove stimulative to inquiry, and lead to thoughtful questioning of the outward world with which we are superficially so familiar, but of which we really know so little. Beginning with the most familiar forms of animal life, he reveals to us mysteries upon mysteries, that fill us with quite as much awe at the thought of the "infinitely little" lying all around and measurelessly beneath us, not less than when we turn our eyes upward and away towards the infinitely great that stretches hopelessly above us.

We suspect that these *Studies*, though arranged as chapters, were originally composed and delivered as Lectures. We know not how else to account for the affectedly familiar and picturesque style in which they are written. They are, however, eminently worthy of, and will undoubtedly meet with, a large class of readers.

FARRADAY'S LECTURES ON PHYSICAL FORCES.*—The greatest of living English Lecturers on Physical Science, with all his honors and brilliant reputation, never more honors himself than when standing in this accustomed place in the Royal Institution of Great Britain, to lecture before a juvenile auditory. These lectures on Physical Forces were delivered during the last winter holidays, in language which all could understand, and illustrated with experiments which all could comprehend. And yet, with all their simplicity of language and of experiment, and their brevity, they will be welcomed by thousands of adult readers. Coming as they do from one of the greatest living chemists, one who has spent the best years of his life in the study of Matter and Forces, and printed from the notes of a reporter, just as they were delivered, *verbatim et literatim*, they are instinct with life, and lucid and exact as demonstration. Appended to the six Lectures is an exposition of Light-House Illumination, and an explanation of the Electric Light.

TRAVELS.

KRAPF'S TRAVELS AND RESEARCHES IN EASTERN AFRICA.*—Dr. Krapf received the latter portion of his education at the Missionary School at Basel, and was sent by the English Church Missionary

* *A Course of Six Lectures on the various forces of matter, and their relations to each other.* By MICHAEL FARRADAY, D. C. L., F. R. L., Fullerian Professor of Chemistry, Royal Institution. Delivered before a juvenile auditory at the Royal Institution of Great Britain during the Christmas Holidays of 1859-60. Edited by WILLIAM CROOKES, F. S. R. With numerous Illustrations. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

* *Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labors during an eighteen years' residence in Eastern Africa, together with Journeys to Jagga, Usambara, Ukambani, Shoa, Abessinia, and Khartum, and a Coasting Voyage from Mombaz to Cape Delgado.* By the Rev. Dr. G. LEWIS KRAPF, Secretary of the Chrishona Institute at Basel, and late Missionary, etc., etc. With an Appendix respecting the snow-capped mountains of Eastern Africa, the Sources of the Nile, the Language and Literature of Eastern Africa, etc., etc.; and a concise account of Geographical Researches up to the discovery of the Uyenyesi by Dr. Livingstone, in September last. By E. J. RAVENSTEIN, F. R. G. S. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

Society, early in 1837, as a missionary to Eastern Africa. He spent eighteen years in missionary toils, travels and explorations; returned with broken health to Fatherland in 1855, and is now Secretary of the Chrishona Institute at Basel.

The actual results of Dr. Krapf's eighteen years of labor in the way of conversions among the natives, numerically considered, were singularly insignificant. One person only, a man named Abbe Gunja, became a christian, and near the close of the volume it is announced as something recent, that the wife of this man has become a convert; so that now after twenty-three years from the beginning of his toils, one active christian family sheds its saving influence at Rabbai Mpia, the point at which the missionary labored most, and to which, amid all his changes and excursions, his mind ever turned as a centre and a home. But who shall say that the good seed sown is not yet to spring up into a rich harvest.

But whatever may be the result of Dr. Krapf's missionary labors, there can be only one opinion respecting the value of his contributions to our knowledge of Eastern Africa. He not only adds largely to our knowledge of Abessinia and its nominally christian population and literature, but he takes us down directly under the Equator, and proves to us beyond dispute, the existence there of perennially snow-capped mountains, unnumbered rivers and vast lakes. He has rendered invaluable service to English explorers in search of the source of the Nile, and points out the region to be visited, and the route to be taken, in the final solution of the great Nile problem.

Between the narratives of Krapf and Livingstone there exists the same difference that there is between a cool, plodding German, and a canny, ardent Scotchman; but as respects the regions traversed by them, both must be read by every one who would acquaint himself with the latest explorations and discoveries in Eastern Africa. Starting from opposite sides of the Equator, they travelled to within a few degrees of each other, through regions of which our geographies and atlases and books of travel have hitherto told us next to nothing. Accompanying the volume in the form of an Introduction, is a brief account of Geographical Discovery in Eastern Africa up to last Autumn, with statistics of African commerce, and a glance of the probable influence on that commerce of the proposed canal across the Isthmus of Suez. For ethnographical and geographical uses, this volume, though small in comparison, is entitled to take its place beside those of Dr. Barth.

"OLMSTED'S JOURNEY IN THE BACK COUNTRY."*—This is the third of a series of volumes embodying the observations of an intelligent traveller in the South and Southwest. Mr. Olmsted entered on his journey "with the distinct hope of aiding those disposed to consider the subject of slavery in a rational, philosophical, and conciliatory spirit." Northern critics have regarded him as rigidly impartial; and it

* *A Journey in the Back Country.* By FREDRICK LAW OL MSTED, author of "*A Journey in Texas*," "*Walks and Talks of an American Farmer in England*," etc., etc. New-York: Mason & Brothers. 1860.

must be confessed that he always writes as if indifferent to all theories and parties, and caring only for undoubted facts and exact truth. But Mr. Olmsted left home for the South an intelligent, thrifty New-York farmer, prepared to detect at a glance the weak points and deficiencies of slave-labor agriculture; and so he may, unconsciously, have given to these a boldness of relief which will strike the southerner as savoring of partiality or unfairness. We could wish, however, that the facts collected in this and the previous volumes, might be pondered well by extremists both at the North and the South; they might contribute to allay the growing bitterness, and lead to calmer and juster views.

ARTHUR'S ITALY IN TRANSITION.*—This is not a stale book, nor one born after due time. It describes what the author saw and heard among all classes in Italy, during the Spring of this 1860. Intelligent use has also been made of Official Documents gathered from the Papal Archives of Revolted Legations, and published in two large volumes by Cavaliere Gennarelli. A fresher and more instructive book on Italy, or one giving a clearer insight into the heart of Italian affairs, and throwing more light on passing events, we are not acquainted with. Mr. Arthur's religious sympathies and zeal, which are purely evangelical, never flag, but flash out on every page, and give a genial life and charm to all his conversations alike with travellers, Italians, Romanists and Protestants.

MISCELLANEOUS.

TOM BROWN AT OXFORD.†—Books for the young cannot, indeed, hold up too high a standard of personal attainment and moral character. Yet, in order to be useful, they must be written by those who are in sympathy with the young, and who appreciate their temptations; not only those springing from outward circumstances, but those enacted by the impetuous and genial spirit of youth. In a word, they must not be "goody" books. The work whose name we have placed above, is, to our view, admirably adapted to interest and benefit all young men. The author draws the scenes of folly and extravagance prevalent among the young men of Oxford with a full appreciation of their attractiveness to the young, while yet the ruinous tendency of these reckless adventures is indicated with unmistakable clearness and much moral impressiveness. The character of the generous, high-minded, presevering student, wins the admiration of the reader, while yet he is not disgusted and repelled by "spoony" and preceptive moral truisms. We regard this as not alone one of the most fascinating, but as one of the most instructive books issued by the publishers whose imprint it bears.

* *Italy in Transition. Public Scenes and Private Opinions in the Spring of 1860; illustrated by Official Documents from the Papal Archives of the Revolted Legations.* By WILLIAM ARTHUR, A. M., author of "*A Mission to the Mysore*," "*The Successful Merchant*," etc., etc. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

† *Tom Brown at Oxford: a Sequel to School Days at Rugby.* By THOMAS HUGHES, author of "*School Days at Rugby*," "*Scouring of the White Horse*," etc. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1859.

HAWTHORNE'S MARBLE FAUN.*—While the primary design of the author was "to write a fanciful story, evolving a thoughtful moral," yet the book, without a formally professed intention of doing so, does for Rome and its scenes what *El Fureidis* aims to do for Judea. The story is one of the characteristic tales of the gentle, pensive novelist of New-England, displaying great power, and keeping perfectly the interest of the reader, yet leaving on his mind, from its weird, ghostly complexion, an uncomfortable impression of nervousness and shuddering, such as one felt in coming out of the Medical College in Boston, after exploring the scene of the most horrible murder of modern times.

But the *story* is useful chiefly as a golden thread on which are strung some of the brightest gems in the literature of travel and art. With not less correctness than Hilliard, and with more imagination, the author enables the reader to behold, under the guidance of a most accomplished *cicerone*, the wonders of ancient and modern Rome. We do not know where are to be found more just and truthful criticisms in reference to art, nor any that enter more deeply into its spirit and life. Did our limits permit, we should be glad to quote the terse, graphic picture of Rome (vol. ii, 120–21), the singularly just protest against nude statuary (vol. i, 157), with many of the numberless passages of condensed power, faultless beauty, and pregnant suggestiveness.

THE HOUSEHOLD OF BOUVERIE.—†Everything that the author ever read, heard of, or experienced, seems to have been laid under tribute for this novel. She has no power of reserve suggesting to the reader resources not yet drawn upon. But her book, while it abounds in crudities and extravagances, and is most unmercifully drawn out, displays a power of imagination, and a fertility of mind, that makes many better written stories seem tame and weak beside it. The author needs discipline and practice.

THE WOMAN IN WHITE.‡—The brilliant and original genius of Wilkie Collins is placing him in the foremost rank of English novelists. His characters are sketched with a bold hand, and he preserves his secret to the last from the shrewdness of the most practised novel-readers. The villain of the story is unique, amusing, and finely executed. The book has no religious element, and its only moral is that common to most novels—the retributive justice which makes the good, that is, those who have the reader's sympathy, to marry at last the right person, and the bad to end before the book does.

* *The Marble Faun; or, the Romance of Monte Beni.* By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, author of "*The Scarlet Letter*," etc., etc. Vols. I and II. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

† *The Household of Bouviere, or the Elixir of Gold. A Romance.* By a Southern Lady. In two vols. New-York: Derby & Jackson. 1860.

‡ *The Woman in White. A Novel.* By WILKIE COLLINS, author of "*The Queen of Hearts*," etc. Illustrated by Jno. McLennan. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

CARLYLE'S CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS.*—With the majority of readers the essays of Carlyle take precedence of all else he has written. They were produced in that transition period of his style when he was passing over from the chaste English of his *Life of Schiller* to the frightful jargon of his Histories. But the essays have long been out of print. Messrs. Brown & Taggard have given us an edition in four volumes with the author's latest corrections, full appendixes, and a complete index. The completeness of this edition, the size of its volumes, the beauty of its type and paper, leave nothing to be desired. It contains a side-view likeness of the vehement, sardonic Scotchman.

EL FUREIDIS.†—It is the purpose of the author of this book to interest the reader in the localities and customs of the Holy Land, by means of a story whose scene is laid in these sacred regions. The design and conception is admirable, superior, indeed, to the execution. The generality of readers will find their attention engaged by the story, to the neglect of the scenery and usages of Judea. There is, too, an occasional instance of verbosity and profuseness of epithet, which lessens the attractiveness of the pages. The moral tendency of the story is beyond praise.

It may be, however, that we do less than complete justice to *El Fureidis*, from the fact that we read it immediately after finishing Hawthorne's *Marble Faun*.

LOUIE'S LAST TERM AT ST. MARY'S.‡ is a simple, naturally told story of school-girl life, portraying, with touching interest, the errors and sufferings of a gifted girl, who finally died of boarding-school. The story purports to be true, and is, as its title indicates, Episcopalian. Its religious tone is healthful.

MESSRS. MASON BROTHERS have sent us three volumes of Music,§ by the well known composers Mason, Bradbury and Hastings, entitled respectively "*The People's Tune Book*," "*Anthem Book*," and "*Church Music*." The names of their authors are a sufficient guaranty of their merits.

* *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, collected and republished by THOMAS CARLYLE. In four volumes. Boston: Brown & Taggard. 1860.

† *El Fureidis*. By the author of "*The Lamp-Lighter*" and "*Mabel Vaughan*." Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1860.

‡ *Louie's Last Term at St. Mary's*. New-York: Derby & Jackson. 1860.

§ *The People's Tune Book*: a class book of Church Music for Choirs, Congregations, and Singing Schools. By LOWELL MASON, Doctor of Music. New-York: Mason Brothers. 1860.

Bradbury's Anthem Book. A Collection of Anthems, Choruses, Opening and Closing Pieces. Adapted to the wants of Choirs, Musical Associations, Conventions, etc. By WILLIAM D. BRADBURY. New-York: Mason Brothers. 1860.

Hastings's Church Music; or Musical Composition for devotional use in Choirs, Congregations, Families and Religious Circles. Collected from various publications, and carefully revised. By THOMAS HASTINGS, Doctor of Music. New-York: Mason Brothers.

We have received several other miscellaneous volumes, of which very little need be said. One of these, with the indefinite title "*A Man*,"* contains a variety of "papers" on topics which are connected, if at all, by a thread so subtle and latent as to escape the scrutiny of the reader.—The English authoress, Mrs. Ellis, endeavors, by a volume of simple stories,† to illustrate the reality of a growing romance on the part of those who are genuinely wedded; and Mrs. Gaskell, the biographer of Charlotte Brontë, has a volume of stories,‡ republished from Dickens's magazines, "*Household Words*," and "*All the Year Round*." Their only merit is that they are readable tales. An anonymous novel,§ which differs too little from a thousand others to require characterization, closes our list.

DR. BAIRD'S REJOINDER TO THE PRINCETON REVIEW on his *Elohim Revealed*, is well worth reading. Like the article to which it replies, it is not written in the best humor possible, but it inaugurates a controversy in the Presbyterian Church not likely to be immediately quieted. We hope, in another number, to inform our readers more fully of the points in dispute.

The Review of Dr. Huntington's notorious Address before the State Convention of Massachusetts Sunday School Teachers, by the Rev. Ns M. Williams, contains a large amount of wholesome truth, which need to be reiterated not only in Massachusetts but elsewhere. Mr. Williams has executed his task with singular ability and fairness, and in excellent spirit. The widely concerted attempt to revive the drooping faith in infant baptism is one of the most significant signs of our times.

JUVENILE.

Among our Juvenile Books, are "*Rosa, the Parisian Girl*,"|| which, unlike most French Juveniles, has a healthful religious tone, and is better adapted to the Sunday school library than multitudes of books that find their way into it. There are also other volumes, by Mr. Abbott,** Mr. Eddy,†† and Mrs. Geldart,‡‡ with whose merits as writers of juvenile literature our readers are already familiar.

* *A Man*. By REV. J. D. BELL. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. 1860.

† *Chapters on Wives*. By MRS. ELLIS, author of "*Mothers of Great Men*." New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

‡ *Right at Last, and other Tales*. By MRS. GASKELL, author of "*Mary Burton*," "*North & South*," etc., etc. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

§ *Wheat and Tares*. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

|| *Rosa, or the Parisian Girl*. From the French of Madame De Pressensac. By MRS. J. C. FLETCHER. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

** *American History*. By JACOB ABBOTT. Illustrated with numerous maps and engravings. Vol. II—Discovery of America. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

†† *The Percy Family*. No. 3—Paris to Amsterdam. By DANIEL C. EDDY. Boston: Andrew F. Graves. 1860.

‡‡ *Stories of Scotland and its Adjacent Islands*. By MRS. GELDART, author of "*Truth is Everything*," etc., etc. New-York: Sheldon & Co.

THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

The *Zeitschrift für die gesammte lutherische Theologie und Kirche*, Heft III, 1860, contains treatises by A. Ortolph on the import of *righteousness* (πῶς) and its kindred words in the second part of the prophecy of Isaiah; by Jatho on the earliest Psalms of David (4th art.); by P. Cassel on the Eighth Psalm with reference to Delitzsch; by Delitzsch, a continuation of his Talmudic studies on the double genealogy of our Lord in Matthew and Luke, showing that in the Talmud the Messiah's genealogy is traced to David, partly through Solomon, partly through Nathan. Its copious bibliography reviews, of course with high commendation, Delitzsch's work on the Psalms, complaining, however, of occasional obscurity and stiffness in his version, from the attempt to reproduce in German too exactly the metrical structure and idiom of the original. It commends very highly a new work by Dr. Balmer-Rinek on "The Prophet Ezekiel's Vision of the Temple,"—a work which translates the description, and gives an illustrative commentary upon it, accompanied by plans and architectural illustrations. It reviews, also, Dr. Peter Schegg's "Evangelists, translated and explained," 2 vols., embracing Math. i—xviii. Its author is Roman Catholic, but the critic characterizes it as thoroughly scientific, marked by profound and comprehensive study and great philological acuteness, and worthy, in its historico-philological features, to be placed along side of Fritzsche and Meyer.

The *Allgemeines Repertorium für die theologische Literatur*, &c., for May, notices at length two works by Dr. Julius Hamberger, containing the leading points of the Ethical, Political, and Religious Philosophy of Franz. Bader, which it characterizes as "containing in a nut the whole philosophy of one of the most intellectual, acute, and imaginative thinkers of Germany." The No. for June contains, under a notice of *Kurtz's Bible and Astronomy*, a rapid sketch of Biblical Cosmology, an article on the history of Foreign Missions, and a notice of the German Translation of Coquerel's Essay on the Person and Work of Jesus Christ, commending warmly both the original and the Translation.

WORKS IN THEOLOGY.—A work on the Proof of Scripture (*der Schriftbeweis*), II half, 2 Part, 738 pp. (completes the work), second thoroughly revised edition.—Philosophical Dogmatics (*Phil. Dog-*

matik), or Philosophy of Christianity, vol. ii (embracing the creation of the world and of man), 8, 558 pp.—Practical Theology (*Praktische Theologie*), by Dr. Karl Fried. Gaupp, Royal Consistorial Counsellor and Professor in Berlin, i vol., Homiletics 8, 536 pp.—The History of Jesus (*Gesch. Jesu*), set forth in public lectures by Dr. M. Baumgarten, Theol. Prof. in Brunswick, 445 pp. "A work somewhat hasty but treats the history of our Lord in a worthy and very able manner."

EXEGESIS AND BIBLICAL LITERATURE.—Commentary on the Psalter (*Commentar über den Psalter*), by Franz Delitzsch, 1 Part, Translation and Interpretation of Ps. i—lxxxix. (Delitzsch is well known as among the best recent evangelical commentators.)—The Prophecies of Zechariah, by W. Neumann, 8, 501 pp.—The Messianic Prophecies in the greater and lesser O. T. Prophets, with Introduction, Original Text, Translation, and a Philological, Critical, and Historical Commentary. Vol. ii, containing the Commentary on the Messianic Prophecies in the second part of Isaiah, ch. xl to lv, with an appendix on the genuineness of Isaiah, by Prof. Dr. L. Reinke, Giessen, 8, 562 pp. (to embrace four vols.).—The Prophets after the Exile (*Die nachexilischen Propheten*). 1st division: The Prophecies of Haggai explained, by Dr. A. Köhler, Privatdocent, Erlangen, 126 pp.—The Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, interpreted in German (*der zweite Brief Pauli an die Cor.*), by Dr. C. H. A. Burger, Erlangen, 8, 266 pp.—The historical relations of the Pastoral Epistles investigated anew (*die geschicht. Verhältnisse der Pastoralbriefe, &c.*), by Dr. W. Otto, Leip., gr. 8, 424 pp.

The Bible and Astronomy (*Bibel und Astronomie*), with additional matter of kindred nature—an exhibition of Biblical Cosmology, and its relations to Natural Science, by Dr. J. H. Kurtz, Theol. Prof. in Dorpat. Fourth thoroughly revised ed.

G. F. Jatho has published a Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Philippians (similar to previous works on Romans and Galatians), tracing briefly, and in general accurately, the course of thought, not neglecting, however, grammatical interpretation.

Classic Greek and the Spirit of Biblical Language (*Profangrécitüt und biblischer Sprachgeist*), a lecture on the Biblical modification of Hellenic ideas, specially the psychological. Published, with remarks, by Gerhard von Zetzschwitz, Prof., &c., at Leipzig, 8, 76 pp. "It treats its subject with equal liveliness, depth, and comprehensiveness."

PHILOSOPHY.—A new periodical, called *Zeitschrift für exacte Philosophie im Sinne des neuern phil. Realismus*, is edited by Dr. F. H. Th. Allihu and Dr. T. Ziller, in connection with several scholars. Vol. i, Heft I, contains "The fundamental errors of Idealism in its development, from Kant to Hegel (A. In the province of Theoretical Philosophy)", by E. A. Thilo—Allihu on the life and writings of Herbart, with a survey of the literature of his school.

The *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und phil. Kritik*, contains articles by Carriere on the Nature, Origin, and development of Language; by Dr.

J. Sengler on the Idea and Object of the Doctrine of Knowledge (art. 1); by J. Frohschammer on the fundamental Philosophy; with reviews.

Schelling and the Philosophy of Romanticism (*Schelling und der Phil. der Romantik*), by Ludw. Noack, Prof. in Giessen—a contribution to the history of German culture. The author is opposed to Schelling, but impartial in his statements, and draws from reliable sources. —The Life of Kant, with the foundations of his doctrine (*Kant's Leben und die Grundlagen seiner Lehre*), by Dr. Kuhno Fischer, three Lectures, gr. 8, 169 pp. —Philosophy and Theology (polemical), by Dr. J. V. Kuhn, Tübingen, 79 pp. —The Genesis of Consciousness on atomistic principles, by M. Drossbach, 8, 392 pp. —The System of Boethius, and the Theological Writings ascribed to him (*Das System des Boethius, &c.*). A critical inquiry by F. Nitzsch, Lic. and Privatdoc. in Berlin, 8, 190 pp. —John Locke, his Theory of the Understanding, and his doctrines regarding Religion, the State, and Education, exhibited psychologically and historically, by Dr. E. Schärer, 8, 312 pp. —Natural Law as founded on Ethics (*Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*), by A. Trendelenburg, 8, 558 pp. —Plato's Idea of the Personal Spirit, and his doctrine on Education and Scientific Culture, by Dr. C. R. Volquardsen, 8, 199 pp. —History of Modern Philosophy (*Gesch. der neuern Phil.*), by Dr. Kuno Fischer. Vol. iii, on Immanuel Kant. Origin and development of the Critical Philosophy, gr. 8, 638 pp. —The Problem and System of Philosophy (*Problem und System der Phil.*), Outlines of Phil. as Science of Sciences, &c., by Frdr. Horn, 8, 73 pp. —The Doctrine of Freedom as a System of Philosophy, by Dr. O. H. Jäger, Docent, gr. 8, 742 pp.

PATRISTICS, AND CHURCH HISTORY.—History of Cosmology in the Greek Church down to the time of Origen (*Gesch. der Kosmologie, &c.*), with special investigations upon the Gnostic system, by Lic. E. W. Möller, Privatdocent, gr. 8, Halle, 581 pp. —The controversy in the ancient church regarding the Passover, presented in its significance for church history, and for the study of the Gospels, by Prof. Dr. A. Hilgenfeld, Halle, gr. 8, 422 pp. —History of Councils (*Concilien-geschichte*), from the original sources, by Prof. Dr. C. J. Hefele, fourth vol., gr. 8, 872 pp.

History of the Christian Church, for schools and families (*Gesch. der christl. Kirche*), by Th. Sauer, Preacher, at Dresden, 540 pp. —Compendium of Ancient Church History, primarily for Academic use. 1 divis. The three first centuries, by C. F. Th. Schneider (Lic. and Privatdoc. of Theol. at Berlin), 140 pp. "A worthy production of a true pupil of Neander." —Donatus and Augustine, or the first decisive conflict between Separatism and the Church, an essay on Church History, by Ferd. Ribbeck, Elberfeld, 682 pp. "A work wrought with astonishing toil and iron industry."

CLASSICAL LITERATURE AND PHILOLOGY.—The second thoroughly revised ed. of Bopp's Comparative Grammar has reached the first half of vol. iii. Three vols. will complete the work. —On the Organism

of the Persian Verb, by Prof. H. A. Barb, gr. 8, 96 pp.—*Carmina popularia Græciæ recentioris*, ed. A. Passow, 8, Leip., 661 pp.—Original Sources of our Alphabet (*Unsern Alphabetes Ursprünge*), by Dr. F. Böttcher, Dresden, 85 pp.

Fred. Dietz has published the third vol. (second improved ed.) of his Grammar of the Romance Languages—a work indispensable to the thorough student of the modern languages.—W. Drumann on the laborers and communists (*Die Arbeiter und Communisten*) in Greece and Rome.—Heinr. Stein has finished the third vol. (embracing books 5 and 6) of his excellent edition of Herodotus, with German notes, belonging to the collection of Greek and Latin writers edited by Haupt and Sauppe. The notes relate more particularly to matters of history, &c.

A small treatise on the Prometheus of Æschylus (*noch ein Wort über Æschylus' Prom.*), by the distinguished scholar, G. F. Schömann of Greifswald, and another by Prof. Jul. Cæsar of Marburg (*der Prom. des Æschylus*), are two congratulatory treatises for the Jubilee of the veteran Welcker of Bonn, and discuss the theological significance of that wonderful drama.—Madvig's Emendations of Livy (*Emendationes Livianæ*) 8, 638 pp.—Encyclopædia of the Philological Study of Modern Languages (*Encycl. des philolog. Studiums der neueren Sprachen*), by Dr. B. Schmitz, 8, 140 pp.—Orations of Isæus (*Isæi Orationes*), with some fragments, ed. C. Scheibe, 8, Leip., 219 pp.—Onosandri de imperatoris officio. Ed. with a revised text and critical comm., by A. Köchly, 72 pp.—Polyæni Strategicon Libri Octo, edited anew, with indexes, &c., by E. Wölflin, 8, 442 pp.—The first vol. of John Stobæus' important work, *Eclogæ Physicæ et Ethicæ*, is edited by A. Meineke, 384 pp.—Lucian of Samosata, a new ed. by F. Fritzsche, vol. i, part 1, 8, 168 pp.

FRANCE.

The New Testament has been translated into French from the Vatican Codex, as published at Rome, in 1859, by P. Vercellone, after the recension of Cardinal Mai. The translation is made by Albert Rilliet, Prof. in Acad. of Geneva. The varying readings of the Latin Vulgate, and of the Greek MSS. up to the tenth century are given. The work is characterized as one calculated, in its execution, "to reassure the most scrupulous and to satisfy the most exacting." (Price of the work, 12fr.

M. de Careil (editor of the previously unedited works of Descartes), who has devoted many years to the life and works of Leibnitz, has commenced a new edition of his works after the original MSS., with notes and introductions, to be completed in twenty vols., of which about twelve are as yet unedited. Vol. i has appeared.

The Philosophy of Laws (*Phil. des Lois*), from the christian point of view, by M. L. Bautain, Prof. at the Sorbonne, etc., (defends the

authority of the Pope and of Traditions.)—Vol. xci of the Abbe Migne's Complete Course of Patrology (*Patrologia Cursus Completus*) contains the second vol. of *Maximus, the Confessor*. Ed. F. Coubeis: Vols. xciv and xcv, the works of *Joannes Damascenus* by P. Michaelis Lequien, each vol. 12 fr.—Francis de Sales' *Introd. à la vie devote*. New ed., carefully revised by Silvester de Sacy.—Critical Examination of the Religious Philosophy of Schelling (*Examen critique de la phil. religieuse, etc.*) by Emile-Alfred Weber.—Heroic Poetry of the Indians, compared with the Greek and Roman Epopee (*Poésie héroïque Indiens, etc.*) by F. G. Eichoff.

Monasticism has latterly been receiving unusual attention in France, engaging, by its progress in wealth and numbers, the attention of the French Senate and furnishing themes for authors. Count Montalembert with his old zeal, but with liberalized views, has published two volumes of a work entitled *The Monks of the West, from St. Benoit to St. Bernard*. It is announced to be translated into both English and German. The Ultramontane party, which has been abjured by Montalembert, is to be represented in a work announced as in preparation, on *St. Benedict and the Monastic Orders of the West*, by the Benedictine abbot Gueranger. There has also appeared in four volumes, *The Life, Times, Work, and Influence of Vincent de Paul*, by the Abbe Maynard, founder of the Sisters of Charity.

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REVIEWER REVIEWED.

BY EQUAL JUSTICE.

Webster and Worcester—"Enlightened Regard for Purity."

THE following statement has been put in circulation relative to the Dictionary adopted by some of the most prominent publishers in the United States:

"The firm of Harper & Brothers is almost the only one of note in the United States which has adopted Webster as the standard of orthography. The Appletons, Putnam, and Scribner, of New York; Little & Brown, Ticknor & Fields, Crosby & Nichols, and all the other leading publishing houses of Boston; and Butler and J. B. Lippincott & Co., of Philadelphia, on the contrary, with enlightened regard for the purity of our language, especially eschew Webster, and have adopted Worcester."

The following communications from many of the houses named above, are a sufficient reply to this statement, the truth of which, with many others, of a like character, is not at all sustained by facts:

"In answer to your inquiry whether the statement that 'we especially eschew Webster and have adopted Worcester' as our standard in orthography is true, we reply *that it is entirely without foundation*. Our practice is to leave this matter to the authors of our books. We have observed that with literary men generally, spelling is entirely a matter of habit, very few of them conforming strictly to the authority of any dictionary; while, in this country at least, the authors of educational text-books, and other works, in reference to which the question of orthography is carefully considered, very generally recognize and carefully follow Webster as their standard.

D. APPLETON & Co.,
CHARLES SCRIBNER,
GEORGE P. PUTNAM."

New York, May 16, 1860.

"Webster's system of orthography is made the standard in our office, and when not otherwise influenced by the preferences of our authors, our publications conform thereto.

The fact that we sell OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND copies of Webster's Dictionaries per annum, we regard as sufficient evidence of the preferences of the public to warrant us in adhering to this standard.

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & Co.

Philadelphia, May 20, 1860.

"Dear Sirs:—In reply to your inquiry we have to remark, that the statement that 'we have especially eschewed Webster and adopted Worcester, as the standard of authority in our publications,' is unauthorized and untrue. Your obedient servants,

Philadelphia, May 20, 1860.

E. H. BUTLER & Co.

"Our attention having been called by you to a statement that we 'eschew Webster, and have adopted Worcester,' we would say that no such statement has been authorized by us.

Our custom invariably is to leave the matter to be settled by the preferences of the authors for whom we publish.

CROSBY, NICHOLS, LEE & Co.

Boston, June 2, 1860.

"In answer to your inquiry, we reply that we have not especially eschewed 'Webster' and adopted Worcester, as the standard of authority in our publications.

We have always left the question of spelling in our books to be decided by our authors as they thought best. Your obedient servants,

LITTLE, BROWN & Co.

Boston, June 2, 1860.

Boston, June 9, 1860.

We endorse the answers given you by our neighbors, Messrs. Little, Brown & Co., and Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co.

CROCKER & BREWSTER.

"In reply to your inquiry regarding the standard system of orthography adopted in our publications, we would say, in all our late issues we have carefully eschewed Worcester's system, adopting Webster as our only standard.

"The introduction of over 1,500,000 copies of Town & Holbrook's Progressive Series of Readers within the past three years, together with the sale of nearly 150,000 copies of the Progressive Speller and Definer, (by the same authors), within the past year, would indicate practically our views.

BAZIN & ELLSWORTH.

Boston, June 5, 1860.

G. & C. MERRIAM:

Boston, June 9, 1860.

"Dear Sirs:—In reply to your note of inquiry, I beg leave to say, that in all questions of orthography and definition, Webster is my appeal, unquestioned and final. I do not, however, control my authors, who, either from habit or choice, prefer Worcester. 'Tis very seldom, indeed, that we have occasion to raise the question of comparative authorities, Webster being with me the end of controversy. Sincerely yours,

HENRY HOYT.

Messrs. G. & C. MERRIAM:

Boston, June 9, 1860.

We do not especially eschew Webster, and have not adopted Worcester. Authors have the entire control of this matter in our publications. Yours truly,

CHASE, NICHOLS & HILL.

Boston, June 9, 1860.

"Of the two Dictionaries we prefer Webster, and when our opinion can decide a customer, Webster goes. In publishing we are governed by our authors. We sell from three to five Webster to one of the other. J. E. TILTON & Co., 161 Washington st."

Another firm, among the most prominent of the Boston publishers, say: "We shall take especial pains in our future books to follow Webster, when not otherwise requested by the author." Another says: "My private opinion of its merits (Webster) over all others, has been freely expressed." The journals, secular and religious, of Boston, likewise, having the largest circulation, recognize Webster as their general standard.

INTRODUCTORY NOTICE.

THE "War of the Dictionaries," as it has been termed, began with an ill-tempered and vituperative attack upon Webster. These assaults have been from time to time renewed in a like spirit; yet sometimes, also, candid and courteous exception has been taken to some of Dr. Webster's views—to his modifications of orthography; his orthoepical notation or other points in his dictionary. Various motives, it may be supposed, have prompted the one class and the other of these strictures. Pecuniary interests, a desire for the notoriety supposed to result from attacking a distinguished man, or work; display of lore; an aversion to changes, even if salutary, and an inordinate attachment to old forms, and true and scholarly criticism, have all, at one time and another, been apparent. If, in repelling these assaults, and replying to these criticisms, the friends of Webster have sometimes "carried the war into Africa," they have yet in so doing acted essentially on the defensive, and not desired it should be understood, either that they supposed Dr. Webster's lexicographical works were not fair subjects of criticism, and partake of imperfection, or that they were not grateful for any suggestions which would enable the editors who have in charge the new editions of his dictionaries which may from time to time appear, to improve and perfect them. On the contrary, as the publishers of Webster, we shall be most thankful to receive, from any quarter, to be placed in the hands of our very able editors, lists of new words, corrected or added definitions, additions or suggestions in regard to the etymology, pronunciation, synonyms, and other features of the dictionary. Stimulated by the wide and strong approval which these works have received, it shall be our aim in the future yet more to deserve that approbation, by availing ourselves of all the helps at our control, to make them yet more complete and perfect. As the article in the *New York World* of June

15th, to which the following is a reply, while evidencing the hand of a scholar, did not yet appear to proceed from one who held the scales of even-handed justice, but was too partizan to render a true verdict, the writer of the reply thought it proper in the same journal to present his own views, as herein embodied. As similar criticisms, more or less modified, have appeared elsewhere, and as the original article replied to was widely circulated, it is thought proper to republish the reply in this form. Dr. Stone, the able editor of the Concord (N. H.) Congregational Journal, says of it, "Of all the articles we have read relating to this controversy, we are constrained to say, this is the most able and instructive. Aside from the party bearing it has, it is most valuable for the general principles of English philology it unfolds and defends. It is written in a courteous and candid spirit, and with the practiced skill of a master."

We commend it to such as take any interest in the question, "What is the best English Dictionary?"

THE PUBLISHERS OF WEBSTER.

SPRINGFIELD, Sept. 1, 1860.

THE TWO DICTIONARIES;

OR

THE REVIEWER REVIEWED.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE WORLD:

IN *The World*, of June 15th, there appears, over the signature of "G. P. M.," a review or critical notice of the two English Dictionaries compiled in this country, and now before the American public—WEBSTER'S and WORCESTER'S. A candid and impartial paper upon such a subject, by a scholar, must be valuable, and would be justly entitled to the attention and confidence of the public.

No work of reference, perhaps, can be more important to a people than a lexicon of the language they employ, and a sensible treatise upon what constitutes a good dictionary, and a discriminating judgment upon the character of existing works of this kind, *should* be a valuable aid to those who need to make a constant use of a lexicon, and yet have neither the time nor the facilities for the necessary investigation as to which dictionary is the best. It would therefore be all the more injurious if it happen that the one who undertakes the task of critic should mislead; more culpable if he did it willfully; the more inexcusable should he do it ignorantly, or under the influence of unfavorable prepossessions. It would be doubly unfortunate for him and for all parties should he bring to his work the judgment and knowledge of a selection as to what a dictionary ought to be, and yet show, in the application of his standard, that he had neither carefully nor fairly examined the dictionaries which he professes to measure by it, but had ventured hasty assertion on the ground of a superficial examination, or the prejudiced statements of interested parties. Has the reviewer in the present case performed his task in a "*candid and impartial*" manner? Has he applied his own *scholarly* tests and standard in a *scholarlike* way?

The reviewer begins by gravely laying down the axiom that "the latest is commonly the best," and that "the imprint settles the point *prima facie*." This is a very summary mode of settling the whole matter, certainly. On this ground the last superficial treatise upon Mathematics, *e. g.* Parker's Quadrature of the Circle, should be consulted rather than the Principia of Newton; the last daub of a picture be preferred to Raphael's master-piece; the last negro melody be chanted rather than Handel's sublimest strains; and a dictionary issued to-morrow supersede both Webster and Worcester.

It is true, that if the compiler of an English dictionary could rightfully appropriate to himself all the labors of previous lexicographers; if he had the skill requisite judiciously to arrange and blend harmoniously together this treasure of materials, the product of generations of labor, and if he had also himself made valuable original additions to the stock of human knowledge in this direction; then truly might "Get the latest," be synonymous with "Get the Best."

But it is to be remembered, in the first place, that by our laws of copyright, one author or publisher may not rightfully appropriate to himself the fruits of the

literary toil of another author, under certain conditions, without remuneration and on an agreed arrangement. Dr. Webster spent from twenty to thirty years of the vigor of his days in the most arduous and unintermitted toil upon this, the great work of his life. Some of the best minds and ripest scholars of his time lent him essential aid—PERCIVAL, TULLY, SILLIMAN, DANA, and others. Worcester himself received two or three thousand dollars for labor in preparing one of the minor works; while the late lamented Dr. GOODRICH and other ripe scholars have added an aggregate of probably *twenty years* of earnest literary labor since. Now, as we have said, all this *half century* of literary toil *can not rightfully* be appropriated by another American author or publisher for a work issued in this country. Does Worcester's dictionary embody the results of Dr. Webster's labor, thus protected by law, or does it not? If it does, it violates vested rights. It would certainly not be surprising if it should be found that it does, even without the intent of the compiler or his assistants; for, as *all* English dictionaries issued in Great Britain since Dr. Webster's work appeared, drew largely (and rightfully there) upon Webster, the matter found thus embodied in *those* works might have been appropriated by some of the persons engaged in aggregating the materials of Worcester. This, however, is a question for the proprietors of Webster's works to care for as they deem proper.

If Worcester's dictionary does *not* thus appropriate Webster's labors, he must, evidently, either have performed those protracted and herculean labors over again himself, or he must have changed, colorably, the *language* of Webster's definitions; and, if they were expressed in the best manner, expressed them less happily; or, finally, the principle that "the latest is the best," is not necessarily true.

Or the case may be thus viewed: In 1847, Worcester's octavo dictionary was published, bearing no comparison with Webster in Etymology, or Definitions, or Illustrative passages—requiring, as G. P. M. knows as well as any scholar, that in these most difficult departments the dictionary should be made anew. In 1850, or, it is believed, a much later period, the work was seriously begun, and has been prosecuted since with more or less intermission, and with more or fewer collaborators. Meanwhile, Dr. GOODRICH and his assistants have bestowed almost constant labor on those additions and improvements which bring WEBSTER in a good degree up to the latest date. The fact that WEBSTER might possibly in this way be as late as the latest, in very important respects, does not seem to have occurred to G. P. M. These additions are scarcely noticed, and obviously have not been examined by him. He simply "believes" that they do not bring the vocabulary up to that of Worcester, and remarks upon the inconvenience of having three dictionaries rolled into one, which shows that scholarly men sometimes jump at conclusions. And yet, in another place, he confidently says that Worcester "contains thousands of words collected from the works of obscure authors, as well as from the rapidly increasing nomenclature of the present day, which will be sought in vain in Webster's pages, or in the additional lists supplied by the editors." Has G. P. M. examined for himself with that minuteness which authorizes him to pronounce a judgment, or does he "believe" upon a hasty, superficial inspection?

But G. P. M. does not seem to feel satisfied that "the imprint *does* settle the point *prima facie*," and that to get the best work upon any subject, you have only to look at the date of the issue; for he proceeds to take up, point by point, the two works, and to institute a comparison between them. His first announcement seems to us to indicate, very decidedly, that it is not the impartial umpire, but the already committed advocate, to whom we are about to listen. Yielding indiscriminate laudation to Worcester at nearly every step, and visiting, as universally, disparagement upon Webster, the *animus* of the paper does not, we confess, strike us favorably. It is not thus that scholarly criticism reaches wise and truthful results. Let us seek to avoid such indiscriminate censure or praise, and, with as much impartiality as we may, follow our reviewer in his points.

In the first place, G. P. M. objects to Dr. WEBSTER that he "aimed at little beyond a dictionary of the language as it is, and as it has been since the time of

Queen Anne," &c. ; i. e. he objects to Dr. W.'s rejection to so great an extent as he does of words purely obsolete. It is true, he acknowledges, Webster thereby "gained space for an increased amount of etymological discussion, and for greater fullness of description." In other words, he prefers the *vocabulary*, or list of words, in Worcester to that in Webster, and he points, with complacent satisfaction, to the "*extent* of vocabulary" in Worcester. That is, as he regarded lateness of date one determining point of excellence, so he regards the *quantity* of words, rather than the *quality* of the list the ground of preference. Either of these, it will at once be seen, is an easily attained measure of value. Let us verify the difference in the two works on this point by citations. Worcester gives, first, of modern words :

Untriumphable, untrowable, untrussed, untuckered, unuplifted, unwappered, unwisdom, unwearable, unvulgarized, unwearable, unquarrelable, unquaker, unruinable, unrenavigable, &c. &c. Cocknefy, cookee, coxcomicality, dandyize, dandyling, incoherentific, imperiwigged, intersomnious, circumbendibus, jiggumbob, solumnigate, fiddlefaddler, grammatication, sapientize, wegotism, weism, somniative, perfectionation, sententiousity, maximize, scrimption, solivagous, dirt-pie, pish-pash, fiddle-de-dee, slip-slop, slubberdegullion, scalawag, transmogrification, &c., &c., &c.

Second, obsolete words : on page 487, are,

Ennead, ennew, enode, enorm, enpierce, enrace, enrange, enrapt, enrheum, enring, enripen, enrive.

Thirteen obsolete ; sixty-four in all—one-fifth obsolete, and one-tenth of all the words in the vocabulary are marked obsolete.*

While it might not be thought a very serious defect, in a popular dictionary, that it omitted *most* of the words in either of these two classes, yet Webster, as some compensation, gives hundreds, if not thousands, of living, current words, in his recent illustrated edition, *not found in Worcester at all*. The following are of this character, thirty-six in number, found on a single page, 1283.

Aaron's rod, abasier, *abandon*, abangga, abeam, abligurition, abolitionize, abortient, aboutsledge, absinthe, absolutistic, absorbent, absorptivity, abstainer, Acadia, Acadian, acantho, acanthoporous, accelerator, account-current, acephalocyst, acetabuliferous, acetabuliform, acinaces, acclinic, a-cock-bill, actino-chemistry, actinoid, actinometric, actinophorous, action-sermon, acton, actualization, aculeolate, acutifohate, acutilobate.

On the following page, 1284, are *fifty-two* words of a like character, none of which are to be found in Worcester.

We respectfully submit to the judgment of those who want a popular dictionary of the language, for constant, current use, whether professed scholars or otherwise, if it is not better, if the alternative is to have but one, to have the living, current words of Webster's vocabulary, as exemplified above, securing, also, "greater fullness of definition," and other advantages, rather than the purely obsolete, and objectionable or unnecessary modern words in Worcester.

But G. P. M. does great injustice to WEBSTER in leaving the impression that it is materially deficient as a dictionary of the earlier literature, and that he limited himself to a period which begins with Queen Anne. If he had founded his opinion on the examination of Webster, instead of an opinion casually expressed by Webster in his remarks on Johnson, as to the comparative value of *quotations* from earlier and later writers, he would not, we think, have ventured so broad and sweeping an assertion. The first column, or third of a page, in Webster, at which we casually opened, refers, in more than twenty instances, to authors earlier than Queen Anne. Surely, it were better to examine the application of one's principles than to go off into cheap, and now second-hand, laudations of the elder writers ; and into stereotyped common places in disparagement of the age of Queen Anne. We concede that WEBSTER is not complete in giving the rarer words and the special uses of the earlier writers ; but G. P. M. has been conspicuously unjust to him in this particular, while the assertion for Worcester of a satisfactory elaboration of the earlier English is quite excessive praise.

It is a mistake, too, if, speaking of the large list of words in Worcester, the impression is sought to be given that it contains *more matter*. On the contrary,

* 10,213 being thus marked in the volume.

Webster, at a less price, contains *one-sixth* more matter within its covers than Worcester.*

The *second* point raised by the reviewer is the comparative merit of the two authors as "derivative etymologists." That there are now greatly increased facilities for tracing the words composing the English language up to their respective sources, beyond what existed when Dr. WEBSTER performed his task; and that now, after the lapse of some years, his work is susceptible of great improvement in this department, is, of course, at once conceded. On the other hand, as remote as possible from just is the contemptuous assertion of the reviewer, that "no man of linguistic learning would now cite Webster as an authority upon any etymological question." Whence comes this sweeping assertion? What spirit is that which prompts this indecent treatment of a man who certainly, in this department, has been held in some—nay, high estimation, by American and European scholars of probably equal ability with this writer? Is it true, as G. P. M. seems to assume, that Webster knew almost literally nothing upon a subject to which he devoted years of investigation? Within the past ten or twelve years, GEORGE BANCROFT, with certainly some little reputation for scholarship, wrote that "the *etymological* part of his dictionary surpasses what had been done for the English language by earlier laborers in the same field."

The North American Review, within the same period, said, "On this ground (etymology) Webster stands not only unrivaled, but alone."

Dr. OGILVIE, the editor of *The London Imperial Dictionary*, so late as 1849, in his preface to that work, says, "Webster spent thirty years of labor upon his dictionary; of these no fewer than ten were devoted to the etymological department alone, *which for accuracy and completeness is unequalled*." It were easy to multiply expressions of the like character from sources entitled to confidence and respect. Have the ten or twelve years which have elapsed since these utterances made Webster's labors wholly valueless?

If we follow G. P. M. into the detail of his charges against Webster on this head, we shall find it made up of certain wholesale assertions which are excessive and indiscriminating in every direction. To assert that Webster's etymologies are useless where they are correct, because the etymologies are too obvious to be needed, is to do gross injustice to the value of the researches to which even recent scholars have always borne testimony, and scholars too who know as much of the appliances and achievements of the new philology as G. P. M. To the ingenuity of many of his suggestions, and the reach of his inductions, we have had the attestation of those who were at home in all the results of the newest school. That he was occasionally fantastical and pedantic, and led entirely astray by some phantom of oriental and Ethiopic analogies, is no news to scholars; in like manner as Mr. HENSLEIGH WEDGEWOOD is sometimes somewhat pedantic and one-sided in his speculations. But to argue because Mr. WEDGEWOOD gives long disquisitions in etymology, and Mr. WEBSTER takes up more space than is desirable in stating the reasons of his opinions, that therefore parallel and fully developed historical etymologies ought not to be introduced, and give no value to an English dictionary, is to argue strangely for a scholar. We apprehend that the interest awakened in the study of etymologies by the writings of TRENCH, SWIN-
TON, and others, will require that this subject should be fully treated in any hand English dictionary, as we believe that the etymologies of WEBSTER, deficient and erroneous as some of them are, are better fitted to awaken and reward a zeal in this direction than those of any other dictionary.

It happens that we have at hand the deliberate judgment of a European scholar, who has given several years to etymological researches, and had lately fallen in with Worcester's dictionary. It was sent unsolicited to a literary friend, and is quite pertinent here. He writes thus:

* WORDS IN THE DICTIONARIES.—Some one curious in such matter, in order to determine the claims put forth by the publishers of Worcester, has had the words in the vocabularies of the two counted, and the ems in each measured, with the following result: The vocabulary proper of Webster contains 99,780 words, the appendices 40,276, making a total of 140,056; that of Worcester, 103,855, the appendices, 28,551; total, 132,406, making 7,650 more in Webster than in Worcester. The number of ems in Webster is 14,747,352; in Worcester, 13,273,532, leaving a balance of 1,473,820 ems of printed matter in favor of Webster.

New York Evening Post.

"I have had this work [the dictionary of Mr. Worcester] upon my table for some days past. * * * In etymology, there is not the least progress to be perceived; it occupies altogether the stand-point of Skinner, Junius, Johnson, Richardson, Horne Tooke, and others. Nay, it is often inferior to any of these, since from its absolute dependence upon them, and its own lack of originality and self-dependence, it frequently makes inapt citations from them. In fact it has not the smallest appreciation of the necessities and demands of the present day. Hence the book swarms with the most glaring and offensive errors. Nearly every article discovers more or less of incorrectness, misapprehension, or inaptitude. Everything is based, not upon principle and order, but upon mere sound, and outward, yet often quite remote, resemblance, and so heterogeneously mixed up, the cognate with the unrelated, the near with the distant, that even when the derivation is in a measure correct, neither sequence nor sound render the fact apparent to one unlearned in such matters. How can such an one, for instance, comprehend that the English *growse* is derived from the Anglo-Saxon *agrisan*, a word of, at best, but remote affinity with it, and when, too, no mention is made of the nearer German word *grausen*? When a number of cognate words are cited by Worcester, their order is usually inverted. That which comes after should have been placed before, and *vice versa*; so, too, he omits or inserts on a mere whim. Does a word, for instance, occur in Spanish and Italian both, he will cite the Spanish only, or the Italian only, giving no reason for his choice. He has Spanish *gratulation*, but not Italian *gratulatione*; Spanish *gratulatorio*, but not the Italian form. Nor are there wanting serious errors with regard to the orthoepey of primitives; for instance, Spanish *gravidad* instead of *gravedad*, an error, by the way, into which an unskilled person would naturally fall. Has he accidentally hit upon the right derivation, he obscures it by so much that is incorrect, that the unlearned can not get at the truth. For instance, under *grasp*, he seems to have correctly judged it folly, with Johnson and Webster, to derive the word from a *nowhere existing* Italian form, *graspere*; by some happy guess he has pronounced it a possible inversion of the Low Dutch word familiar to German scholars, viz.: *grapsen*. But what does he now do? Instead of patting this word foremost, he gives the first place, with utter inappropriateness, to the Italian *grappare*, a word itself derived, as is *grapsen*, from the same old German word *grappen*, which is as if a son of the same father could have begotten his brother. Every one must now at once perceive that *grasp* is not a mere Italian word, but that it can be of German origin only; and every one, in view of Worcester's derivation, will be disposed to ask with amazement, "Whence comes the *s* in *grasp*? May a person, without authority, and at his own pleasure, either insert or reject an *s*? We have now seen Worcester's error in the word before *grapsen*; what does he give after it? The German *greisen*. Here is a twofold error, one of orthoepey, and the other of signification. (1) *greisen* is a mistake, or, possibly, a misprint for *greifen*; and (2) *greifen*, English, *gripe*, is entirely unconnected with *grapsen*, *grappare*, and *grasp*; *greifen*, English, *gripe*, Gothic, *greipen*, Slavonic, *grabiti*, is a root verb; while *grappen* is from *gerappen*, from the Low Dutch *roppen*, High German *rapen*, to snatch away. Is not this utter ignorance of etymological principles?

"Thousands upon thousands of similar instances might be pointed out. Everything is in confusion, as at the tower of Babel. What, for instance, has the Italian *grigio*, French *gris*, from old Saxon and old High German *gres*, *carus*, new High German *greis*, to do with English *gray*, Anglo Saxon *grag*, German *gran*? Both begin with the same letters, *gr*, and that is all, while their fundamental vowels and terminal sounds are wholly diverse. Thus is proved true the saying of Wieland, that etymology, in the hand of a sage, is a revealer of weighty matters, but in the hand of a fool, is changed to corruption and folly.

"The word *grease* both Johnson and Webster have correctly derived from the French *graisse*, as evidently would appear on the first glance. Worcester does the same, but he puts *graisse* in the second place, giving the first place to a Greek word, *grisis*, ointment, (which is a twofold error,) and following with the Gael, *creis*, which itself came originally from the English word in question. But what, I ask, has *grisis* (so written by him by way of assimilation, or with direct intent to deceive, for *chrisis*, from *chrío*, I anoint.) to do with the English *grease*, French *graisse*, from *gros*, fat, through Latin *crassus*? And so in innumerable instances. But, again, there are many words for which he makes no attempt to give the etymology, and that for the very good reason that none but the most thorough-going etymologists are competent to detect and trace back their descent. Such words are, *to gore*, *grebe*, &c."

The reviewer's *third* point is "the form and orthography of words." Hear the *dictum* of the reviewer: "It is emphatically the office of a dictionary to tell us what the language *is*, not what it *ought to be*; just as it is the duty of a guide to conduct the traveler along the public highway, and not, though perhaps by a straight line, through the swamps or over the hills, where *he* thinks the engineer should have laid it." Our proposition is, that is the province of the lexicographer to tell us what the language is, and to indicate where, in his opinion, an obvious, legitimate, and practical improvement, perhaps already begun, may be carried out. In other words, we would not have the traveler always continue to walk a mile in order to gain a half mile, when an experienced engineer can with little difficulty conduct him to his journey's end by a shorter route. Let him leave the old road open, by all means, to those who from habit choose still to

walk over it, but let these not complain of such as prefer to spend the time gained by the shorter route in resting at the inn, or farther prosecuting the journey. Or, dropping the figure, is it the province of the lexicographer blindly to *follow*, or judiciously to *guide* public usage? Here, we take it, is the precise point of difference between Webster and Worcester in this particular, that which makes Worcester shifting and unreliable, and Webster principled, consistent, and a helper in the acquisition of language. Let us test what Webster has done for the language in this respect. Before us lies a dictionary published in Boston in 1827, the year before Webster's large work appeared. Its American editor is JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, whose name is appended to the preface, which bears date, *Cambridge, Nov., 1827*. It is Todd's Johnson. It, of course, from Dr. WORCESTER's principle, and also from well-known cotemporaneous usage, presents the orthography then employed. On two consecutive small octavo pages (pp. 92, 93) appear the following *twenty* words, thus spelled:

Antaphroditick.	Antick, <i>a.</i>
Antapoplectick.	Antick, <i>n. s.</i>
Antarctick.	To Antick, <i>v. a.</i>
Antarthritick.	Antickly.
Antasthmatick.	Anticosmetick.
Anthypnotick.	Antifanatick.
Anthypocondriack.	Antihysterick.
Anthysterick.	Antinephritick.
Antiarthriticks.	Antiparalytick.
Anticachectick.	Antipathetick.

Here are twenty words of *one* class spelled with a final *k*. (There are others, on the same pages, of other classes, as *Anteriour*.) Dr. WEBSTER, in his work, published the following year, rejected the final *k* from every one. Worcester, and *universal English and American usage now do the same*. Who secured this great reform, which Worcester, on his own avowed principle, would never have attempted? and this extending to scores and hundreds of cases in words of a single class? Who secured the rejection of the *u* from *superiour*, *favour*, &c., now almost equally universal? The man whose labors G. P. M. derisively speaks of as "orthographical novelties, or rather innovations," as "arbitrary violations of established usage"—which "usage," by the way, is rarely the same, even by the same writer, who rejects his guidance. On some of these points, the reviewer reluctantly concedes that "the practice of the United States is almost uniformly in accordance with Webster and Worcester," (the latter adopting WEBSTER.) As "usage" has now so generally settled upon Webster's system, we may safely, even on the reviewer's rule, leave the public to carry forward what it has already so generally sanctioned. Only, we think, it had been more graceful if the reviewer, even reluctantly, had accorded to him some small praise for his secured improvements.

We can well understand why the public taste should have been offended by some of the innovations proposed by WEBSTER in his edition of 1828—innovations no greater than those adopted by MILTON, LONDON, HARE, and WHEWELL; but that sensible men who are familiar with the history of English orthography, or with its known unsettled condition in England, or who see evidence of the freedom allowed and taken by German writers, should lend themselves to the indiscriminating outcry against the orthography given in the revised edition of 1847, has to us seemed one of the wonders above wonders. That small *litterateurs*, amateurs, affected with a desire to secure an *Anglican* preciseness that should be more precise than the English themselves practice, should set up a small capital in literary taste and knowledge by zeal in this direction, and should undertake to do a small business upon it, in a literary way, is quite easy to understand. But that grave and scholarly critics should lend themselves to blow the fires of a controversy so small as the orthographical controversy is not easy to explain. Is the Professor at the Breakfast table right when he says that the battle of the dictionaries is fought on other grounds than honest differences of literary opinion—that it represents rivalries of cities and institutions, and systems of opinion and hostile prejudices?

At the *risque* of forcing words out of their *logical connexion*, we might occasion some *surprise* to our readers by *showing* the spelling of fifty years since; but it might not be thought *honourable* thus to bias the *superiour judgement* of the Boston *centinels*, the *partizans* of purity against the *gulph* of Webster's corruptions.

For the benefit of the sapient Boston editor, who congratulated his readers at the publication of Worcester's dictionary, "now we shall have the language spelled as Skakespeare spelled it," we copy the following inscription on Shakespeare's monument:

Stay passenger, why goest thou by so fast?
Read if thou canst whom envious death hath plast
Within this monument Shakspeare: with whome
Quick nature dide; whose name doth deck ye tombe
Far more than cost, scith all that he hath writt
Leaves living art but page to serve his witt.

We add also the well-known inscription in the original orthography:

Good frend for Jesus' sake forbear
To digg the dust enclosed here.
Blest be ye man yt spares these stones
And eurst be he yt moves my bones.

The public, in general, are tired of the dispute. The whole difference between Worcester and the new Webster, involves not more than fifty words, if we except some seventy like *traveler*, which are spelt with a single *l* by Webster, as recommended by Bishop Lowth. This change has been very extensively adopted in this country, and we wonder that Dr. Worcester has failed to recognize the fact.

The *fourth* point, *pronunciation*, our reviewer dispatches in a paragraph or two, evidently having given little attention to the subject, but seeming to derive his opinion from the one-sided and oft-reiterated statements of the publishers of Worcester. Yet, of course, as bound to make the "latest the best," he must accord the preference to Worcester. He only cites two points, complaining that Webster does not discriminate between the sound of *a* in *fate* and *fare*, where a difference does exist; "and, on the other hand, in *book* and *wolf*, discriminates between sounds which are identical, except as they are casually differenced by the consonant following." Now, in the first place, Webster's *school* dictionaries give *fate* and *care* as modifications of the same sound; while, in the introduction to his large work, Webster gives the very principle mentioned by G. P. M. as applicable here—a modification of the sound by the consonant following, (p. lxxx.) Worcester, in his octavo dictionary, gives the same rule. This is all that SMART and leading English orthœpists deem necessary. The precise difference between Webster and Worcester, as to pronunciation, we take to be this: Webster declares that "in no case can the true pronunciation of the words in a language be accurately and *completely* (*i. e.*, in all instances) expressed on paper; it can be taught only by the ear and by practice. No attempt has ever been made to mark the pronunciation of all the sounds in any other language, and in our language it is worse than useless." Hence he avoids the error of attempting too much. We have the testimony of some of the most eminent living orthœpists, who have had long experience in teaching articulation and pronunciation, to the fact, that the figured key adopted in Webster's school dictionaries, and in the appendix to the quarto, indicates the *nuances* of sound so far as it is safe or wise or even possible to do it by any such notation. Worcester seeks to go farther into this field, and thereby leads his follower astray. He teaches thus positive error. Take, for example, the words *frank*, *lank*, etc.; these he re-spells *frangk*, *langk*, etc., striving to indicate this nasal sound by re-spelling. Let any one try these words, by pronouncing, for example, *frang* in the first place, and then adding the sound of *k*. Does he get the true sound? Does anybody ever so pronounce these words? Is not this an attempt to perpetuate what Webster justly calls "the odious vulgarisms" of Walker? So of other cases.

But, in the second place, Webster does *not* "in *book* and *wolf* discriminate between sounds which are identical," but *by* an appropriate, distinct notation for each, recognizes their identity of sound—*i. e.*, double *o* in *book* has the same sound

as the single *o* in *wolf*—thus avoiding the very gross error of Worcester, who gives the broad *ô*, and *move* in his key as the example, and marks both the *o*'s in *cool* with the same mark; so doubling the vowel sound—thus, *coo-ool*, *too-ool*, &c. This gross error is repeated *seventeen* times in a single column, page 311. So, he gives long *e*, as in *mete*, and then, where the vowel is doubled, makes both *e*'s long, as *meet*—or *mee-eet*, *fee-eed*; &c. These errors are repeated *hundreds of times* through the volume. (See twenty-seven instances on page 894.) The English orthœpists, as Smart, &c., fall into no such error. Smart places one breve over *both* the vowels in *good*, &c., one horizontal mark over both *o*'s in *cool*, and re-spells *meek*, *meke*. Thus, our reviewer justifies the egregious error of Worcester, against Smart and other English orthœpists, and censures Webster, who avoids this very error.

Fifthly, "The matter of *definitions*."—The reviewer concedes that "with a certain class of exceptions, his [Webster's] definitions are superior to those of his predecessors, and in the case of words which have one or more distinct, independent significations, they are frequently *as good as can well be given*." Here, at last, something is conceded. In the first place, if Webster's "definitions are superior to those of his predecessors," to establish Worcester's claim to superiority, it must be contended that in the power of giving a clear and truthful definition of a word, he excels Johnson, Richardson, Walker, and *all* earlier English lexicographers. Yet, it must be remembered, this is essentially an old field—the same words and the same meanings, to a very great extent, are to be given. Worcester has long been before the public as a lexicographer. His octavo and other dictionaries had been issued—certainly some of them—when Webster's superior excellence as a definer was conceded by the English and American public so generally. Has Worcester changed his characteristics in this respect? Then, if, as G. P. M. concedes, Webster's "definitions are frequently as good as can be given"—expressed in the very best way—must not a change of phraseology be for the worse? or, retaining essentially the phraseology, violate copyright? The truth we take to be this: in some few lists of words, as those defined by some of his collaborators, lucid and valuable definitions are given. In those defined by Worcester himself, or taken from his other works, the old peculiarity prevails—defining by synonymous words; while Webster gives a full, descriptive meaning. Any page of the two works will furnish abundant instances. Take the one which has been cited, the first definition of faith.

WEBSTER.

FAITH. 1. Belief; the assent of the mind to the truth of what is declared by another, resting on his authority and veracity, without other evidence; the judgment that what another states or testifies is the truth. I have strong *faith*, or no *faith* in the testimony of a witness, or in what a historian narrates.

WORCESTER.

FAITH. 1. Fidelity; faithfulness; truthfulness; truth; constancy. "The faith of God." *Romans*, iii. 3.

The general voice of the public is determining, it seems to us, with unmistakable expression, that its old guide in definitions has not at all been superseded, but that, as Horace Mann said, "There is a general unanimity of opinion that Webster's is the best defining dictionary of the language." The two works must be themselves compared, in detail, to reach an intelligent conclusion on this point, but the definitions of *faith* given above seem truthfully to present the distinguishing characteristics of each. Here, truly, as G. P. M. says, the friends of Webster "are undoubtedly right in regarding this as his strongest point"—for it is *the* point of all others of paramount importance. It may safely be said that where one person consults an English dictionary to learn the orthography, pronunciation, or etymology, of a word, twenty refer to it for a definition. Dr. Webster's clear and acute mind, his protracted etymological investigations, and his long experience, alike combined to qualify him for his task as a *definer*.

G. P. M. does indeed attempt to qualify the praise which he gives to the definitions of Webster, by endeavoring to show that he goes too far in discriminating the meaning of words, and often gives as a distinct signification that which it can only have in connection with the sentence or phrase in which it occurs. We

grant that Webster erred in this way, as Johnson did to a far greater extent. But this does not detract from the incomparable superiority of his definitions as a whole. The learned and somewhat obscure disquisition of the critic, which would leave the impression that it is not possible to discriminate a great variety of senses in the great majority of words in a language, is decisively refuted by what has been attained in some of the best dictionaries of well-known languages, living and dead. To pass off Worcester as in any sense comparable to Webster, except in the case of a few classes of words, by such rather rambling and pointless disquisitions, is quite impertinent to the matter in hand, and will not be accepted by those who form well-grounded opinions. Worcester's definitions, even when correct and full, are lacking in that freshness and life which a vigorous, sharp, and comprehensive understanding can give—which no merely honest painstaking can ever impart. It gives us no pleasure to dwell upon Worcester's defects as a definer; but his defects of accuracy, where an independent judgment ought to have suggested corrections; his defects of oversight, which a quicker understanding would not have failed to detect; his defects of self-reliance, which have led him to copy faults and to lean on inferior authorities, and the general mediocrity of attainment, (with occasional brilliant exceptions,) must be obvious to all critical judges, and compel the unanimous judgment of candid and competent men that, considering all the materials at the editor's command, and the increased facilities for using them, the product falls far below what the public had a right to expect, and is marked by respectable mediocrity, in which neither philosophical discrimination nor sagacious accuracy are conspicuous.

There are yet two more points to which the reviewer hardly adverts, the *synonyms* and the *pictorial illustrations*. Are we to infer from this that he concedes the superiority of Webster in these particulars? These are each, it is believed, of very considerable importance, if of less magnitude than the others.

As to the *synonyms*, Professor GIBBS, as good authority on such a matter as the country affords, after enumerating CRABB, GRAHAM, PLATT, TAYLOR, WORCESTER, &c., declares those in Webster, "The best on the subject." Professor Goodrich here aims to give the leading distinctions as being founded in etymology, and as being those which are more fully ascertained. We cite a single example:

Worcester.

ABOLISH.

SYN.—We *abolish* a custom, or institution; *annul* or *disannul* a contract; *abrogate* a law; *revoke* an edict; *repeal* a statute; *cancel* an obligation or debt; we *efface* in order to mend; we *obliterate* to forget; we *abolish* to destroy.

Webster.

TO ABOLISH, REPEAL, ABROGATE, REVOKE, ANNUL, NULLIFY.

These words have in common the idea of setting aside by some overruling act.

Abolish applies particularly to things of a permanent nature, such as institutions, usages, customs, &c.; as, to *abolish* monopolies, serfdom, slavery, &c.—*Repeal* describes the act by which the legislature of a state sets aside a law which it had previously enacted.—*Abrogate* (from *ab* and *rogo*, to call back,) was originally applied to the repeal of a law by the Roman people; and hence, when the power of making laws was usurped by the emperors, the term was applied to *their* act of setting aside the laws. Thus it came to express that act by which a sovereign or an executive government sets aside laws, ordinances, regulations, treaties, conventions, &c. *Revoke* (from *revoco*, to call back,) denotes the act of recalling some previous grant which conferred power, privilege, &c.; as, to *revoke* a decree, to *revoke* a power of attorney, &c. Thus, also, we speak of the *revocation* of the Edict of Nantes.—*Annul* is used in a more general sense, denoting simply to make void; as to *annul* a contract, to *annul* an agreement, &c.—*Nullify* (from *nullus* and *fio*, to make of no effect,) is an old word recently revived in this country, and applied to the setting of things aside either by force or by total disregard; as, to *nullify* an act of Congress.

We think the following estimate of Worcester, as compared with Webster, to be far more candid and just than that offered by G. P. M.

The present edition of Worcester will, at once, be recognized as an *expansion* of the well-known octavo edition of 1847. It retains the same peculiarities in some respects with but little change. Its *vocabulary* is greatly enlarged, and it claims to be greater than that of any other dictionary. It is obvious that much effort has been made to increase it, and sometimes terms are inserted which scarcely deserve to be called *words*, unless the name be applied to technical terms so rarely used and so entirely self-explained that they need not be given, or to terms of literature and life, so uncouth and fantastic that they ought not to be so much as named. To admit such words, however, is the fault of all dictionary makers, to which, we suppose, their publishers prompt them against their own better judgment. We believe that Worcester and the new Webster have, on the whole, very few important omissions in their vocabularies.

In respect to *orthography*, Worcester is true to himself, and those who think that he is in the right, and that the dispute upon this subject is of consequence, will think so still.

In respect to *pronunciation*, Dr. Worcester has retained his full conspectus of the history of the various modes ever used by any respectable orthœpist, and has given the authority for each. His own taste and judgment may be safely trusted as a guide in the preference which he indicates, and will be generally followed, as it represents the actual usage of cultivated men. It is very rare that, in this respect, there is any important difference between Worcester and Webster.

In *etymology*, the improvement of Worcester is very considerable upon his octavo edition. Richardson, and the authorities on whom Richardson relied, have generally furnished the materials, while Dieffenbach and Diez have been now and then consulted. The rich stores which the modern researches into comparative philology have placed at the command of one competent to use them, have not been wrought. No more decisive token of imperfection here can be named, than the neglect to give the *historical* order of the kindred and con-radical words in other languages, so that the various changes can be distinctly traced backward to the earliest and simplest form, or forward from the root through its various changes and accretions. Without this, etymological researches and conclusions are mere literary pedantry and patch-work. Webster was an original worker, and though he began and left off too early to avail himself of the principles and apparatus which comparative philology would have furnished, and though he was occasionally misled into fantastic and oriental guesses, yet his etymologies are of much value, and the form in which they are presented is, of itself, a stimulus to this kind of research.

The *definitions* of Worcester are greatly improved, as compared with his former edition. They are given in short propositions to a greater extent, which is the only form in which a real definition can satisfy the mind. But we are still sorry to see so great a prevalence of mere synonyms in his definitions, and to observe that strings of words are often loosely attached to his more extended definitions. In this respect Worcester is much more loose and vague than Webster, who errs quite too often in this way. The historical order in the development of meanings is not carefully followed, though in this particular Webster is also much at fault. The attempt has been made to give fewer classes of meanings than Webster, and to give them in briefer sentences, but there is not infrequently a marked defect of discrimination in thought and precision of language. Occasionally, on the other hand, we are surprised at a very happy elucidation of a meaning, which shows the fine discrimination and the skillful touch of a master. The illustrative quotations are well chosen, being taken chiefly from the common *fond* of dictionary-makers, Johnson and Richardson; but being taken at second-hand, are sometimes singularly misused. The various technical and special meanings are exceedingly full, but are often incorrect or defective through the want of critical judgment in the editor. With the amplest allowance for these single points and cases of superiority, Worcester and his coadjutors have yet by no means equaled Webster as a definer. It would take many years of research and independent judgment to

do this. The *synonyms* of Worcester are by no means equal to those of Goodrich, in the Pictorial Webster, which are the fruit of much thinking, and show a real and well-grounded discrimination. As to the cuts, those who care for them will prefer those of Webster.

To sum up: In the *vocabulary* there is not much to choose. In *pronunciation* and *orthography*, not stuff enough to make an argument. In *etymology*, Webster is an original, with the errors of his time, but still instructive and inspiring, often sagacious, and always full. Worcester is meager, unscholarlike, and of little worth, and altogether behind the means at command. In *definitions*, Webster maintains his unquestioned supremacy, as also in the *synonyms* and *pictorial illustrations*.

In some respects, Worcester and Webster supplement each other, and every literary man who can, will choose to have the two.

In conclusion, while we have felt constrained to animadvert upon the course taken by the reviewer in question, and have felt great surprise that an American scholar should so entirely, and with partially-judging censure, disparage an author like Webster, who has done something to give American scholarship honor abroad, we do not feel it necessary to deny to Dr. Worcester the merit due to him. That merit, so far as he is personally concerned, we think we do him no injustice in saying is mainly that of a compiler. Not entering, or professing to enter very much, the field of original research, he diligently aggregates the product of others' toil. It is a useful, if unpretending, task. Yet, evidently, it does not add very much to the sum of human knowledge directly. The gentlemen associated with him, however competent any of them may have been, have evidently not devoted time enough to these duties to produce very widely extended or exhaustive results.

EQUAL JUSTICE.

THE DICTIONARIES.

It is universally conceded by the leading booksellers, that no large work has ever had so extensive a sale in this country as Webster's Quarto Dictionary.

Since the addition of the elegant illustrations, synonyms, and other new features, the regular sales of the work have been forty per cent. greater up to this date, (August 10, 1860,) than at any previous period.

The testimony of large jobbing houses, as well as of retailers, corroborates the statement of the publishers of Webster, as to the immense *present sale* of their Quarto, as compared with that of the work which claims to be a rival.

One Boston bookseller has sold *one hundred and nineteen* copies of Webster's Pictorial, and only *two* copies of Worcester, and states that "it is all that have been called for."

The most extensive jobbing house in the book-trade, in the city of Boston, has sold *thirteen hundred and one* copies of Webster's Pictorial, and *two hundred and twenty-nine* of Worcester's since the books were published. In other cities the proportion in favor of Webster is much larger, as the Trade well know, and as the following statements show.

One firm in Philadelphia has sold several thousand copies, and has publicly stated that their sales of the various editions of Webster amount in the aggregate to more than *one hundred thousand* copies per annum.

"Our sales of Webster in comparison with Worcester, are in the proportion of about *ten to one*."
E. H. BUTLER & CO.

Philadelphia, Aug. 16, 1860.

"We have sold, since 1st of January *fifty* copies of "Worcester's Quarto Dictionary," and *two hundred and six* of "Webster's Pictorial Unabridged." It may be mentioned, however, that the sales of Worcester's book were *all* made within a few weeks after publication; but after the first impulse, there was a sudden decline, and we have now *little or no demand* for it, while Webster is in steady request, and if anything, sales increasing."

New York, Aug. 16, 1860.

IVISON, PHINNEY & CO.

"We have sold, wholesale and retail, *two hundred* copies of Worcester's Quarto Dictionary, and *six hundred and eighty-six* of Webster's Pictorial."

New York, Aug. 16, 1860.

D. APPLETON & CO.

"We have sold more than *one hundred* copies of Webster's Pictorial Dictionary, and *two or three* copies only of Worcester's."

Portland, Aug. 13, 1860.

SANBORN & CARTER.

We have sold *six hundred and thirty-three* copies of Webster's Pictorial Dictionary, and *forty* copies of Worcester's.

New York, Aug. 17, 1860.

PRATT, OAKLEY & CO.

Since the publication of Worcester's Dictionary, quarto, (Feb. 24, 1860,) we have sold *four* Webster's Quarto to one of Worcester's.

New York, Aug. 17, 1860.

COLLINS & BROTHER.

We have sold *four hundred and sixty-two* copies of Webster's Pictorial Dictionary since its appearance, and *twelve* copies of Worcester's.

New York, Aug. 17, 1860.

CLARK, AUSTIN, MAYNARD & CO.

We have sold *three hundred and sixty-six* copies of Webster's Pictorial Dictionary, and only *ten* copies of Worcester.

Chicago, Aug. 16, 1860.

S. C. GRIGGS & CO.

We have sold *eight hundred and thirteen* copies of Webster's Pictorial Dictionary, and *one hundred and ten* copies of Worcester's.

New York, Aug. 17, 1860.

A. S. BARNES & BURR.

We have sold *three hundred and seventy-two* copies of Webster's Pictorial Dictionary, and *eight* copies of Worcester's.

Cincinnati, Aug. 23, 1860.

APPLEGATE & CO.

